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The purpose of this thesis is to establish the trends and constants of U.S. riverine 
warfare tactics in past and present unconventional conflicts.  It excludes U.S. riverine warfare 
campaigns that were fought against a conventional opponent, or, more specifically, an 
opponent who practiced warfare in accordance with the orthodox principles espoused by 
Clausewitz and Jomini. Riverine warfare is defined as a special form of combat that blends 
military and naval forces into a joint riverine force that fights along the inland waterways, 
referred to as a riverine area.  The riverine force can pursue two objectives: (1) to gain and 
maintain control of the waterways and contiguous land, and (2) to exploit the use of 
waterways for offensive assault operations.  A riverine force uses a combination of specific 
tactics to obtain these objectives. 
The relevance of studying tactics is drawn from Captain Wayne P. Hughes' study, 
Fleet Tactics.  Tactics are defined as the handling of forces in combat; acts of deployment, 
maneuver, and application of force.  Hughes suggests that the study of strategy is hollow 
without recognizing that tactics and strategy are interconnected. Tactics constrain the 
implementation of a strategy, since they provide the means to achieve the desired ends. 
Hughes presents a theory that uses military history to link the tactical and technological trends 
of the past to discern the future form of warfare.  This thesis applies Hughes theory to 
examine the tactics of two past and one ongoing riverine warfare campaign in three 
unconventional conflicts: The Second Seminole Indian War (1835-42), the Vietnam War 
(1965-72), and the Colombian Drug War (1989-present).  The cases provide a means to link 
the tactical trends of riverine warfare from which the authors suggest two primary 
implications. 
The first is that U.S. riverine forces have relied on two strategies to gain complete 
area control of a riverine environment: (1) search and destroy, which relies on the tactics of 
raids to demoralize an opponent, and (2) clear and hold, which pursues tactics that establish 
strongpoints along vital waterways in a riverine area.  The thesis suggests that although 
complete area control has never been achieved against a guerrilla opponent, clear and hold 
strategies have been more effective in establishing partial control. 
xv 
The second implication is that the United States has consistently pursued search and 
destroy strategies in the first few years of each conflict studied in an attempt to win complete 
control of the riverine area.  However, tactics employed to execute search and destroy 
strategies have failed to establish any form of lasting control, especially when fighting an 
opponent who practices guerrilla warfare within a riverine area. 
The thesis concludes with a suggestions of how to improve the United States riverine 
warfare capabilities.  Primarily, it recommends that the United States maintain a standing 
riverine force trained and imbued with tactics that support clear and hold strategies in 
unconventional conflicts.  These strategies are more conducive for the employment of riverine 
forces in future conflicts.  These forces must have the necessary tools to wage effective and 
efficient riverine warfare.  Time may not be available to regenerate a tactical proficiency for 
an uncertain future requirement.   A failure to appreciate the lessons learned from past 
ruthless riverine conflicts against the guerrilla will condemn the United States to sustain the 
Stygian Myth:  gaining absolute control of a riverine area with a small force without 
resorting to total war. 
xvx 
I.  INTRODUCTION:   RIVERINE WARFARE 
STYGIAN:   Of or pertaining to the river Styx; hence, hellish; infernal; 
gloomy; deathly; also inviolable, as an oath sworn by the river Styx.1 
STYX:  Greek Mythology: the principal river of the under world. 
. . .it can be seen that a struggle for the command of a great inland 
waterway is always likely to lead to operations of an abnormal kind, and 
is certain to test the skill and resource of the opposing commanders to no 
small extent. The essence of such operations lies in the judicious 
application of amphibious force and the cooperation of troops on the banks 
with vessels in the channel. Farragut's bold advance after the capture of 
Vicksburg was carried out almost entirely without the support of land 
detachments: it partook therefore of the character of a raid, and its 
influence over the course of the campaign was in consequence not of a 
decisive kind. The move down the river from Cairo, on the other hand, 
was carried out by a flotilla and an army acting in concert. The force on 
land and the force on the water moved hand in hand, extending their 
influence and their control southward. What these won from the enemy, 
they kept? 
This thesis examines the application of U.S. riverine warfare tactics to past and 
present unconventional conflicts. Tactical trends and constants of riverine warfare can 
be identified to determine a riverine capability for unconventional conflicts. More 
importantly, the study will provide implications for a present and future riverine capability 
'William Allan Neilson, Ed in Chief, Webster's New International Dictionary of the English 
Language, 2d Edition (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Company, Publishers, 1959), p. 2505. 
2Ibid, p. 2506. 
'Colonel C. E. Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their Relationship and 
Interdependence (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1905), p. 412.  Callwell devoted an entire 
chapter to the "command of the inland waters and waterways, and its influence upon military 
operations." Italics added for emphasis by authors. 
to meet future contingencies.   This chapter presents the theory, concepts, definition of 
terms, scope, methodology, and organization of the study. 
Chapter I contains the theory, concepts, terminology, scope, and methodology of 
the study. Chapter II analyzes The Second Seminole Indian War. It provides the first use 
of riverine warfare conducted by U.S. riverine forces against guerrillas. Chapter III 
focuses on U.S. riverine operations conducted during the Vietnam War in the Mekong 
Delta against a guerrilla opponent. The same systematic approach will be used to analyze 
this case as that applied to Chapter II. Chapter IV presents a brief overview of ongoing 
riverine operations in Colombia. These operations prompted the regeneration of a U.S. 
riverine force. Chapter V establishes the tactical trends and constants of riverine warfare 
in unconventional conflicts. Chapter VI presents the implications for present and future 
riverine force employment and the general conclusions drawn from the study. 
A.  THEORY 
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN, (Ret.), outlined a theory in his book, Fleet 
Tactics: Theory and Practice, that can be applied to the study of riverine warfare.4 
Hughes defines a strategy as: 
Policies and plans that govern actions in a war or a major theater of war. 
(Strategy establishes unified aims of war and sites for the employment of 
forces allocated toward those aims. The intention of strategy is to affect 
the outcomes of wars or campaigns; of tactics, the outcomes of battles or 
engagements. Therein lies the distinction and connection between them.)5 
Tactics he defines as: 
The handling of forces in combat; acts of deployment, maneuver, and 
application of force. (Sound tactics are procedures that employ forces to 
attain their full combat potential.   It is not possible to define tactics or 
"Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
1986). 
5Ibid., p. 287. 
sound tactics as procedures to win a battle.)6 
These definitions are used in this study. One notes that strategy alone does not determine 
whether or not an objective can be achieved. Strategy and tactics are interconnected. 
Tactics rely on the forces available and how they are trained to wage war. Only through 
effective tactics can one achieve the objectives outlined in a strategy. Therefore, this 
study focuses on the means (tactics) to achieve desired ends (the objectives of a strategy 
or plan). 
Hughes also illustrates the importance of studying the tactical trends in previous 
conflicts to suggest the future form of warfare. He is quoted at length to present the logic 
of his argument, which is at the foundation of the theoretical approach used in this study: 
The first is to correct the impression that strategy is somehow 'more 
important.' Strategy is constrained by the capacity to win battles; means 
must determine ends, just as much as ends govern means. My advice is 
to think of them as two sides of a coin, and if you are enthralled by 
strategy, remember to look at both sides of the coin. 
The second is that there are principles, or constants, and trends, or changes 
in warfare.7 This is true of both strategy and tactics, and for that matter 
policy, logistics, and campaigning (or operational art). My advice is to 
forget forever the common interpretation of Mahan that he preached 
merely a search for principles of strategy. The uses and lessons of history 
run much deeper, and are in any case as likely to have tactical as strategic 
consequences. 
The third is a theorem deriving from the first two. It is that discerning 
trends is the special way history can help keep from fighting the last war. 
Since tactics are as important in the long run as strategy, and since both 
constants and trends of tactics will be manifest to an acute observer, it is 
6Ibid., p. 286. 
7Hughes characterizes principles "as a guide to action," and prescriptive in nature. A constant is "an 
assertion about unchanging truth." Whereas, principles say "do this to succeed," a constant says "this is 
so, now apply the knowledge wisely." Cited from Hughes, "Mahan, Tactics, and Principles of Strategy," 
in John B. Hattendorf, ed., The Influence of Mahan on History (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 
1991), p. 32. 
important to look for both. My advice to military historians is to help 
military men, who seldom know history well enough to establish the 
tactical and technological trends of the past in order to see the 
implications for the future.8 
If Hughes' theorem is correct, and is applied to the study of riverine tactics, one 
should be able to identify the tactical trends and constants of riverine warfare. If so, it 
should then be possible to extract future implications. This thesis provides an analysis 
of two cases of U.S. riverine operations against an unconventional foe, beginning with the 
Second Seminole Indian War (1836-1842) and ending with The Vietnam War (1964- 
1972). If one intends to propose implications for the future mode of riverine warfare, 
then the tactical trends and constants need to be established. But before one can discuss 
the subject of riverine warfare, it is necessary to provide the terms and concepts. 
B.  CONCEPTS 
1.  Riverine Warfare 
Current    doctrine    provides    the    following    concepts    and    definitions: 
a.  Riverine Area 
The riverine area is an inland or coastal area comprising both land and 
water, characterized by limited land Lines of Communication (LOCs), with extensive 
water surface transportation and communications.9 Current doctrine for riverine 
operations categorizes riverine environments according to three types of environments. 
Type I environments comprise waterways that are not suitable for riverine operations 
except for small, shallow draft craft. The Type II environment is characterized by several 
navigable waterways and tributaries that can be exploited by shallow draft craft.   Type 
'Hughes, "Mahan, Tactics, and Principles of Strategy," p. 36. Italics added for emphasis. 
'Naval Special Warfare Tactical Memorandum, NSW/USMC Riverine Operations Handbook 
(1 January 1993), p. 2-1. 
Ill environments are dominated by waterways and are navigable by vessels with drafts 
of 20 feet or more.10 
Riverine areas may include swamps, deltas, river systems, streams, canals, 
inundated areas, and other bodies of water that provide the predominant means of 
transport and communication within a geographic area. When the river meets the sea, it 
is difficult to determine where the riverine environment begins. For practical purposes, 
it is where the river craft can operate continuously despite rough seas. Therefore, military 
forces operating in such areas should consider the utility of waterways for mobility within 
the riverine area first, and relegate coastal waters to craft specially designed for such an 
environment. 
b.  Importance of Riverine Environment 
Most major population centers are located on coasts, lakes, rivers, and 
inland waterways." In less developed countries, inland waterways and riverine areas 
serve as the centers of life. People in those countries rely on the riverine areas for 
subsistence. As natural lines of communication, the rivers provide a cost-effective means 
of transport for the raw goods extracted from the interior of a state. The economies of 
many lesser developed states depend upon the delivery of these goods to the 
manufacturing centers and/or export locations along the coastal areas. 
In On War, Clausewitz devotes several chapters to military operations in 
riverine areas. He first presents the advantages of defense along rivers, streams, swamps, 
and inundated areas. These waterways served as natural barriers to assaulting forces if 
the crossing points could be defended. Additionally, he recognized that these waterways 
could serve as lines of communication if they are navigable and provide a more secure 
and quicker means to deliver supplies and troops than overland LOCs. When Clausewitz 
directs his attention toward attacks upon swamps and flooded areas, he highlights the 
inherent advantage of such terrain to a defending force: 
l0Ibid., p. 2-2. 
"Ibid., p. 2-2. 
Swamps. . .are too wide to enable us to drive the enemy off the opposite 
bank by cannon fire and permit us to construct our own means of crossing. 
Strategically, the consequence is that one avoids an attack on swamps and 
tries to bypass them. Where the country is so densely cultivated—as it is 
in many low-lying areas—that the means of passing are innumerable, the 
defenders' resistance may still be relatively strong; but for an absolute 
decision it will be that much weaker, and therefore, inappropriate. If, on 
the other hand, the low-lying ground can be fortified by flooding, as in 
Holland, resistance can grow to be absolute, and then any attack is bound 
to fail.12 
The constraints and advantages of mobility prompted numerous nations to join land and 
sea forces to create ad hoc riverine forces. In 1883, Alfred T. Mahan chronicled the 
Union's riverine and coastal blockade operations during the American Civil War in The 
Gulf and Inland Waterways.12 He linked the strategic objective of gaining and maintaining 
control of the Mississippi Valley with the tactical means employed by the Union's naval 
and military forces. Mahan, a prominent theorist of naval strategy, establishes the 
historical foundation for the concept of riverine warfare. Hughes has cited Mahan's work 
as the best source that could have prepared young naval officers for the conduct of 
riverine warfare in the Vietnam War.14 
c.  Definition of Riverine Forces 
This force is a specially trained combat group comprised of both military 
and naval elements organized for sustained operations in a riverine environment. The 
basic combat group will be generally smaller than for ground operations due to the 
operational environment.15 This riverine force exploits the mobility of the waterways to 
maneuver elements inland for operations directed against an enemy. 
12Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans, by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 543. Italics added for emphasis. 
"Alfred T. Mahan, The Gulf and Inland Waterways (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883). 
l4Hughes, "Mahan, Tactics, and Principles of Strategy," p. 35. 
15George E. Buker, Swamp Sailors: Riverine Warfare in the Everglades, 1835-1842 (Gainesville, FL: 
University Presses of Florida, 1975), p. 5. 
d. Definition of Riverine Warfare 
"It is a specialized form of combat neither naval nor military but a blend 
of the two conducted in a riverine environment."16 Furthermore, it consists of combat and 
associated support operations within the riverine environment. These operations can be 
conducted by joint naval, land, and air units. 
e. Definition of River Warfare 
An engagement between a naval force and an opponent who may either 
fight along the waterways or from the banks. But the form in combat "... is naval in 
execution not withstanding the use of small vessels within restricted waters."17 However, 
the opponent may often employ artillery or mines to counter the naval vessels that attempt 
to control the waterways. The important distinction is that the naval force does not 
operate with ground forces, but rather operates independently. 
/  Definition of Riverine Operations 
These comprise all military activities designed to achieve or maintain 
control of a riverine area by restricting or eliminating the enemy's activities 
or by destroying his forces. Operations are characterized by the extensive 
use of river assault boats to transport military forces and equipment and 
to provide close combat support to ground assault forces in the area of 
operations.18 
g.   Control of Riverine Areas 
Current proposed doctrine for joint riverine operations states that "riverine 
operations... employ various types of...forces...in a concerted effort to gain and/or maintain 
control of riverine, coastal, delta, or other uncontrolled areas."19 
l6Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
"Ibid., p. 5. 
'"Captain Wade C. Wells, USN, (Ret.), "The Riverine Force in Action, 1966-1967," in Frank Uhlig, 
Jr., Vietnam: The Naval Story (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 414. 
''JOINT PUB 3-06, "Doctrine for Joint Riverine Operations" (proposed Pub, May 1994), p. 1-1. 
Since control of the riverine environment is the ultimate objective of 
riverine operations, the following section presents a model that suggests a means to 
evaluate how much control can be achieved through riverine operations. By pursuing 
control one is also denying the enemy the use of the waterways. 
h.   Gradations of Control 
Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie developed a theory of power control in his book, 
Military Strategy.  He states: 
The successful strategist is the one who controls the nature and placement 
and the timing and the weight of the centers of gravity of the war, and 
who exploits the resulting control of the pattern of war towards his own 
ends.20 
This applies to riverine operation's ultimate objective of gaining and/or 
maintaining control within a riverine area, which inherently includes denying the enemy 
the use of the waterways. Also, these operations are conducted in support of a larger 
ground campaign. In current riverine operations doctrine, the tactics are not precisely 
linked to the obtainment of the ultimate objective. After careful consideration, the authors 
propose six levels of control that can be pursued by riverine operations. These levels 
were developed from discussions with Captain Hughes and will be referred to as the 
Hughes' Gradation of Control Model. This model shows a graduated approach to gaining 
control over a riverine area:21 
(1) Incidental Raids. 
Objective:  To harass and disrupt enemy activity within a riverine area. 
Means:  Employment of a riverine force to conduct limited raids against the enemy either 
directly (target enemy forces) or indirectly (target enemy infrastructure; personnel and 
resources). 
Forces:  Mission dependent. 
20Ibid., p. 97. 
2lHughes' gradation of control model was formulated during the thesis research process. 
8 
Level of Control:   Local, temporary, and incidental to the purpose of the operation. 
(2) Limited Denial Operations. 
Objective:  Deny the enemy movement along waterways within a selected portion of a 
riverine area. 
Means:  Employment of a riverine force upon selected waterways to interdict and impede 
enemy up and downriver (longitudinal) movement. 
Forces:   Small commitment of riverine forces for waterborne presence in selected 
locations exploiting the mobility of waterborne forces. 
Level of Control:   Limited longitudinal control of selected waterways. 
(3) Temporary Control of Longitudinal-Waterway Movement 
Operations. 
Objective:   Temporarily deny the enemy longitudinal movement along waterways within 
a riverine area. 
Means:  Employment of riverine forces to control all vital points along the waterways 
within the riverine area. 
Forces:  Requires medium commitment of riverine forces for waterborne presence. 
Level of Control:  Temporary control of longitudinal traffic along major waterways 
within riverine area (fails to impede cross-waterway movement). 
(4) Temporary Control of Cross-Waterway Movement Operations. 
Objective: Temporarily deny the longitudinal and cross-waterway movement within the 
riverine area. 
Means:  Employment of riverine forces to patrol all navigable waterways within the 
riverine area. 
Forces:   Requires large commitment of riverine forces for waterborne presence for the 
duration of the campaign. 
Level of Control:  Temporary control of longitudinal and cross-waterway movement 
within the riverine area. 
(5) Limited Riverine Area Control Operations. 
Objective:  Deny the enemy longitudinal use of specific waterways within the riverine 
area. 
Means:  Employment of riverine forces and establishment of enclaves to control all vital 
points along the waterways within the riverine area.   Enclaves would be linked and 
supported by the riverine force. 
Forces:  Requires large commitment of riverine force for a sustained land and waterborne 
presence. 
Level of Control:  Partial area control. 
(6) Riverine Area Control Operations. 
Objective:  Deny the enemy longitudinal and cross-waterway movement within the 
riverine area. 
Means:  Employment of riverine forces and establishment of enclaves at vital points 
along the waterways.  Riverine forces required to patrol all waterways. 
Forces:  Requires large commitment of riverine forces for a sustained waterborne and 
land presence. 
Level of Control:   Highest degree of control established within the riverine area. 
2.  Riverine Warfare and the Guerrilla 
a.   Unconventional Warfare 
A type of warfare that departs from the normal combat operations of 
organized military forces employing the standard weaponry of the period. 
Most often the term is applied to the irregular combat activities of 
partisans [q.v.] or guerrillas [q.v.] against the conventional forces of the 
occupying [or established] power.22 
22Trevor Dupuy, Curt Johnson, and Grace P. Hayes, Dictionary of Military Terms: A Guide to the 
Language of Warfare and Military Institutions (New York: The H. W. Wilson Co., 1986), p. 223. 
(1) Guerrilla Warfare. "Military and paramilitary operations 
conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous 
forces."23 
(2) Guerrilla. "Spanish for 'Little War.' Pertaining to irregular 
warfare. A participant in fighting not directly connected with a formal military 
organization or operation."24 
b. Importance of Riverine Environment 
The importance of a riverine environment to guerrilla war has been 
discussed by many observers. James E. Cross noted: 
Guerrilla war can and has been waged in every sort of climate and 
country, but there is no question that jungles, marshlands, and mountains 
are the ideal forcing beds for this activity especially where the distances 
are great and the forces of law and order are small.25 
Writers on the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare have noted the 
significance of rugged and inaccessible terrain, such as riverine areas, as being essential 
for success. John Ellis has extracted salient comments from Clausewitz's On War. 
Clausewitz notes within the chapter titled 'Arming the Nation' the 
advantages of promoting guerrilla warfare - 'people's wars.' Noting the 
importance of terrain, Clausewitz points to the key variable for determining 
success was the size of the country. 'The more an incumbent army spreads 
itself out, so much greater will be the effects of arming the nation.' Other 
key factors that are favorable for the pursuit of the guerrilla strategy 
include: 
(1) That war is carried on in the heart of the country 
(2) That it cannot be decided by a single catastrophe 
(3) That the theater of war embraces a considerable extent of the country 
23 Ibid., p. 107. 
24Ibid., p. 107. 
25James Elliot Cross, Conflict in the Shadows: The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War (New York: 
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1963), p. 17. Italics added for emphasis. 
(4) That the national character is favorable to the measure 
(5) That the country is of broken and difficult nature, either from being 
mountainous, or by reason of woods and marshes, or from the peculiar 
mode of cultivation in use. 
Within the actual nature of guerrilla warfare he notes 
. . .Another. . .leading principle in the method of using such levies. . .is 
that as a rule, with this great means of defence, a tactical defence should 
seldom or never take place. . .They may, and should. . .defend the 
approaches to mountains, dykes, over marshes, river-passage, as long as 
possible. . . .26 
A participant in the 1833 revolutionary movement in Italy had this to say on guerrilla 
warfare: 
.. .one should place one's forces in hidden, inaccessible spots, behind hills, 
rising ground, hedges; in valleys, on mountains, amongst rocks, in thickets, 
behind clumps of trees, along river banks, on the edges of forests and 
woods, in places in which it is easy to conceal oneself, so that one can 
attack the enemy at will and bring off minor successes. . .it[the guerrilla 
force] should choose appropriate terrain for its base area - mountain areas 
and plains dotted with forests, woods, hills, lakes, swamps, etc. . . .27 
The importance of exploiting inland waterways has been promoted by more modern 
guerrilla leaders, as well, including Mao Zedong. In the 1930s he identified the 
importance of inland waterways for basing guerrillas: 
There are many historical examples of the establishment of bases in river, 
bay, and lake country, and this is one aspect of our activity that has so far 
received little attention. . .We should establish bases along rivers and 
26John Ellis, A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), pp. 62-63. 
Italics added for emphasis. 
27Ibid., p. 82. Italics added for emphasis. 
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watercourses in territory controlled by the enemy so as to deny him access 
to, and free use of, the water routes.28 
c.  Historical Instances of Guerrilla Uses of Riverine Areas 
Beginning in the early 14th century, Irish rebels, using guerrilla tactics 
against the English occupation forces, sought refuge in woods and bogs. By the mid 
1600s, the Tories (formerly Woodkernes) were infamous for their unique use of the bog 
area. A Tory would: 
. . .lay down in the long grass of the bog. . .sometimes spring into a 
stream, and lay there like an otter, with only his mouth and nostrils above 
the water. . Every man would take his gun to pieces, hid the lock in his 
clothes, stuck a cork in the muzzle, stopped the touch-hole with a quick, 
and threw the weapon into the next pond. . .When the peril was over... 
every man flew to the place where he had hid his arms, and soon were in 
full march towards some Protestant mansion.29 
During the American Revolution, Francis Marion created a successful 
partisan force in South Carolina. Operating from Snow's Island in the Great Pee-Dee 
River, Marion staged numerous raids and ambushes against Cornwallis' forces and supply 
lines. Operating from within the riverine environment, Marion employed unconventional 
tactics to erode the morale and will of the Tories and British.30 The success of Marion 
depended upon his ability to maintain a base area within a riverine environment. This 
afforded his partisans the mobility and concealment necessary to evade and attack 
undetected. 
28Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, (New York, NY: 
Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1961), p. 109. Italics added for emphasis. 
29Ibid., p. 39. Italics added for emphasis. 
30Bruce Lancaster, Phantom Fortress (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Co., 1950), p. 74. Also see, 
Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (New York: William Morrow and Co., 
1994), pp. 67-68, and Fred Cook and Bruce Lancaster, The American Revolution (New York: American 
Heritage Press, 1958), pp. 167-170. 
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During the early years of the First Republic in France, peasants would at 
times oppose the new revolutionary government by waging guerrilla campaigns. One 
such instance took place in 1793, when guerrillas of the Vendee River region utilized the 
riverine area to its maximum advantage. The Vendean guerrillas of the Lower Vendee 
were able to mount numerous ambushes upon the new French Republican Army and then 
swiftly withdraw into the marshlands. These guerrillas were so effective that a French 
general stated: 
I assure you nothing was wanting to the soldiers save the uniform. . .To 
me this war with peasants, of brigands, which has been so greatly ridiculed 
and treated with contempt. . .has always seemed the great test of the 
Republic.31 
During the period of 1836 through 1842, the Seminole Indians staged a 
protracted, defensive insurgency against a joint U.S. military force. Relying on the 
waterways and dense vegetation of the Florida Everglades, the Seminole warriors 
employed unconventional riverine tactics against a larger force exacting a high cost. 
d.   Control of Riverine Area 
The traditional approach to the control of a riverine area centers on the 
physical terrain. The employment of a riverine force within a specific region can achieve 
a gradation of control. Conventional riverine tactics target only one, the enemy's mobility 
along waterways, of the three necessary conditions required for the sustainment of 
guerrilla war.  These necessary conditions for guerrilla war are as follows: 
The first is greater mobility than the conventional military forces opposed 
to them. The second is a detailed and intimate knowledge of the 
countryside where the fighting takes place. Being native to the battlefield, 
the guerrillas are likely to know it better than the soldiers who enter the 
region to restore order. The third needed advantage is a better intelligence 
31Ellis, p. 55. 
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service than that of the government forces, and this must include a high 
level of security as to their own plans and movements.32 
Mobility is dependent upon knowledge of the countryside. This stems from 
an effective intelligence capability. The effectiveness of this intelligence capability stems 
from the support of the population that inhabits the respective countryside. This support 
facilitates the guerrilla's attempt to exploit the advantages of greater mobility, better local 
knowledge of the countryside, and a better intelligence capability than the occupying 
force. Within the riverine area, the people also provide the essentials for an insurgency 
movement: supplies, recruits, and intelligence.33 
The unconventional approach to the control of the riverine areas centers 
on the control of the "human terrain," the people. The guerrillas' tactics center on 
employing a specific level of force, coercion, and/or terrorism against a specific 
population to obtain a level of support. Neither a large portion of the population nor the 
complete loyalty of the people are required to ensure the provision of adequate support. 
Within a riverine area, it is essential for the guerrilla to direct his tactics 
towards the obtainment of the three ingredients (supplies, recruits, intelligence) that only 
the "human terrain" can provide. Within the context of marginal terrain (riverine areas, 
jungles, and mountainous areas), author Patrick O'Sullivan notes: 
The essence of guerrilla tactics is to trade space for time. The enemy is 
allowed to dominate a lot of ground, but his morale and force are slowly 
eroded by a thousand small cuts. He is drawn to extend his supply and 
communications lines and spread his firepower thinly, so that his internal 
connections as well as his flanks may be gnawed and his resolve eroded 
by constant nipping. Hit-and-run raids, diversions, sabotage, terrorism, and 
ambush are the chief engagements. Although feinting and running to 
avoid pitched battles are primary ploys and although strategically guerrilla 
war is usually defensive, to achieve success, it must be tactically on the 
offensive. Employing what Liddell Hart calls "indirect methods," guerrilla 
"Cross, pp. 27-28. 
"Ibid., p. 35. 
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actions inspired his advocacy of waging a war of movement and 
surprise .... 
The ultimate objective of both sides in guerrilla war is control of the 
people. Thus, in order to succeed, any force countering guerrilla action 
must not only defeat the insurgents militarily, but also politically separate 
the population's sympathy from them and ensure the existence of an 
acceptable social order and government.34 
The key point drawn from O'Sullivan is that guerrilla movements will 
originate and flourish in those marginal areas where government control is limited. "The 
people will provide support for that side which can punish them most severely for 
disloyalty to its cause."35 In the guerrilla's eye, control of the riverine area is exercised 
through the control of the human terrain. 
The goal of the guerrilla and the government is to establish "political 
authority over a specified population within a defined geographic venue . . . [both] forces 
have two tools to obtain this goal: popular perceptions of legitimacy and a credible 
capacity to coerce ... the credibility in one side's ability to coerce was defined by the 
recipient (the people)." Thus, the guerrilla's perception of control of a riverine area 
focuses, first and foremost, on the human terrain.36 Control of the physical terrain only 
becomes critical when the guerrilla is threatened with the potential loss of his sanctuary 
within the marginal terrain. 
C.  SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study examines riverine operations directed against a guerrilla opponent. 
Therefore, it concentrates on instances of U.S. riverine warfare that supported a larger 
"Patrick O'Sullivan, Terrain and Tactics (Westport, CT. Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 126. Italics 
added for emphasis. 
"Cross, p. 38. 
36Larry Cable, "Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Peacekeeping 
Post Cold War," unpublished paper in Revolutionary Warfare Course, Supplemental Readings (USAF 
Special Operations School, Hurlburt Field, FL, undated), p. 2. 
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land campaign against a guerrilla opponent. To limit the scope the authors drew upon a 
suggested linkage of past conflicts that was proposed by Sam C. Sarkesian. In a paper 
submitted during a two-day symposium on "The Role of Special Operations in US 
Strategy for the 1980s," Sarkesian notes: 
In the history of the U.S. military operations against the Seminole Indians 
(1836-43), in the Philippines (1898-1901), and in Vietnam (1964-72), one 
is struck by their similarities with respect to political-military problems, 
military operations, and insurgency forces. Unfortunately, there has been 
little historical analysis for the development of doctrinal guidelines. To 
reduce the gap between past experience and current operational 
contingencies, there is a pressing need to examine the doctrinal relevance 
and irrelevance of the lessons of the Vietnam War. . . .3? 
It is recognized that U.S. forces have been engaged in riverine and river warfare 
throughout the world from involvement in Africa, Latin and South America, Asia, and 
Europe. This study concentrates on the employment of naval and military units organized 
in a combat force for sustained operations against unconventional opponent, in a riverine 
environment. The following conflicts are reviewed: The Second Seminole Indian War 
(1836-1842), the Vietnam War (1964-72) and the ongoing counterdrug riverine operations 
in Colombia (1989 - present). Both cases involved the formal organization and 
development of riverine forces specifically designed for sustained operations against a 
guerrilla opponent. Second, these riverine forces were in support of a larger 
counterinsurgency campaign. 
The Seminole War was the first instance where both naval and military units were 
organized into a riverine force to engage an unconventional enemy in a riverine 
environment.  As noted by author George E. Buker: 
. . .striking similarities may be observed between the naval operations of 
the Seminole War and those of the Vietnam War.    In spite of the 
"Sam C. Sarkesian, "Organizational Strategy and Low-Intensity Conflicts," in Frank R. Barnett, B. 
Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz, eds., Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 1984), pp. 271-72. Italics added for emphasis. 
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technological changes, the organization and modus operandi were basically 
the same.38 
Although not within the scope of this study, the American Civil War combined 
both naval and military forces to prosecute riverine warfare, especially in the Mississippi 
Valley. Naval and military officers involved in the Second Seminole Indian War led 
riverine forces in the Civil War.39 Riverine operations in the Civil War have been cited 
in doctrinal publications, official histories, and associated articles as the most relevant 
case study for riverine warfare in Vietnam.40 However, the Civil War was waged against 
an enemy that relied on the orthodox mode of conventional warfare, and therefore, is not 
reviewed. Instead, the tactical innovations are examined during the chapter on constants 
and trends. 
The Vietnam War included extensive riverine operations in the Mekong Delta (IV 
Corps Tactical Zone), southern portions of the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), and to a 
lesser magnitude in I Corps area of operations. U.S. riverine forces played a crucial role 
against an unconventional opponent. As in previous conflicts, the guerrilla relied on the 
riverine area to establish base ares from which to build support and wage a guerrilla war. 
The riverine forces challenged the Viet Cong's ability to maintain control over the 
numerous villages throughout the riverine areas. 
Riverine operations in Colombia are being conducted by the Colombian Marine 
Corps against a guerrilla force who has associated itself with drug traffickers. The 
Colombian Marine Corps requested that the U.S. Marine Corps aid them in developing 
a riverine force capability. This regenerated the requirement to consider whether or not 
the U.S. needed to maintain a standing riverine warfare capability. 
"Buker, p. 139. 
"Kenneth J. Hagan, This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power (New York: The Free 
Press, 1991), p. 130. 
40Hughes, The Influence of History on Mahan, p. 35. See also, William B. Fulton, Riverine 
Operations, 1966-1969 (Washington, D. C: Department of the Army, 1973), p. 3. 
18 
The authors submit that the through evaluating the employment of riverine tactics 
from the earliest case to the most recent, one can establish tactical trends and constants. 
The establishment of tactical trends and constants will provide a means to see the 
implications for future form of riverine warfare. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
To trace the tactical trends and constants, the authors developed an approach to 
analyze three cases of U.S. involvement in riverine warfare. This historical approach will 
aid in determining the tactical trends and constants of riverine warfare as waged by U.S. 
riverine forces against unconventional opponents. Since tactics are subject to change by 
technological innovation, the authors link those major technological innovations that 
prompted a change in U.S. riverine tactics. The Hughes' gradations of control model will 
be applied to each conflict to determine the level of control achieved by U.S. forces 
employing riverine tactics. Hughes' elements of the combat process, as presented below, 
will be used in each case to categorize the tactical trends and constants. 
1.  Structured Analysis 
Each case will be evaluated using the following structured approach: 
• The objectives of the riverine operations and their integration into the overall 
campaign objective. 
• The tactics employed by U.S. riverine forces to achieve the intended objectives. 
(Hughes' gradations of control model can be applied to link the tactics to the 
intended objectives.) 
• The enemy's tactical response to U.S. riverine operations. 
• The U.S. riverine forces' tactical adjustments during the conflict. 
• Technological innovations that impacted on riverine tactics. 
• Analysis of the tactical outcome of the riverine operations. 
19 
2.  Terminology 
U.S. riverine tactical trends will center upon the following elements of the combat 
process: Command and Control (C2), Firepower, Scouting, Antiscouting, Screening, and 
Maneuver.  The definition of each are extracted from Hughes' Fleet Tactics:*1 
Antiscouting. Actions taken to destroy, diminish, or preclude enemy scouting 
effectiveness. (Antiscouting includes the destruction of enemy scouts, such as shooting 
down surveillance satellite or a reconnaissance aircraft, deceiving enemy sensors, jamming 
sensors to reduce tracking or targeting effectiveness, and interfering with a scouting 
report.) 
Command and Control (C2). Decisions made and actions directed by the 
commander to employ force, counterforce, scouting, and antiscouting resources to 
accomplish an objective. (C2 includes the integration of scouting information, combat 
decisions, and the dissemination of these decisions, but it excludes acts of scouting 
themselves. Support for C2 includes staff work, decision aids, and communications 
systems.) 
Firepower. The material means of a fighting unit to reduce enemy forces. It is 
the capacity to destroy, measured in rate of delivery (as, for instance, shells per minute). 
Maneuver. Movement to achieve a tactical advantage. (Maneuver may be 
associated with force, counterforce, scouting, or antiscouting. Ideally, maneuvers are made 
with all four elements in mind.) 
Scouting. Acts of search, detection, tracking, targeting, and enemy damage 
assessment, including reconnaissance, surveillance, signals intelligence, and all other 
means of gathering information that may be used in combat. Scouting is not 
accomplished until the information is delivered to the commander being served. 
Screening. The use of forces to help protect other more valued units, 
accomplished by some combination of antiscouting and escorting, and often by scouting 
as well. 
"'Hughes, Fleet Tactics, pp. 287-89. 
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These elements of the combat process will allow us to categorize specific U.S. 
riverine tactics employed within both cases. This will facilitate the establishment of 
trends and constants throughout the history of U.S. riverine warfare. 
21 
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II.  THE SECOND SEMINOLE INDIAN WAR: 1835 -1842 
A.  THE WAR 
1. Nature of the Conflict 
The treacherous Everglades of southern Florida were the setting for the U.S. 
experience with riverine warfare against an unconventional opponent. The Second 
Seminole Indian War (1835-1842) had its origins in the Seminole refusal to abide by the 
U.S. imposed treaties that mandated relocation to reservations west of the Mississippi 
River.42 Refusing to leave ancestral homelands, they waged an effective defensive 
insurgency for seven years to preserve their autonomy in the heart of the Everglades. 
This area provided the ideal sanctuary from which a few hundred warriors waged a 
guerrilla war against "conventional" Army and Navy opponents. Neither service was 
prepared for this kind of war. In the event, both were forced, for the first time in U.S. 
history, to merge their capabilities in a riverine force which as its ultimate goal the 
removal of the Seminoles from Florida. The war tested the mettle of no fewer than eight 
field commanders. Those who insisted upon employing traditional service methods of 
warfare would remember the conflict as a "graveyard for military reputations."43 
2. Evolution of Riverine Warfare 
Riverine warfare became necessary after many land campaigns failed to "trap" the 
Indians between converging columns of soldiers and force a decisive battle. In the best 
traditions of Napoleonic warfare, the army hoped to employ   superior firepower to 
42The following references provide the foundation for this chapter: George E. Buker, Swamp Sailors: 
Riverine Warfare in the Everglades, 1835-1842 (Gainesville, FL: University Presses of Florida, 1975), 
Virginia Bergman Peters, The Florida Wars (New York: Archon Books, 1979), John K. Mahon, History 
of the Second Seminole War (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1967), John T. Sprague, The 
Origin, Progress, And Conclusion Of The Florida War (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 
1964 reprint of the 1848 version), Myer M. Cohen, Notices of Florida and The Campaigns (Gainesville, 
FL: University of Florida Press, 1964 reprint of the 1836 version), Mark F. Boyd, Florida Aflame: The 
Background and Onset of the Seminole War, 1835 (Tallahassee, FL: The Florida Historical Quarterly, 
Vol. XXX, No. 1, July, 1951). 
43T. Harry Williams, The History Of American Wars From 1745 to 1918 (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1981), p. 142. 
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overwhelm the enemy, demoralize his fighting spirit, and decisively end all hostilities. 
Two factors denied success: first, the Seminole warriors seldom presented the opportunity 
for such a battle to develop, preferring the "irregular" small unit tactics of the raid and 
the ambush instead. Second, on those rare occasions when a large force of Indians did 
engage in battle, the terrain inhibited the maneuvering of superior firepower. For the 
Indians, the Everglades became the natural "equalizer" thwarting the regular land force's 
attempts to apply superior firepower. Operating from the Everglades, the Seminoles 
mounted many raids to harass and disrupt U.S. military efforts after which they sought 
the safety of this sanctuary. Eventually, it was the innovations of two junior naval 
officers that the battle against the Seminoles was brought to the uncharted waterways of 
the Everglades.  (See Figure 1) 
3.  Early Riverine Operations 
In order to halt the flow of weapons to the Seminoles, which were thought to 
come from Spanish traders from neighboring Cuba and the Bahamas, the United States 
Navy's West India Squadron was initially directed to establish a blockade around southern 
Florida. Although the force never intercepted any gun runners, sloops, schooners, 
steamships, and gunbarges were kept on station throughout the war. To reinforce this 
effort, "boat expeditions" comprising sailors and marines patrolled the coastal and inland 
waterways. Additionally, the Navy helped the Army with the establishment of supply 
depots along navigable rivers. Steamships towed gunbarges armed with naval cannon up 
these rivers in an effort to supply the depots. However, poor coordination between the 
land and river forces usually hindered rather than helped sustain the vital supply bases. 
Without these forts, the Army could not stage an effective land campaign in a region that 
virtually prohibited overland transportation of personnel and supplies. 
By late 1837, the Seminoles were waging an effective raiding campaign from 
inside the impenetrable Everglades. A completely different and innovative strategy was 
required. After two years, the littoral efforts of the Navy provided only limited support 
for the land campaign. After conducting many forays along the inland waterways during 
his boat expeditions, Navy Lieutenant Levine M. Powell proposed a concept of 
24 
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Figure 1.  Riverine Warfare in the Florida Peninsula43 
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operations to the Secretary of War, Joel R. Poinsett, in September of 1837. This concept 
of operations was designed to: 
. . . circumnavigate the Everglades . . . discover the aforesaid retreats, to 
endeavor to capture the women and children, to fall upon the war parties 
. . . and to harass and terrify the nation, by this unexpected inroad from 
this quarter.45 
This concept would lay the foundation for an effective strategy that called for the 
development of riverine forces and tactics. It took five years for the riverine force to 
fully exploit this unique form of warfare against a guerrilla opponent. 
4.  Lieutenant Powell's Campaign 
During the command of Major General Thomas S. Jesup, the fifth since the onset 
of hostilities, Powell was placed in charge of a riverine force consisting of 200 soldiers, 
sailors, and marines. This force was directed to enter the Everglades and drive the 
Indians into the columns of soldiers positioned to the north and southwest edges of the 
swamps. During late December 1837, Powell's force, embarked on flat-bottomed boats, 
entered the interior from the east and engaged in numerous small skirmishes. 
When returning from operations in January 1838, the riverine force discovered 
a trail along the St. Lucie River leading into the Jupiter Inlet. Following the trail by foot, 
Powell's troops captured a Seminole woman who provided them with essential 
information. After the troops had returned to the boats, a raiding force was organized, 
a raiding force. Guided by the Indian, Powell's force of 85 men marched five miles into 
the interior in search of the enemy encampment. Sighting smoke coming from inside 
the swamp, the force was ordered to form in the conventional "line" before marching 
toward the suspected site. Just outside the area, the force was met with heavy gunfire 
from the Seminoles who had positioned themselves behind covered and concealed 
positions.   Immediately, Powell ordered a charge and slowly pushed the Seminoles back 
45Buker,  p. 56. 
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into the recesses of the swamp. Within minutes, the sporadic fire from the Indians slowly 
increased and finally overcame that of the attacking force. Recognizing the futility of 
continuing the assault, LT Powell ordered a retreat. 
Suffering numerous casualties, the riverine force fought a fierce retreat back to the 
boats. In its haste, the survivors were forced to abandon one boat fully laden with 
essential supplies. Attacking an undetermined size force in unfamiliar terrain late in the 
day proved costly to the newly organized riverine force. Thanks to the discipline of the 
unnerved soldiers, casualties were limited to five dead and 22 wounded (including Powell 
himself). A couple of months later, LT Powell had another opportunity to pursue his 
concept of bringing the war to the Seminoles within their riverine sanctuary. 
In March 1838, Powell was ordered to support Army Lieutenant Colonel James 
Bankhead. Powell scouted the area in vicinity of the New River before the arrival of 
Bankhead's combined force of regulars and Tennessee volunteers. Powell's riverine forced 
located a trail that led to a "hummock" within the swamp. He communicated this 
information to the colonel who was waiting at the edges of the swamp. Both 
commanders agreed to join forces and push deep into the swamps to attack the Indians. 
Upon reaching the suspected position, the combined riverine force attempted to parley 
with the defenders who answered with gunfire. Immediately, the force reorganized into 
three units. One unit maintained a center position to provide holding fire while another 
swept around to the left through two feet of water. The third, mounted on boats, 
maneuvered to the right through deeper water - a classic double envelopment was in the 
making. 
When the units came within range of the Indians' rifles, Powell used a naval 4- 
pounder on his lead boat to force the Indians to vacate a favorite defensive position. The 
Seminoles abandoned numerous supplies, including 20 skin canoes. Although no Indians 
were killed or captured, this action was the first successful attack within the sanctuary 
of the Seminoles. Powell's concept was proven effective, especially when using shallow 
draft boats that could mount small naval artillery. The engagement at the Jupiter River 
inlet led to  further advances in the effective use of riverine forces. 
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5.  Colonel Harney's  Campaign 
On 23 July 1839, Colonel William S. Harney's small detachment of 26 soldiers 
was overrun and massacred by the Seminoles at a trading post on the Caloosahatchee 
River. Escaping the massacre with a few of his soldiers, Colonel Harney set the stage 
for a new form of riverine warfare. During December 1840, the colonel made use of a 
runaway black slave, (who had been captured at one time by the same Indians) to plan 
a raid against the unsuspecting Indians. Acquiring 16 canoes from the Navy's riverine 
force, Harney embarked 90 men for a punitive expedition deep inside the Everglades. 
Using the black slave as a guide, the colonel led the riverine force toward the Seminole 
encampment. A few days into this expedition, it encountered small bands of Indians 
either on shore or canoes. To achieve surprise (though in violation of his superior's 
orders), Harney disguised his force to appear like Seminoles by wearing native clothing 
and applying "war paint" to the soldiers' faces. The deception proved quite successful. 
Never suspecting that the "whiteman" could enter so deep into the Everglades, the Indians 
were caught by complete surprise. The riverine force killed most of the warriors and 
destroyed the encampment. Upon departing, the colonel hung the dead bodies of the 
Indian leaders from nearby trees as a reminder for the massacre at the Caloosahatchee 
River. Harney's 12 day venture into the uncharted interior immediately caught the 
attention of LT John T. McLaughlin, USN. Like his predecessor LT Powell, McLaughlin 
continued to bring the battle to the Seminoles by assuming command of what was to be 
known as the "Mosquito Fleet." 
6.  Lieutenant McLaughlin's Campaign 
In 1839, Lieutenant McLaughlin, Powell's former executive officer, was in 
command of the inshore blockade around the southern tip of Florida. This force, 
commonly referred to as the Florida Expedition, consisted of schooners, barges, and a 
limited number of flat-bottomed boats. Frustrated by the passivity of the blockading 
routine, McLaughlin sought a more offensive strategy. Through his efforts, more 
personnel, flat-bottomed boats and recently acquired canoes were added to the force now 
referred to as the "Mosquito Fleet."  These additions provided an enhanced capability to 
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reach beyond the headwaters of the rivers that entered the Everglades. This finally 
brought the superior firepower of the United States directly upon the Seminole warriors 
and their supporters. 
McLaughlin conducted numerous expeditions throughout the Everglades, 
predominantly using flat-bottomed boats and canoes. Lightly loaded, the canoe was used 
as the primary means to get within close proximity of the Indians wherever they ventured. 
Becoming familiar with the region through the use of captured black slaves and Indians, 
the Mosquito Fleet developed into an effective combat capability. Between December 
31, 1840, and January 19, 1841, the force, manned by 150 sailors and Marines proved 
worth by crossing of the Everglades, thereby becoming the first U.S. forces to accomplish 
such a feat. More important, this demonstrated the ability to leave the protection and 
support of the schooners and barges and conduct sustained operations deep within the 
interior of an enemy's riverine sanctuary. Henceforth, McLaughlin and Harney joined 
forces and conducted numerous "sweeping" and "flushing"operations within the 
Everglades. This combination of different tactics of riverine warfare provided the 
synergism for an effective campaign against the Seminoles. Although few warriors were 
encountered, the riverine forces discovered many well-hidden encampments and 
destroyed vital resources. The initiative had been seized from the Indians who were now 
forced to operate in small family groups so as to minimize the risk of detection. 
The highlight of the Mosquito Fleet came during its final expedition in February 
1842. By simultaneous deploying two separate units from the west and east sides of the 
Everglades, McLaughlin's "Task Force" planned to conduct a pincer movement over the 
course of 60 days. Living in dug-out canoes and foraging for food from the interior, the 
riverine force demonstrated a capability for sustained operations that demoralized the 
Indians. Again, few warriors were encountered, but more concealed cultivated areas were 
located and destroyed which tested not only the endurance of the warriors but also of the 
women and children who supported them. This "total war" against the Seminole nation 
deep within its sanctuary, reduced the Indians to basic food gathering techniques for 
subsistence. By May of 1842, fewer than 300 Seminoles, a 100 of which were warriors, 
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had their activity restricted to basic survival within the confines of the swamps. After 
numerous requests by the last field commander, Colonel Worth, the Secretary of War 
authorized a cessation in hostilities on 10 May 1842. The next month, under orders, the 
Mosquito Fleet was disestablished. At this time, the force consisted of twelve small 
sailing vessels, a few barges, 50 officers, 582 enlisted men (100 marines included), and 
140 dugout canoes.46 Hostilities officially ended, without treaty, on August 14, 1842. 
B.  THE ANALYSIS 
1.  Hughes' Model Applied 
a. Lieutenant Powell's Campaign 
(1) Objective. LT Powell's early operations sought to harass and 
disrupt Seminole activity within the navigable waters along the southern peninsula of 
Florida. These operations were usually triggered by the threat of Indian attack against 
settlements and supply bases. Later operations sough to deny the Indians the ability to 
move along selected waterways so as to prevent their escape into the Everglades. 
(2) Means. In response to calls for assistance, Powell conducted 
limited raids or expeditions against the attacking Indians and their vital resources. His 
later operations were conducted on specific waterways such as the Jupiter River inlet. 
These "river blockades" were designed to interdict and impede the Indians' movement 
towards their sanctuary within Everglades. 
(3) Forces. Powell's initial riverine force was comprised of 
approximately 200 sailors, marines, and soldiers. About one half of these were involved 
in the assault operations. Personnel were temporarily assigned for a specific operation 
and upon the completion of which they returned to their parent units and ships. Early 
operations were conducted with the use of launches, cutters, and some flat-bottomed boats 
obtained from numerous sources. Later riverine operations were longer in duration and 
were reinforced by larger ground forces.    These operations primarily used the flat- 
46Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1936), 
pp. 157-158. 
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bottomed boat and a small number of canoes for the transport of assault forces. During 
the operation with Colonel Bankhead, the combined riverine force consisted of about 500 
personnel. Upon termination of these operations, all personnel would return to original 
units. 
(4) Level of Control. Early expeditions or raiding operations 
provided temporary relief from the attacking Indians. Local control was incidental to the 
duration of the operation. Later operations sought to exploit the mobility of larger 
riverine forces within specific locations. This provided limited control of selected 
waterways, however, Powell's ship-based operations and temporary reinforcement of 
additional soldiers impeded his ability to maintain a waterborne presence in selected 
locations. 
b.   Colonel Hartley's Campaign 
(1) Objective. Colonel Harney's "punitive expedition" was 
undertaken to harass and disrupt enemy activity within a riverine area, in this case, deep 
within the Everglades. This raid demonstrated the ability to deliver firepower directly 
against the enemy. 
(2) Means. Harney's riverine forces conducted a raid within the 
Everglades seeking to destroy the Indians and their vital resources. By using canoes from 
the Navy's riverine force, Harney was able to attack an enemy encampment not reachable 
by any other means. Shallow-draft vessels provided the essential mobility necessary for 
the raid. 
(3) Forces. Harney organized a small riverine raiding force of 
about 90 personnel from his unit, the 2nd Dragoons. This force operated independently 
from all other forces. The size of this assault force was much smaller than those used 
in previous riverine operations. 
(4) Level of Control. The level of control was local, temporary, 
and incidental to the purpose of the raid. The raid had a psychological impact upon other 
Indians who formerly thought the Everglades to be impenetrable by the U.S. forces. 
Complete control of the waterways within the Everglades was no longer exercised by the 
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Seminoles.  The nature of the operation did not allow the maintenance of a waterbome 
presence. 
c. Lieutenant McLaughlin's Campaign 
(1) Objective. The formation of the "Mosquito Fleet" afforded LT 
McLaughlin the opportunity to devote all available combat potential towards denying the 
enemy longitudinal movement along waterways within the Everglades. Once the "fleet" 
units had established an effective "perimeter" around the Everglades, McLaughlin sought 
to deny the enemy both longitudinal and cross-waterway movement within the interior. 
(2) Means. McLaughlin positioned his "fleet" around the southern 
peninsula of Florida in a three tier arrangement, with mutual support provide within and 
between each tier. The schooners provided an outer barrier just outside the coastal waters 
and the gunbarges formed the secondary barrier closer inshore and around coastal islands. 
Once the fleet established control of all vital points along the coastal waterways, riverine 
operations commenced to patrol all navigable inland waterways within the Everglades. 
(3) Forces. Initially, the Mosquito Fleet consisted of three 
schooners and associated barges, two gunbarges, a number of flat-bottomed boats, a few 
canoes, and a landing force of 150 men. As operations progressed in obtaining more area 
control, the fleet increased to seven schooners with associated barges, three gunbarges, 
140 canoes, and an aggregate force of 622 men. By the later stages of the campaign, 
Army and Navy forces joined up to form riverine "task forces," that conducted operations 
deep within the interior for periods up to 60 days. They effectively created a waterborne 
presence. Operations persisted for the duration of the campaign but at a very high cost 
to personnel and equipment. 
(4) Level of control. The formation of the Mosquito Fleet and its 
subsequent growth provided the means to initially gain temporary control of the 
longitudinal traffic along the major waterways of the Everglades. Control of the cross- 
water movement could not be achieved until riverine forces started patrolling the 
waterways within the interior.   Once operations with large riverine forces commenced, 
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the temporary control of both longitudinal and cross-waterway movement within the 
Everglades was served. 
2.  The Elements of the Combat Process 
a.   Command and Control 
Riverine operations were not integrated into the overall campaign plan 
during the initial years of the war. As with all operations, the absence of a joint unified 
command structure greatly impeded the ability to join forces and prosecute the war 
efficiently. Riverine operations were an ad hoc function for the blockade force 
commander, who would cooperate with an army commander to support the land campaign 
plan. At times, these coordinated operations resulted in confusion during the execution 
phase, especially when the Secretary of War directed the riverine force's employment in 
support of the land campaign. To add to this complex command structure, all naval 
vessels within the theater of operations did not fall under the operational control of the 
blockade force commander. The army had operational and administrative control of 
schooners, barges, and steamships not belonging to the West India Squadron. This 
condition delayed the effective integration of riverine forces into the overall campaign 
plan. Fortunately, at the tactical level, cooperation between naval and military 
commanders resulted in a more favorable employment of riverine forces for specific 
operations. 
(1) LT Powell's Campaign. LT Powell maintained operational 
control of both personnel and equipment of the riverine force, allowing him to prosecute 
independent and supporting operations. The decentralized control exercised by the field 
commander granted Powell authority to meet the needs of the supported commander as 
he saw fit. Due to communications restrictions of that period, Powell exercised direct 
tactical control of his forces by positioning himself forward during all operations. While 
underway, Powell controlled boat formations through visual and audible signals. 
Effective command and control was dependent upon training and unit cohesiveness. 
(2) Colonel Harney's Campaign. Colonel Harney's campaign was 
exemplary of independent operations not in support of another unit. Once permission was 
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granted by the field commander, Harney was free to conduct his raiding campaign where 
and how he saw fit. To maintain control of his small riverine force, Harney placed 
himself well forward within the formation of canoes. Single file formation (column) with 
strict noise discipline facilitated command and control of the entire force. Drawing upon 
personnel from his own regiment, the colonel enjoyed increased control through close unit 
cohesiveness. 
(3) LT McLaughlin's Campaign. Assuming command of the 
Mosquito Fleet in December 1839, LT McLaughlin acquired operational control of all 
vessels of the offshore and coastal blockade force. Prior to this, previous commanders 
had to contend with the control of three separate organizations: the offshore blockade 
force, the coastal blockade force, and the revenue cutter force under the control of the 
War Department. For the first time since the beginning of the war, the naval commander 
could direct all operations within his area of operations, which now included the 
Everglades. McLaughlin strategically placed his forces to meet the demands of war. The 
command ship, the schooner Flirt, maintained a center position within the Florida Keys 
whence McLaughlin directed his operations. Establishing a supply base in the Keys, he 
would also conduct training exercises prior to each riverine operation. During these 
riverine operations, he would position himself in the lead canoe to personally direct the 
operations. Granted decentralized control by the field commander, McLaughlin had 
maximum flexibility to maintain the blockade and continue the "harassment of the 
Indians" as he saw fit. 
b.  Firepower 
The flintlock musket provided the main firepower element during the 
Seminole War. The war was known as the "Flintlock War," because the terrain restricted 
the positioning of artillery against the Indians during land engagements.47 The terrain also 
imposed restrictions upon the firepower for the riverine force. Naval guns provided an 
additional element of fire power only if the vessel could be brought within range of the 
47Mahon, p. 325. 
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enemy. Moisture in waterborne operations within the Everglades made the operation of 
the flintlock musket susceptible to malfunction and misfire. Innovations were necessary 
to deliver firepower upon the Seminoles within their riverine sanctuary. 
(1) LT Powell's Campaign. The primary firepower element of the 
early riverine force was the Model 1816, Caliber .69, flintlock smoothbore musket.48 A 
well trained marksman was capable of firing accurately to a range of 100 yards; however, 
reloading was a timely process (in theory, 3 rounds a minute for the average soldier). 
The terrain of the Everglades barred the use of the weapon at standoff distances; most 
engagements occurred within 50 to 100 yards meant that the first volley was usually 
followed by the traditional charge. Often, the dense vegetation and swamps hindered the 
commander's control over such assaults. 
Naval guns aboard the blockading ships provided the most lethal 
firepower available to the riverine force. However, the naval gun provided firepower 
primarily at the periphery of the theater of hostilities. Depending on the draft of the 
vessels, only limited firepower could be provided for operations on coastal and inland 
waterways. During the early stages of the war, the decentralized control of all vessels 
further limited the amount of available firepower. Whereas the Army controlled most of 
the vessels that operated along the navigable rivers, the Navy's vessels remained in the 
coastal waters.  The following type vessels were utilized in the Seminole War:49 
Sloop-of-War 18 guns 6-32 pounders 
Schooner 1 - 2 guns 6-24 pounders 
Steamer 1 - 2 guns 6-12 pounders 
Gunbarge 1 - 4 guns 4-12 pounders 
Mackinaw boat(flat-bottomed) 1 gun 4-pounder 
48Ibid., p. 121. 
"'Howard I. Chapelle, The History of The American Sailing Navy: The Ships and Their Development 
(New York: Bonanza Books, 1949), p. 156, 427, 227, 413. 
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The vast potential for firepower was restricted to the coastal and 
navigable inland waterways. Beyond the river inlets, the flat-bottomed boat with the 4- 
pounder was the extent of naval gunfire support. For the interior waterways, this 
capability was sacrificed due to the need for shallower draft boats. Firepower for riverine 
operations within the Everglades ultimately rested upon what the individual soldier, sailor, 
or marine could carry to close with and engage the enemy. 
(2) Colonel Harney's Campaign. The primary firepower element 
for Colonel Harney's operations was still the individual weapon. However, this was no 
longer limited to the single-shot flintlock musket. Harney and his dragoons are 
recognized as the first unit in the United States to use repeating rifles in combat. This 
weapon was the Paterson Colt Revolving Cylinder Percussion Carbine, Model 1836, 
Caliber .69, seven shot, hammerless, with a 32 inch barrel.50 Although the Colt was 
shunned by most other military officers during the time, Harney recognized its increased 
firepower. It allowed Harney to reduce the size of his unit but still maintain the same 
volume of fire. Additionally, the traditional tactic of "volley and charge" gave way to 
his "irregular" use of continuous and intermittent fire. 
(3) LT McLaughlin's Campaign. Unlike his predecessors, LT 
McLaughlin controlled the naval gunfire support provided by his blockade force, but this 
was still restricted to coastal waters and navigable rivers. Since McLaughlin preferred 
the use of the large, ten-man and smaller, three-man canoes, the naval gun mounted on 
flat-bottomed boats rarely provided fire support for his operations. This placed a 
premium on the individual weapons of the soldiers, sailors, and marines. 
The primary firepower element for later riverine forces was initially 
the flintlock musket. As in the Harney campaign, LT McLaughlin recognized the 
advantages of the repeating shoulder weapon. He convinced the Secretary of War to 
purchase the Paterson Colt Revolving Percussion Carbine, Model 1839, Caliber .47, six 
50A. Merwyn Carey, American Firearms Makers (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1953), 
p. 20. 
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shot, with a 24.5 inch barrel.51 This increased firepower allowed McLaughlin to reduce 
the size of his unit without sacrificing the volume of fire. The potential for continuous 
and intermittent firepower prompted McLaughlin to divide his riverine forces into smaller 
independent task units. 
c.  Scouting 
The riverine force depended on its own scouting capability for the conduct 
of operations. The lack of maps placed a premium upon an intimate knowledge of the 
countryside.52 Intelligence from higher command did not usually provide timely or 
accurate information. The separation of naval and military command of the coastal and 
inland water vessels also prevented the dissemination of intelligence to the riverine force 
commander. The absence of telegraph and rapid courier transit further hampered the 
dissemination of information to units operating in the immediate area. 
(1) LT Powell's Campaign. The riverine force was restricted to 
information that could be immediately disseminated to the commander. The use of flat- 
bottomed boats, canoes, and limited foot patrols for scouting the interior waterways was 
the extent of information gathering activities. This prompted the necessity to enlist the 
support of local inhabitants, which usually meant capturing Indians or former slaves. 
Attempting an expedition or an assault into the interior without the assistance of a 
"reliable" guide resulted in disaster or a futile operation as in the case of LT Powell's 
earlier operations. 
(2) Colonel Harney's Campaign. Colonel Harney put his trust and 
confidence in the abilities of captured slaves to lead his unit to the Indian encampments. 
The colonel understood the futility of undertaking an operation deep within the interior 
without such a capability. The absence of such an essential asset delayed the colonel's 
raiding operations for over 18 months.   Once a guide was obtained, he would exploit 
51Charles Edward Chapel, The Gun Collector's Handbook of Values (New York: Coward-McCann, 
Inc., 1970), p. 285. 
"Mahon, p. 129. 
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every detail of information that could bring his force closer to the enemy. As with LT 
Powell, the colonel was restricted to the information gathering activities provided by his 
own resources.  Advance scouting parties in canoes were used during the operations. 
(3) LT McLaughlin's Campaign. The formation of the Mosquito 
Fleet under one operational command provided LT McLaughlin with an inherent scouting 
capability. By merging the schooners and barges together, he established an effective 
offshore and coastal surveillance system. This became crucial for his forthcoming 
riverine operations. He dispatched exploring parties along the coast for the development 
of navigation charts in support of future operations. His extensive use of native guides 
include the services of a captured Indian leader named Chia, who led many long 
expeditions into the swamps. Prior to the landing of riverine forces, McLaughlin also 
dispatched advance scouting parties to conduct reconnaissance. As with Colonel Harney, 
McLaughlin was very reluctant to conduct operations in the interior without the assistance 
of a reliable guide. 
d. Antiscouting 
The movement of riverine forces at night was the most effective means to 
limit enemy scouting activity. This was a most difficult task to perform especially in 
unfamiliar territory with vastly changing terrain features. The importance of a "reliable" 
guide becomes apparent with this activity. 
(1) LT Powell's Campaign. Powell conducted night movements 
but at a high cost of time and energy exerted by his personnel. Moreover the temporary 
nature of the assignment of forces inhibited the ability to conduct extensive training in 
night land and water navigation. LT Powell relied upon the services of the Creek Indians 
and ex-slaves to covertly gather information concerning the Seminole Indians. The use 
of these agents was limited due to problems with reliability and availability. 
(2) Colonel Harney's Campaign. By reducing the number of 
personnel and relying on swift and stealthy canoes for mobility, the colonel was able to 
move his force along the Everglades' shallow waterways faster than the previous, larger 
riverine forces.    The low profile of the five man canoe afforded more potential for 
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concealment in the swamps. Also, canoes traversed the water "quieter" than other vessels. 
A canoe force conducting a night movement was the most efficient means of precluding 
effective enemy scouting. Command and control at night with a small force embarked 
in canoes was less difficult. Independent operations by one unit diminished the difficulty 
of the night movement due to stronger small unit cohesiveness. By violating a superior's 
order, Harney achieved deception by disguising his force as Indians to achieve surprise. 
This deception proved to be the critical element for success of the raid. 
(3) LT McLaughlin's Campaign. LT McLaughlin used various 
techniques to foil enemy scouting activity. For one, he staggered his ship movements 
along the coast to confuse enemy scouting. For another, and like his predecessors, he 
conducted night movements and ensured that noise discipline was strictly enforced. He 
used ship's sextant to navigate in the swamps by using predominant hummocks as a 
platform to make observations. During day movements, he dispatched scouting parties 
in small canoes to provide early warning against a possible enemy counterattack. These 
parties camouflaged their canoes when patrolling ashore was required. On one occasion, 
this activity resulted in the ambush of an Indian scouting party embarked in canoes. As 
with Colonel Harney, McLaughlin used deception prior to his major expedition into the 
Everglades. After feinting entry into the Everglades from the east, as was past common 
practice, McLaughlin penetrated from the west while maintaining a holding force along 
the eastern seaboard. His prior charting of the western waters of the Everglades 
facilitated this maneuver. 
e.  Screening 
The schooners and barges provided limited protection for the riverine 
operations along the coast and deeper rivers. While the vessels could deter the enemy 
from "flanking" the riverine force if within range of the naval guns, the riverine force 
itself had to depend on its organic firepower to secure its movement deep within the 
interior. 
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(1) LT Powell's Campaign. The deployment of small "exploration 
parties" facilitated safe transit but reduced the speed of the advance. Powell often 
eliminated screening elements when a guide was employed. 
(2) Colonel Harney's Campaign. As is the case with most raids, 
screening elements can often forewarn the enemy of impending attack by a larger unit. 
Consequently, the balance between security and surprise had to be considered by riverine 
forces. Emphasis towards anti-scouting activities prevailed over the emphasis of 
counterforce. Harney was of the personality to risk that security based upon confidence 
in the guide and the firepower capability of his riverine force. 
(3) LT McLaughlin's Campaign. As stated earlier, the use of the 
coastal and offshore blockade force ships provided a screening capability for riverine 
operations conducted in close proximity to the shore. Within the interior, the advance 
scouting parties and the establishment of ambush sites performed screening and 
antiscouting functions. With the formation of the Mosquito Fleet, LT McLaughlin's 
positioning of ships and riverine forces provided a capability to respond to an enemy 
counterforce. 
/  Maneuver 
Early riverine operations relied on launches and cutters drawn from the 
blockade force. Keel barges provided a limited "lift" capability, but they could not 
operate in the shallow rivers. Riverine operations within the interior depended on the 
flat-bottomed boats that carried up to 15 armed and equipped personnel. Boat movement 
was controlled by close formations that allowed a hasty debarkation of personnel to 
launch an attack. Regular infantry tactics were employed once the force was ashore. 
Initially a line formation to control both firepower and movement was the standard tactic 
of the day when an enemy was confronted. The tactics of the enemy prompted a change 
to irregular "skirmish tactics" that proved more conducive to the nature of the conflict and 
the terrain.  This was similar to that experienced by the British during the Seven Years 
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War and the American War of Independence.53 Unfortunately for the U.S., the exploits 
of Rogers' Rangers and Marion's Swamp Foxes were later "frowned upon" by those who 
felt a need for "well disciplined regulars with a suitable respect for authority."54 In 
addition to skirmish tactics, a night movement was a common technique to approach an 
enemy position; however, attacks were normally conducted in daylight. Traditional 
weapons handling procedures and control of a unit's firepower restricted combat to 
daylight. 
(1) LT Powell's Campaign. The movement of the riverine force 
as one maneuver element was the standard practice during the early war years. 
Maneuvering in company to battalion size formations were the common practice when 
trying to engage the enemy. This facilitated the massing of the firepower thought 
necessary to overwhelm the Indians. The need for quick access to overwhelming 
firepower drove the requirement for a large riverine force, which proved disadvantageous. 
(2) Colonel Harney's Campaign. Colonel Harney chose to 
maneuver his force as one element towards the intended assault site. The choice to use 
the canoe and movement in column envisaged lateral dispersion of the force if immediate 
cover and concealment were required. This formation allowed maximum firepower to 
be delivered along the flank, the most vulnerable position within the column. Also, 
column formation allowed for the hasty transit through danger areas. Once debarked, 
the riverine force immediately attacked the enemy using "irregular" fire and movement 
tactics without the commander exercising control over the unit. 
(3) LT McLaughlin's Campaign. LT McLaughlin's riverine force 
maneuvered in a variety of ways in the four years that he commanded the Mosquito Fleet. 
Single axis approach by one force later evolved to the deployment of several forces 
converging on the same target from different directions.   Sweeping missions, flushing 
"Robert Leckie, The Wars of America (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), pp. 44-49. 
See also Kenneth Roberts, Northwest Passage (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1936), pp. 
146-174. 
"Ellis, p. 53. 
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missions, and finally large-scale pincer movements highlighted the operations of the 
riverine force. Favoring the use of the large dugout and smaller canoes, Mclaughlin's task 
forces penetrated the far reaches of the Everglades. Drawing from the strengths of his 
predecessors, mobility with the "irregular" delivery of firepower, he achieved a tactical 
advantage over the Seminoles that proved decisive to the outcome of the war. 
C.  THE ENEMY'S CAMPAIGN 
1. Objective 
The objective of the Seminole Indians was to harass and disrupt the efforts of the 
U.S. military to remove them from their homeland. Exploiting the use of the rivers and 
swamps provided the less numerous Seminoles with an "equalizing element" in their fight 
against the vast combat potential of the U.S. military. 
2. Means 
The Indians used rivers to conduct limited raids and ambushes against specific 
U.S. military forces and supporting supply bases. Operating from within the Everglades, 
the Indians demonstrated a riverine expertise by sustaining an insurgency within difficult 
terrain. Until the effective employment of U.S. riverine forces, the Seminoles exploited 
the use of all waterways within the interior and temporary use of specific coastal and 
inland waterways. 
3. Forces 
The Seminoles used units of various sizes to conduct their guerrilla campaign. 
Initially, large forces were employed to conduct offensive operations against settlements 
and forts. Once the U.S. commenced the ground offensive campaign, the Indians shifted 
towards small unit defensive operations which used the tactics of terror, ambush, and the 
raid. However, the Indians were still capable of launching major operations with riverine 
forces that numbered as many as 200 warriors. 
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4.  Level of Control 
Physical control of the riverine area was not necessary to sustain the insurgency, 
however, intermittent longitudinal-waterway movement along specific waterways was 
essential for offensive operations. Likewise, intermittent cross-water movement within 
the interior was necessary to conduct defensive operations. Mobility was coupled with 
a detailed and intimate knowledge of the Everglades. This knowledge facilitated a better 
intelligence [scouting] capability than that of the U.S. These three necessary conditions 
determined the leading warriors' control of the Seminole Tribes. The tribe provided the 
essentials for the sustainment of the insurgency: supplies, recruits, and intelligence. 
D.  THE ENEMY'S ELEMENTS OF THE COMBAT PROCESS 
(Those peculiar to the conduct of riverine operations.) 
1.  Counterforce 
The capacity to reduce the effect of the U.S military's firepower. The Seminole 
Indians created an effective counterforce by wise use of difficult terrain, guerrilla tactics, 
and Spanish-made rifles. The synergism of these elements provided the necessary 
firepower to thwart the traditional assault tactics of larger U.S. forces. 
a. Defensive Force 
The capacity to either destroy attacking weapons or defeat them by 
"softkill" methods other than shooting them down. The Seminole Nation retreated to the 
Everglades to affect "softkill" methods by maneuvering to avoid the superior firepower 
of U.S. forces and sapping its energy. As in the Plains Indian Wars, the environment 
produced more casualties for the U.S. forces than resulted from actual combat. Of 4,191 
U.S. regulars who participated in the war, 350 were killed in action and 1,116 suffered 
non-battle deaths. 
b. Staying Power 
The capacity to absorb damage and continue fighting with measurable 
effectiveness. Four years after the U.S. launched total war against the Seminole Nation, 
the warriors maintained the capability to launch a major offensive.  On August 6, 1840, 
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the Indians launched an amphibious raid after nightfall over 30 miles of open water. One 
hundred and thirty-five Seminoles attacked a supply base located on Indian Key Island 
and repelled the subsequent relief effort. Two barges armed with 4-pounders were turned 
away after the Indians returned fire with a captured 6-pounder loaded with musket shot.55 
c. Cover 
Secrecy, camouflage, or concealment to avoid attack. The Indians were 
masters of the use of camouflage and concealment in military operations and in the covert 
cultivation of basic subsistence. One unique application of concealment in military 
operations involved the placement of scouts and snipers high in the cypress trees of the 
swamps. The Indian covered himself with Spanish moss to blend in with the tree and 
surrounding area. In order to minimize the destruction of vital subsistence, covert crop 
cultivation areas were scattered throughout the Everglades. These "wild vegetable" plots, 
separated by patches and swamps, were discovered in previously patrolled territory as late 
as May 1842.  One plot was discovered within a few hundred meters of a U.S fort.56 
d. Deception 
Deliberate misrepresentation of reality to gain an advantage. The Indians 
often used numerous peace negotiations to rebuild and reconstitute their combat potential 
and cultivate crops. Colonel Harney fell victim to this practice when his unsuspecting 
unit suffered an attack at a trading post. 
e. Dispersion 
The displacement of units that carry force. The manpower basis for the 
Seminole Nation were small dispersed family bands or groups. This facilitated a 
capability to maintain a fluid and flexible combat organizational structure. When 
required, large strike units were quickly assembled and/or promptly dispersed into small 
ambush elements to meet the threat posed by U.S. forces. 
"Jack Sweetman, American Naval History: An Illustrated Chronology Of The U.S. Navy And 
Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), p. 47. 
56Peters, pp. 223-224. 
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2. Antiscouting 
Actions taken to destroy, diminish, or preclude U.S. scouting effectiveness. 
Antiscouting activities of the Indians included the use of "one man" camps to lead U.S. 
forces away from protected areas. This campsite positioned on a small hill facilitated 
observation of approaching U.S. forces. The practice of forming trails from the river to 
these campsites would induce U.S. scouts to compromise their activity. Once the scouts 
were observed, smoke signalling was used to alert the surrounding area. The use of 
smoke was also used to distract the scouting efforts of the U.S. Conversely , U.S. forces 
relied upon smoke as a sign of enemy activity. Another means of Indian antiscouting was 
the removal of wounded or killed warriors during a conflict. This precluded a proper 
battle damage assessment by the U.S. forces. The most effective means of antiscouting 
was the specific targeting of U.S. scouts and guides. To this end, the Indians were 
effective snipers. Seminole defectors were recognized to be the primary intelligence asset 
for the U.S. forces. This prompted a terror campaign within the Seminole nation to 
preclude collusion with the U.S. forces, death as the penalty for an Indian who violated 
this law. 
3. Command and Control Countermeasures 
Actions taken to defeat or delay the effectiveness of the enemy's command and 
control. The Indians ambushed message couriers and intercepted mail transports to 
disrupt the command and control of widely dispersed U.S. forces. Revenue schooners and 
barges were attacked, thereby disrupting the primary means of communication along 
coastal and inland waterways. In battle, the Seminoles would employ snipers to eliminate 
controlling elements of combat units. U.S. officers were favorite targets of this activity. 
E.  TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS 
The Seminole War occurred during the last days of the Age of Sail. The influence 
of the naval officers within this war prompted the innovations by those officers who 
sought a better way to fight the next riverine war. 
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1. Steam Propulsion 
Commander Mayo, LT McLaughlin's predecessor as commander of the blockade 
force, was a proponent of steamships for riverine operations. Although the early steamers 
did not preform well, Mayo proposed that two steamships be built with the following 
specifications: shallow draft of no more than 12 inches, 35 feet in length, and a crew of 
30 men for operations up to 30 days. Also required were rifle bullet proof sections that 
could be attached and removed from the sides. Armament included either a four or six- 
pounder surrounded by the protective section. Despite LT Powell's earlier successes, 
Mayo considered the penetration of the Everglades by small riverine forces boats to be 
futile effort without sufficient firepower, especially naval gunfire support.57 
2. A Riverine Schooner 
As the commander of the blockade force, McLaughlin attempted to increase the 
firepower of his "fleet." Although he predominantly pursued the enemy with the shallow- 
draft canoe, he directed attention to improving the effectiveness of schooners. He 
proposed the following to the Secretary of War: 
... a fast schooner of sixty or seventy tons which would not draw more 
than five or six feet of water: it should have a beam wide enough to store 
a barge in each waist. These barges should draw no more than eight 
inches, be pulled by ten oars and carry fifteen men. The armament should 
consist of one twelve-pounder on the schooner and two light swivel guns 
for the barges.58 
The result was the schooner, Phoenix, which joined the Mosquito Fleet in May 1841. 
McLaughlin also included  recommendations for increased firepower: 
... six eighteen pounder carronades . . . with Paixhan shot to be used for 
clearing a hammock or to cover an opposed boat landing, if the occasion 
arose.  (Paixhan is a hollow shot filled with a fused explosive charge.  It 
"Buker, p. 93. 
58Ibid., p. 72. 
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is named after a French artillery officer, Henri Joseph Paixhan, who, in 
1822, recommended such charges on French warships.)59 
The 1825 class of 24-gun corvettes were armed with Paixhan shell guns 
as were later ships such as the Portsmouth commissioned in 1844.60 Just 
as the Paixhan shell was introduced to clear a hummuck in the 1840's, the 
Beehive projective was first used in late 1966 by U.S. troops to clear the 
jungles of Vietnam.61 
3. Repeating Firearms 
The Colt repeating weapons did not gain acceptance by most of the military or 
naval officers who used them. The weapons were prone to misfire, especially in the 
damp swamps of the Everglades. Although officers such as Colonel Harney strongly 
encouraged their use, repeating weapons were not considered appropriate for the basic 
soldier for another 60 years.62 
4. Aerial Observation 
An attempt was made to introduce balloons for a reconnaissance capability in the 
early years of the war. However, the proposal was denied by the field commander, 
General Armistead, who thought the forest were "too dense for visibility."63 
59Ibid.,p. 118. 
^Chapelle, p. 438. 
6lT 
'Dupuy, p. 29, defines - a direct fire, defensive antipersonnel artillery round, it was an advance over 
earlier canister-type ammunition.  The Beehive projectile of the U.S. 105mm howitzer is a canister filled 
with 8,500 steel flechettes that is fired in a flat trajectory and detonated by a time fuze.  At detonation 
the flechettes fan out, producing a shotgun affect. 
"Arcadi Gluckman, Identifying Old U.S. Muskets, Rifles, and Carbines (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole 
Books, 1965), p. 293-296. 
"Mahon, pp. 288-289. 
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F.  CONCLUSIONS 
The creation of a riverine force provided the necessary means to deliver firepower 
against an enemy, who operated in marginal terrain. Unable to destroy the enemy, the 
riverine force eventually applied its combat power to destroy the Seminole's vital 
resources. This indirect approach of targeting the Indians' resources was an effective 
means of coercion.64 Direct engagement with the enemy did not usually take place nor 
did it prove necessary. Instead, concentrating on gaining control over the inland and 
coastal waters hindered the Seminoles' mobility and aided the U.S.'s prosecution of the 
war. The key to a successful campaign depended on the riverine force's ability to disrupt 
the Indian's exploitation of cross-waterway movement within the Everglades. 
It took over four years to create a combat force that had the potential to attack the 
Indian's physical, mental, and spiritual will to wage a long and ruthless war. The 
development of an effective riverine capability evolved through four years of trial and 
error. Initially operating from the U.S. Navy's blockade force, LT Powell led numerous 
boat expeditions, which shifted to interdiction operations on inland waterways against the 
Indians. The absence of a unified command at the operational level prevented the proper 
integration of available naval and military resources to exploit this newly founded 
capability. This limited Powell to raiding operations which initially met with defeat when 
traditional tactics were applied against a guerrilla foe. However, by the end of his 
command, LT Powell had increased the combat potential of the riverine force capability. 
The combat potential of Colonel Harney's riverine force highlighted the advantages 
of attacking the enemy with "irregular tactics." This capability was the only effective 
means of engaging an enemy directly. The raid totally depended on recently acquired 
information {intelligence} obtained from a Seminole defector. Also, these defectors led 
forces to the intended objective. The Seminoles quickly adjusted to this intrusion of their 
sanctuary by improving antiscouting activities.   The raiding capability now required an 
4Cable, p. 6. 
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adjacent sustainment capability to engage and weaken the enemy's mobility within the 
Everglades. 
Sustained riverine operations did not take place until the advent of the Mosquito 
Fleet. The fleet integrated all necessary units and resources to conduct year-round 
riverine operations in conjunction with other military operations. The commander, LT 
McLaughlin, would "cooperate" with an adjacent commander, Colonel Harney, to exploit 
the capabilities of both forces.65 The nature of the guerrilla war required the integration 
of a large waterborne presence {clear and hold} with a limited raiding/strike potential 
{search and destroy}. This unified riverine force capability exploited all the elements of 
the combat process to strike at the Seminole Indians nerve center. This nerve 
center [center of gravity] was the Indian society: the people, the village, the crops, and the 
cattle herds.  Author John M. Mahon attributes success to the following: 
One ingredient necessary for the destruction of the vital center of Seminole 
culture was knowledgeable scouting and guiding. Many villages, well 
protected by nature, went undiscovered for years, even though close to 
white strongholds. These, and the Seminoles' remotest hideaways, might 
never have been found, except for the guides who had lately been with the 
Indians. Sometimes the guides were Seminoles; more often they were 
Negroes.66 
Allied with the Seminoles at first, the runaway slaves defected the Indian cause once the 
U.S. established a credible capability to coerce. That capability was the mobile riverine 
force. 
The Seminole Indian War required the services of 60,691 militiamen, volunteers, 
and regulars to fight against 1,200 Indians over a six year period. Only a few hundred 
of these were believed to be warriors.67  At one time, the U.S. deployed approximately 
"Major General William B. Fulton, Vietnam Studies: Riverine Operations (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 1973), p. 5. 
"Mahon, p. 324. 
"Robert M. Utley and Wilcomb E. Washburn, Indian Wars (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1985), p. 133. 
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9,000 men against the Indians. Of the 4,191 regulars who served, 350 were killed in 
action, whereas 1,116 died of noncombatant causes - a total of 41 percent. Although 
approximately 700 Indians were killed during the war, it can not be determined how many 
were warriors. The actual cost of the Seminole Campaign has been estimated at no less 
than $115,032,335.88.68 The Navy accounted for the greatest expenditure due to the 
transport of men and supplies into the theater of operations. Of special note, LT 
McLaughlin underwent a congressional investigation for suspected mishandling of 
government funds when purchasing equipment for the Mosquito Fleet. His expenditure 
of $343,937.00 was questioned; however, he was later exonerated of any wrongdoing. 
Prosecution of the war was notably ruthless. Massacres and atrocities occurred 
from both sides. A frustrated general stated that "to rid the country of them[Seminoles] 
you must exterminate them." Unable to bring the elusive Indians to battle, generals sought 
out the guerrillas in operations that would become known as "search and destroy."69 
After six years of a brutal and costly war, the hostilities ended without treaty. The 
primary objective of fighting the war - removal of all Seminole Indians - was never 
accomplished. The U.S. government eventually granted the remaining Indians a 
"temporary" reservation south of Pease Creek within the Everglades.70 Succeeding in 
asserting their autonomy, the Seminoles remain their today. In 1967, John M. Mahon 
concludes his History of the Second Seminole War with: 
... the fact that they [U.S. Government] finally were forced to permit a 
handful of unconquered Seminoles to remain in the Everglades stands as 
an eternal reminder of the difficulties of combating guerrilla-style 
operations.71 
68Warren W. Hassler, Jr., With Shield and Sword {Amts, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1982), p. 
115. 
69Williams, p. 142. 
70Hassler, p. 115. 
"Mahon, p. 325. 
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III.  RIVERINE  WARFARE IN THE MEKONG DELTA:   1966-1969 
A.  THE WAR 
1.  Nature of the Conflict 
The war in Vietnam was the setting for America's most intensive riverine warfare 
experience against an unconventional opponent. As in the Seminole and Civil Wars, the 
Army and the Navy were not prepared initially. Both services had to merge personnel 
and resources into a Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) in an attempt to achieve the ultimate 
objective: pacification of the Mekong Delta. The objective of the Viet Cong (VC) was 
to challenge the attempts by U.S. and Republic of Vietnam (RVN) forces to solidify 
political and military control down to the hamlet level. Refusing to yield to pacification 
efforts, the VC waged an offensive insurgency war in the Mekong Delta. 
Encompassing an area approximately as large as the lower Florida peninsula, the 
Delta was "a strategic prize in the struggle for political control in Vietnam. . . [it] 
contains a large percentage of the country's population, and is its bread-basket."72 The 
area was inhabited by over six million Vietnamese, who lived in closely spaced rural 
settlements and worked in the rice fields. The inundated Delta provided the ideal 
sanctuary from which the VC could wage its guerrilla war. The Viet Cong prosecuted 
a guerrilla war in the Delta. Prior to the Tet Offensive in 1968, North Vietnamese Army 
(NVA) involvement in the Delta was restricted to a small advisory and logistic role. By 
mid-1966, VC strength in the area was estimated at approximately 80, 000 Viet Cong; 
close to five percent were NVA.73 By 1970, after the VC had suffered heavy losses in 
the Tet Offensive and following counteroffensive, NVA forces came to comprise 30 
percent of the Viet Cong forces operating in the Delta.74  From 1966 through 1969, the 
"Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force 1967 Environment Study.  Washington, D.C.: March 1967, p. 
25. 
"Micheal Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other 
Figures, 1618-1991, Vol. II, (Jefferson, NC:  McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1993), p. 1239. 
74Ibid., p. 1293. 
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MRF contested the Viet Cong with a force of little over 5,000 sailors and soldiers. For 
three years, the field commanders employed the MRF in different roles in an attempt to 
wrestle military control of the Delta from the Viet Cong. 
2. Evolution of Riverine Warfare 
The VC controlled the people at the village and hamlet level. They had immediate 
access to recruits, intelligence, and supplies. By contrast, political and military control by 
the central government of Saigon never reached below the district level.75 To change this 
situation, the Saigon government required a strategy that denied the enemy's use of the 
waterways. Recognizing that the RVN's conventionally trained military forces were 
incapable of success, the United States established the MRF. For the VC, the Delta 
became the natural "equalizer" against the regular land force's superior firepower. 
Operating from the Delta, the VC mounted numerous raids and returned to the safety of 
this impregnable sanctuary. It took the efforts of a Navy captain and Army colonel to 
organize a riverine force to bring the battle to the VC. 
3. Early Riverine Operations 
The United States Navy initiated operation "Market Time" (TF 115) off the coast 
of South Vietnam, in March 1965. The barrier force intercepted few large shipments; 
its presence deterred the seaborne NVA infiltration. The blockade was maintained 
throughout the war, supported by patrol aircraft, destroyers and destroyer escorts, patrol 
gunboats, Coast Guard cutters, coastal patrol boats, and Vietnamese Navy (VNN) vessels. 
However, the VC continued receiving war material and assistance from the NVA through 
Sihanoukville, Cambodia and the upper reaches of the Mekong Delta's waterways. In 
order to operate in the shallow inland and coastal waters, the Navy purchased shallow- 
draft "Swift" boats (PCFs). With these craft, the Navy launched operation "Game 
Warden" in December 1965 in an effort to deny the enemy's use of the waterways. In 
addition to the Swift boats, the Navy used river patrol boats (PBRs) and helicopters. Like 
"The administrative structure consisted of the village, district, and province.  The province included 
several districts, which included numerous villages. 
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the Swifts, the PBR had to be purchased specifically for the river patrol mission. It took 
two years before the Navy reached its authorized number of PBRs, which at the height 
of Game Warden, included a force of 220 PBRs and 35 helicopters. Game Warden units 
were organized into a naval task force (TF 116). 
By late 1966, the Viet Cong were operating from the Rung Sat Special Zone 
(RSSZ) to wage an effective raiding campaign along the water routes connecting Saigon 
to the sea. The Navy's operations on the periphery of the RSSZ provided only limited 
support for the land campaign. A completely different and innovative strategy was 
required. While a member of Naval Advisory Group Vietnam, Navy Captain David F. 
Welch proposed a concept of operations to General Westmoreland, Commander U.S. 
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV). Westmoreland forwarded this 
idea: 
In much the same way that U.S. forces in, for example, the Seminole War 
and the Civil War had used waterways to facilitate military operations, 
why could we not create special units equipped to utilize the extensive 
waterways of the Delta to get at the Viet Cong?76 
This concept would lay the foundation for an effective strategy that called for the 
development of riverine forces and tactics. It took six months of building upon available 
naval assets before the riverine force could fully exploit this unique form of warfare 
against a guerrilla opponent. In 1966, the Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force (MDMAF) 
concept, shortly renamed the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF), was approved. 
4.  Riverine Warfare Campaign 
In March 1966, COMUSMACV and Commander Naval Forces Vietnam 
(COMNAVFORV) sought to exploit the waterways through inland amphibious operations, 
and developed the concept of joining together a naval river assault force and a brigade 
size ground force.   The Army and Navy prepared for deployment of the MRF to the 
76General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1976), p. 
208. 
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Mekong Delta. The MRF's mission was to "seek out and destroy Viet Cong main and 
local force units, their resources, and their infrastructure, and to open waterways of the 
Mekong Delta to commerce."77 The first operational elements arrived in theater, 
established the supporting elements, and launched initial operations in January 1967. In 
early 1967, Task Force 117, the naval component, and the 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry 
Division, the ground component, arrived in South Vietnam as the two combat elements 
of the MRF. Shortly thereafter, they began operations in the RSSZ. By June 1967, the 
MRF had engaged in a series of operations in the RSSZ and the Mekong Delta. 
TF 117's River Assault Flotilla 1 consisted of converted LCM-6 craft and specially 
designed Armored Support Patrol Boats (ASPB). The converted LCM-6 included 
monitors, zippos (monitors with two flame throwers positioned in the bow), hospital craft, 
LCMs with helicopter landing platforms, armored troop carriers (ATCs), and 
command/communication boats (CCBs). Floating artillery barges were developed for 
105mm howitzers. By June 1967, the TF 117 River Assault Flotilla 1 consisted of two 
River Assault Squadrons (RAS) was assigned two River Assault Divisions. Each RAS 
consisted of 26 ATCs, 5 Monitors, and 2 CCBs, and 1 Refueler.78 By October the Navy 
added Armored Support Patrol Boats (ASPBs) to each RAS. 
The MRF became a true riverine force in theory and in practice. It included both 
naval and military elements, which exploited the inland waterways for numerous short 
duration "search and destroy" operations. During a few operations the MRF attempted 
to sustain "clear and hold" operations within selected areas for a period up to one month. 
Dedicated artillery units and air support increased the MRF's available firepower to fix 
and destroy VC units. The river assault craft provided the mobility to attack the VC in 
areas previously impervious to sustained large ground force operations. 
"Captain Wade C. Wells, USN, (Ret,), "Riverine Operations in Vietnam" in Full Mission Profile 
(Naval Special Warfare professional Publication, 1992) pp. 41-42. 
78Norman Friedman, U.S. Small Combatants: Including PT-Boats, Subchasers, and the Brown-Water 
Navy: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Pres, 1987), p. 328. 
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Overall, the MRF's operations can be divided into three phases, with each having 
fairly distinct characteristics:79 
Phase I (2 June 1967 to 31 January 1968) included search and destroy operations 
primarily against VC main and local units in Dinh Tuong and Long An Provinces. A 







19 Jun 67 Eastern Cam Giuoc Dist 
Long An Province 
256 74 (US) 
28-29 Jun 67 Cam Son area, Dinh 
Tuong Province 
300 149 (VNMC) 
38 (US) 
14-16 Sep 67 Cam Son area 213 16 
6 Oct 67 Cam Son area 100 (Not Reported) 
18Nov67 
(VNMC) 
Ciao Due Dist 
Dinh Tuong Province 
266 Moderate 
98 (US) 
10 Jan 68 Cai Be Dist 47 68 (US) 
Dinh Tuong Province 
Table 1.    Summary of Major Battles: Phase I8 
79The idea for dividing the operations into phases, the included tables, and figures were extracted 
from Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Loper, "The Mobile Riverine Force or the Marriage of the Brown 
Water Navy and Rice Paddy Army," published study, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U. S. Army War College, 
9 March 1970), pp. 47 - 57. 
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Figure 2.  Phase I Area of Operations (2 June 1967-31 January 1968) 80 
loper, p. 49. 
56 
Phase II (1 February 1968 to 8 August 1968) was highlighted by the Tet 
Counteroffensive and several riverine search and destroy operations into the central Delta. 







1-2 Feb 68 My Tho 120 65 
4-6 Feb 68 Vic Vinh Long 142 94 
14 Feb- 
2 Mar 68 
Vic Can Tho 321 242 
4 Apr 68 Vic Ben Tre 85 205 
14 May 68 Vic Mo Cay 57 (N/A) 
28 Jul - 
7 Aug 68 
Cai Be Dist 249 (N/A) 
Table 2.   Summary of Major Battles:  Phase II82 
82- Loper, p. 52. 
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Figure 3.  Phase II Area of Operations (1 February 1968-8 August 1968) 82 
"Loper, p. 53. 
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Phase III (9 August 1968 to 30 June 1969) found the MRF committed to support 
the pacification of Kien Hoa Province, which restricted riverine operations primarily to 
the eastern Delta. Table 3 shows principal engagements. Figure 4 portrays the area of 
operations. 
Date Location 
23 Oct 68 Vic Mo Cay 
22-23 Jan 69 (unreported) 
20 Feb 69 Giom Trom Dist 
31 Mar 69 Vinh Binh Province 
20-22 Apr 69 Vinh Bin Province 
21 May 69 Vic Ben Tre 












MLoper, p. 57. 
Table 3.  Summary of Major Battles:  Phase III84 
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Figure 4.  Phase III Area of Operations (9 August 1968-30 June 1969) 84 
"Fulton, p. 134. 
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From 1967 to late January 1968, the MRF primarily conducted strike (search and 
destroy) operations in the Long An and Dinh Tuong Provinces. Operations usually lasted 
two to four days with approximately eight operations launched per month. Usually, no 
more than four 4-day operations could be undertaken each month due to the high rate of 
immersion foot cases when the troops remained in the swampy areas for any period over 
three days. Typically, MRF operations employed battalion-size operations up to late April 
1967. After that the availability of greater numbers of riverine craft allowed 
multi-battalion operations. The typical modus operandi was for the river assault craft to 
transport companies to landing sites, whereupon the units maneuvered to envelop a 
suspected enemy base area. The riverine craft supported the ground troops with transport, 
fire, and blocking stations. Also, the river craft repositioned forces to intercept the VC 
or support other units engaged  in an assault. 
From February to August 1968, the MRF participated in the Tet counteroffensive 
and numerous riverine assaults in the central Delta. Beginning in early August, the MRF 
was expanded and divided into two Groups; Alpha and Bravo. Mobile Riverine Group 
Alpha was assigned the mission of pacification (clear and hold) in Kien Hoa Province 
until July 1969. Mobile Riverine Group Bravo pursued operations in the western Delta. 
Between December 1966 and August 1969, the 9th Infantry Division lost 2,624 killed in 
action and 18,831 wounded in action, which included the airmobile assaults as well as the 
riverine force operations. 
As previously noted, the MRF pursued two distinct types of operations: search and 
destroy, and clear and hold. The following two cases provide an in depth look at how 
each was carried out. 
a.  MRF Search and Destroy Operations (Phase I/II) 
In June 1967, the MRF launched a series of search and destroy operations, 
under the code names of Coronado I through XI. Most of these operations followed the 
same pattern. First, the MRF would receive information on the whereabouts of enemy 
units, usually from Vietnamese units in the province. It then quickly drafted a 
coordinated plan with participating Vietnamese forces and U.S. units for locating, 
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immobilizing, and destroying the enemy. Usually, the planning and execution of the 
operation together took seven to ten days. This required extensive coordination with other 
U.S. and Vietnamese units, and between the MRF's Army and Navy components. After 
completion of a mission, the MRF either continued to exploit the available information 
of enemy activity in the province, or pulled up anchor to shift the Mobile Riverine Base 
to a new area of operations. The following example focuses on a typical search and 
destroy mission conducted during Operation Coronado V (12 September - 7 October 
1967).  It is representative of the MRF's Phase I/II operations. 
The MRF had operated in the Dinh Tuong Province on previous operations 
and knew the location of the enemy's prepared fighting positions. The commanding 
officer of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Colonel Bert A. David, developed a plan 
to assault the VC's heaviest fortifications along the Räch Ba Ria waterway in Cam Son 
area. To keep the enemy from dispersing again, he planned to withhold preparatory 
artillery fire and limit helicopter overflights until the MRF had cleared the first bend in 
the waterway. David also decided to delay the overland movement of one battalion from 
Cai Lay until after the ATCs with two battalions embarked had penetrated the Rach Ba 
Ria.  He placed one heliborne battalion on standby at the Dong Tarn base area. 
On 15 September, under the cover of darkness, two River Assault 
Squadrons with the two battalions embarked made their way from the Mobile Riverine 
Base toward the objective area. Shortly after 0700, they entered the waterway to find 
heavy vegetation along both banks and a series of tree lines covering the ground inland. 
The first RAS consisting of 23 craft with one battalion aboard entered the waterway in 
a standard formation. Two ATCs preceded the column and performed mine sweeping 
duties ahead of the formation by dragging a chain abaft along the muddy bottom. Next 
in line came the two monitors to screen the lead mine sweeping element and main body 
as well as to provide fire support during the landing. Behind the monitors, ATCs carried 
the assault troops, with one platoon per boat. Directing the formation was a CCB, which 
maintained position in the center behind the ATCs. The second RAS followed in line 
behind the first in similar fashion minus the mine sweeping detail. 
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Navy Lieutenant Commander Francis E. Rhodes, the commanding officer 
of the lead RAS, directed the river assault formation up the narrow waterway toward the 
selected landing sites on the east bank. After rounding the first bend in the river, the 
second RAS remained in position to land at the southern landing sites. Before reaching 
the upriver landing sites, the lead RAS came under heavy fire from RPG-2 and RPG-7, 
57-mm recoilless rifle, automatic weapons, and small arms from prepared positions along 
the east and west banks.86 The MRP returned fire with 20-mm and 40-mm cannons from 
the monitor, 81-mm mortars from all boats, .50 caliber and M-60 machine guns, and 
small arms fire. The smoke and chaos of the close ambush separated the lead ATC from 
the force, after it had pushed past the two temporarily disabled mine sweeping ATCs. 
Lieutenant Colonel Mercer M. Doty, one of the battalion's commanding 
officers, was observing the contact from the airborne command and control helicopter. 
Seeing the lead ATC had made it to the northern landing site, he ordered the formation 
via radio to push through the ambush and land the first RAS's ground force at the 
objective. However, Rhodes thought the RAS could not continue without mine sweeping 
craft and ordered a withdrawal to the downriver landing sites. Except for the one ATC, 
the rest of the RAS retired to the southern landing sites. After three hours of 
reorganizing, resupplying, and evacuating the casualties, the RAS attempted a second pass 
to reach the northern landing sites. This time, preceded by air and artillery fire, the 
battalion successfully landed above the ambush site despite continuing heavy enemy fire. 
Prior to the second RAS attempt, the other U.S. battalions converged on 
the enemy's position. The reserve battalion was flown in to set up a blocking position on 
the east bank. One battalion maneuvered overland from the northeast. The southern RAS 
remained at the downriver landing sites to block any enemy attempts to escape along the 
streams. The river assault craft remained in the vicinity to provide fire support and serve 
as a blocking station in case the enemy attempted to cross.   Before nightfall, a fifth 
85Captain W. C. Wells, USN (Ret.), "The Riverine Force in Action," in Frank Uhlig, Jr., ed., 
Vietnam: The Naval Story (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 444. 
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(Vietnamese) battalion was airlifted onto the west bank to flush out the enemy and 
provide support. 
Throughout the day, the MRF attempted to drive the enemy from its 
position, but by nightfall had to retire to defensive positions. During the night, the enemy 
dispersed into small elements and attempted to evade the U.S. and Vietnamese net 
surrounding their position. Despite a few short engagements, the remaining Viet Cong 
escaped annihilation and disappeared into the night. 
The fighting ended the following morning. After a thorough sweep of the 
enemy's position, the MRF reported 213 VC dead. The engagement cost 16 US/VN killed 
and 146 wounded.87 During the fierce fighting to reach the northern landing sites, the 
Navy sustained 3 killed and 77 wounded. Notably, the RAS expended 10,273 rounds of 
40-mm ammunition, 16 rounds of 81-mm, 7,445 rounds of 20-mm, 20,934 rounds of .50 
caliber, and 40, 216 rounds of .30 caliber from 0700 to 1600 during the fight of 15 
September.88 This engagement had been the costliest to date for the RAS. 
b.  MRF Clear and Hold Operations (Phase III) 
In 1967, Military Assistance Command Vietnam defined pacification as: 
... the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or 
re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the 
participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible 
territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground government, 
the assertion or reassertion of political control and involvement of the 
people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity 
capable of self-sustenance and expansion. The economic element of 
pacification  includes the  opening of roads and waterways  and the 
87The above details were extracted from Major General Robert Fulton, Riverine Operations, pp. 
128-134, Captain Wade C. Wells, "The Riverine Force in Action," pp. 444-445. 
88William B. Fulton, Vietnam Studies: Riverine Operations, 1966-69 (Washington, D.C.: Department 
of the Army, 1973), p. 134. 
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maintenance of lines of communication important to economic and military 
activity.89 
Prior to 1968, the MRF pursued a search and destroy campaign throughout 
the Mekong Delta region. Operating from Mobile Riverine Bases (MRBs), the MRF 
could pick up and move from area to area to avoid establishing a pattern. But the 
situation following the Tet Offensive changed the tactics of employing the riverine force. 
In August 1968, the MRF conducted a major search and destroy operation in U Minh 
Forest, the last large scale strike operation. After returning, the MRF was dedicated to 
the pacification of the eastern province of Kien Hoa as part of the Accelerated 
Pacification campaign. The concept entailed stationing one battalion within Kien Hoa 
near Ben Tre, and maintaining two battalions afloat with the MRB. All three battalions 
relied on airmobile operations within Kien Hoa. 
In February 1968, Westmoreland approved a proposal to reorganize the 
Mobile Riverine Force. The Navy's TF 117 had grown from two River Assault 
Squadrons to three by July of 1968, and the Navy decided to form two Mobile Riverine 
Groups, Alpha and Bravo. Alpha consisted of five river assault divisions, while Bravo 
received three. Also, the reorganization called for more afloat battalions, which would free 
up the troops assigned to base defense duties for airmobile operations. By the end of 
1968, two brigade headquarters, seven infantry battalions, and a fourth river assault 
squadron were configured for riverine operations.90 In September 1968, three U.S. 
riverine battalions with supporting artillery elements began search and destroy operations 
in Kien Hoa Province. The objective was similar to previous operations, but Alpha 
remained within Kien Hoa to pursue a waterborne presence strategy rather than an 
incidental raiding strategy. Bravo remained across the river at Dong Tarn to support other 
operations. 
89Harry G. Summers, Jr., Vietnam War Almanac (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1985), p. 
276. 
""Fulton, p. 171. 
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Mobile Riverine Group Alpha was assigned the pacification operation, 
which lasted from September 1968 until the announced withdrawal of the 2nd Brigade, 
9th Division in June 1969. In Kien Hoa, the enemy adjusted to the presence of the MRF. 
The VC relied on small unit ambushes against the river assault craft which by June 1969 
were continuously conducting assault landings, cordon and search, troop sweeps, 
ambushes, blocking, escorting, and defoliation missions, and some psychological warfare 
and medical civic action programs.91 
During the Kien Hoa pacification operation, the MRF shifted from 
operating in easily relocatable MRBs to the vicinity of Kien Hoa that included only four 
suitable anchorages. This changed the nature of its operations. The enemy knew the 
location of the MRB and frequently ambushed its limited approaches. VC swimmers and 
sappers successfully mined the LST USS Westchester County and a Navy salvage craft. 
In the first instance, the LST was at anchor in the My Tho River along with the other 
vessels of Group Alpha when a mine caused extensive damage, killed 25 and wounded 
27. In the second instance, the salvage craft was sunk on the Ham Luong River, resulting 
in two dead and 13 wounded. Water mines and RPG-2 and RPG-7 were the VC's 
weapons of choice due to their lethality and lighter weight than the recoilless rifles. 
To counter the swimmers and sappers the MRF improved base defenses. 
Nets, concussion grenades, and hull inspections by Underwater Demolition Team 
personnel were emphasized. Elements from the MRF launched cordon and search 
operations to round up suspected guerrilla members and supporters. One such operation 
targeted swimmers and sappers on an island south of Dong Tarn in the My Tho River. 
The operation included 24 MRF river assault craft with two infantry battalions, eight river 
patrol boats, plus VNN units. The local island inhabitants were moved temporarily to 
three collection points, screened by the National Police, and issued new identification 
cards.   The River assault craft and patrol boats assumed blocking stations around the 
"Fulton, p. 178. 
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island as the infantry swept it for VC units. At the end of the operation on 7 January 
1969,  a total of 70 Viet Cong had been apprehended.92 
In February 1969, the VC frequently ambushed the River Assault Divisions 
operating around Ben Tre. At the end of the month, enemy SCUBA divers attempted two 
consecutive attacks upon an LST at anchor in Dong Tam across the river and to the North 
of Kien Hoa province. Each time, the crew used concussion grenades to thwart the 
attacks. VC ambushes continued throughout the duration of the river assault operations 
in Kien Hoa. By early July 1969, the remaining U.S. River Assault Divisions provided 
base defense security for Dong Tam and operated with Vietnamese units. In August 1969, 
River Assault Flotilla One was disestablished, and the craft of the River Assault Divisions 
were turned over to the Vietnamese Navy. The remaining river assault craft participated 
in "SEA LORDS" operations. SEA LORDS integrated elements from the Navy's Task 
Force 115, 116, and 117 under one operational command (TF-194). Assets from TF 117 
were reorganized into smaller units and mixed with other PBRs and PCFs to conduct 
barrier, strike, and pacification operations along the Cambodian border and on the Cau 
Mau Peninsula. 
The clear and hold operations were characteristically different from search 
and destroy operations. For one, the riverine forces often operated in smaller units (6 to 
10 river craft) throughout the area. In addition, they pursued a waterborne presence 
through frequent routine patrols, night ambushes, and cordon and search operations, as 
well as limited search and destroy missions. From the summer of 1968 until October, the 
MRF operated without air support, which forced a heavier reliance on the organic fire 
support of the riverine assault craft. The overall effect of the MRF's continuous presence 
was aided by the coordinated efforts of the Vietnamese ground forces in Kien Hoa. 
Together, the MRF and Vietnamese forces contested the VC's control over a province 
which once boasted that it was the birth place of the communist NLF.93 In 1967 the VC 
92Fulton, p. 174. 
"Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Base Information Brief, "Political Implications of Military 
Operations in the Delta (IV Corps)," dated 27 September 1966, p. 2. 
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in Kien Hoa numbered 12,000; in 1969 their numbers fell to 9,000; and by 1971 the VC 
numbered only 2,000.94 
Despite the apparent success of maintaining a permanent waterborne 
presence within Kien Hoa for an extended period, the Army still continued the practice 
of search and destroy tactics as the more important objective. Following the Tet 
Offensive, the Army became less enamored with riverine operations, and by July 1968 
decided to rely more on airmobile operations for search and destroy missions. This led 
the 9th Infantry Division to redeploy its riverine battalions in July 1969 prior to the 
airmobile configured brigades. The Navy's TF 117, left without ground forces, turned 
over most of its 178 river assault craft to the VNN. 
B.  THE ANALYSIS 
1.  Hughes' Model 
a.  Mobile Riverine Force Strike Operations (Phase I/II: June 1967 
to August 1968) 
(1) Objective. To harass and disrupt VC activity within the 
Mekong Delta. 
(2) Means. The MRF conducted search and destroy missions 
against VC main and local forces and their base areas within the Delta region. The 
riverine force operated from Mobile Riverine Bases that usually moved to a new area of 
operations every two weeks. 
(3) Forces. The normal force complement used to conduct search 
and destroy operations, as outlined in the case example, included two River Assault 
Squadrons with two battalions embarked. TF 117 had 100 river assault craft by June 
1967, and 178 by October 1968. Also, other brigades from 9th Infantry Division usually 
contributed one reserve battalion, and the Vietnamese often added one to two battalions. 
These additional forces relied on vehicles and helicopters for mobility. In terms of 
personnel, the MRF included approximately 3,000 sailors and 2,200 soldiers configured 
"Clodfelter, p. 1264. 
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for riverine operations.  During the summer of 1968, the Army increased the number of 
troops configured for riverine operations to three maneuver battalions. 
(4) Level of Control. The intended level of control was local, 
temporary, and incidental to the purpose of the operation: destruction of the Viet Cong 
units and their base areas. From 1967 through January 1968, the MRF inflicted heavy 
casualties upon the VC main and local forces. The enemy's exploitation of the waterway 
was disrupted. However, lacking a permanent waterborne presence, the MRF could not 
deny the enemy's exploitation of the Mekong Delta's waterways. 
b.  MRF Clear and Hold Operations (Phase III: August 1968 to July 
1969) 
(1) Obj ective. The MRF attempted to deny the enemy longitudinal 
and cross-waterway movement along the numerous waterways surrounding and within the 
Kien Hoa province. 
(2) Means. The MRF established its Mobile Riverine Base at 
Dong Tarn across the My Tho River from Kien Hoa Province. It conducted frequent and 
continuous operations along the waterways surrounding and criss-crossing the province. 
Small unit operations included patrols, raids, ambushes, sweeps, blocking missions, some 
psychological warfare operations, and convoy protection. 
(3) Forces. The MRF placed one battalion ashore in Kien Hoa and 
positioned two battalions afloat to maintain continuous presence missions for over one 
year. It operated with five River Assault Divisions, three U.S. battalions, and one 
Vietnamese Marine Corps battalion. The MRF supported the Kien Hoa ground forces 
engaged in pacification operations. 
(4) Level of Control. The MRF's control of the riverine area was 
continuously contested by the VC throughout the pacification efforts in Kien Hoa. 
Control was far from established. 
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2.  The Elements of the Combat Process 
a.   Command and Control 
The commander of III and IV Corps Tactical Zones (Commander, II Field 
Force) integrated Mobile Riverine Force operations into the land campaign. The RVN 
forces coordinated operations with the MRF. ARVN maintained operational control of 
its battalions assigned to strike operations with the MRF. The U.S. Senior Advisor for 
IV CTZ also coordinated operations between the U.S. and Vietnamese forces. 
At the Task Force level, there was no unified operational command 
structure. The 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division fell under the administrative and 
operational control of 9th Infantry Division Commander. The Navy's River Assault 
Flotilla One (TF 117), which consisted of two River Assault Squadrons, fell under 
administrative and operational control of the Commander Naval Forces Vietnam 
(COMNAVFORV). However, COMNAVFORV directed TF 117 to work closely with 
and support MRF operations. Although the command structure did not formally unify the 
riverine force under one operational commander, this was overcome by cooperative 
working relationships between the naval and military component commanders. 
(1) MRF Search and Destroy Operations. The River Assault 
Squadrons operated in support of the Army's 2nd Brigade. The Army was responsible 
for the conducting tactical operations, coordinating fire support, base defense, and 
establishing liaison with Vietnamese officials. The Navy supported Army operations, 
assisted in base defense, provided escort and transport for waterborne movements, and 
provided logistic support.95 
During waterborne movement, the Navy River Assault Commander 
exercised control over the formation through a column formation. The 
Command/Communication Boat with the Assault Commander embarked directed the 
spacing and rate of advance from the rear.   Once ashore, the ground force commander 
95John Forbes and Robert Williams, Riverine Force: The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1987), p. 90. 
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coordinated the movement of troops and craft from a helicopter circling the area of 
operations. 
Tactical control during operations benefitted from the heliborne 
command posts. The helicopter could rise above the fray and maneuver the elements to 
envelop the enemy. The commander directed both the naval and military units actions, 
despite not being officially granted the authority over supporting naval assault craft. 
The airborne commander could maneuver the riverine force quickly, 
but the slow speed of the assault craft limited the riverine forces' capacity to reposition 
its forces quickly. Nevertheless, the riverine assault craft were essential for extraction and 
reinsertion of troops when helicopters were not available for troop lift or could not find 
suitable landing sites. At ground level, control was maintained through radio 
communications and pre-planned contingencies. The fluid process of combat did create 
confusion for ground commanders, but the control procedures limited response time. The 
larger the force, the longer it took to maneuver. 
(2) MRF Clear and Hold Operations. The 9th Infantry Division 
Commander integrated the MRF into his pacification efforts by concentrating their efforts 
in Kien Hoa. Control became decentralized as units increasingly operated in smaller 
elements to adjust to enemy tactics. The lack of air assets from the summer until October 
of 1968 forced the force element commanders to rely on controlling the units from afloat 
and ground positions. 
b.  Firepower 
Superior U.S air power provided the main firepower advantage during the 
Vietnam War. The war was known as the "helicopter war." The varied terrain and limited 
overland lines of communication led the U.S. to rely heavily on the helicopter for 
maneuvering forces and delivering firepower against the VC and NVA. The inundated 
and vegetated terrain of the Mekong Delta along with a large rural population also 
imposed restrictions on the MRF's firepower. Moisture in waterborne operations within 
the Delta made the operation of the individual and crew served weapons susceptible to 
malfunction and misfire. 
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(1) Search and Destroy Operations. The MRF employed three 
means to deliver direct and indirect firepower: air, ground, and waterborne. Operations 
primarily relied on the mobility and destructive power of close air support provided by 
helicopter gunships. Dedicated artillery elements allowed the MRF to call in preparatory 
and direct fire support. Organic firepower centered on the river assault craft and ground 
troop weaponry. The river assault craft used a variety of weapons, depending on the 
mission of the craft: the monitor had a direct fire 81-mm mortar, 40-mm and 20-mm 
automatic cannons, two .50 caliber machine guns, and two Mk 18 grenade launchers. The 
CCBs possessed a 40-mm cannon, while the ASPB relied on an 81-mm mortar, a 20-mm 
cannon, a twin .50 caliber machine gun, and two or more MK 18 grenade launchers. The 
supporting floating artillery delivered 105-mm fire, and close air support relied on 
predominantly helicopter gunships and attack helicopters. When feasible, fixed-wing 
aircraft strikes added to the destructive capacity of riverine operations. 
The supporting fire from aircraft, especially helicopter gunships 
inflicted heavy casualties upon exposed enemy, and destroyed fortified positions. 
Artillery served the same purpose, but did so less discriminately. The enemy recognized 
their vulnerability to American firepower, and tried to separate the U.S. fire support from 
the supported unit.96 The closer the VC could get to the MRF, the better it fared in 
separating the force from its fire support. 
The riverine force attempted to overcome its vulnerability to close 
engagements by increasing the organic firepower and survivability of the river assault 
craft. A tradeoff between protection, speed, draft, firepower, and armor led to a 
composite force of river assault craft. Overall, the MRF relied on the rate of delivery and 
volume of superior firepower to destroy the enemy. Maneuver centered on fixing the 
enemy against a blocking position where supporting fire it was hoped could do the work 
of close combat.   The American style of warfare — offensive, attrition based warfare ~ 
96Robert H. Scales, Firepower in Limited War (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University 
Press, 1990), p. 74. 
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became too enamored with its ability to project firepower into the swampy and inundated 
rice paddies of the Mekong Delta. 
(2) Clear and Hold. Except for the period between the summer of 
1968 through October, the MRF had air and artillery fire support available. The MRF 
operated in gradually smaller units and thus dispersed its firepower. As a result, the vice 
of massed firepower became less frequent, forcing a shift in tactics with greater reliance 
on stealth (eg. night operations, ambushes). 
c.  Scouting 
(1) Search and Destroy Operations. Scouting was emphasized as 
essential to the success of strike operations. Lieutenant General Julian Ewell, 
commanding general of the 9th Infantry Division, emphasized that intelligence had to be 
exploited immediately due to the rapidly changing situation within the area of 
operations.97 The MRF gathered information from overflights, other units, captured VC, 
VC defectors, and, most important, the local Vietnamese forces and villagers. Critical 
scouting activity still centered on gaining information from people and not from new 
technology based systems. 
In theory, the electronic sensors, air overflights, radar, and night 
vision devices apparently offered the MRF an advantage over the enemy. In fact, vital 
information, such as enemy base areas and activities, could only be gained through the 
local people. Since the enemy relied on basic means to communicate and move within 
the Delta, the MRF was required to rely on Vietnamese sources to provide the necessary 
information to launch an operation. If not, a strike operation risked becoming an armored 
reconnaissance operation instead. 
Before launching a mission, information was collected through 
aerial reconnaissance and by military intelligence units. During the movement to the 
objective area, the helicopters scoured the countryside to provide the MRF with the latest 
information. In several instances, chance sightings of Viet Cong forces led a commander 
97Senior Officer Debriefing Report: LTG Julian J. Ewell, CG, 9th Infantry Division, Period 25 
February 1968 to 5 April 1969, of 24 November 1969, p. 3. 
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to immediately adjust landing sites to maximize the chance of enveloping and destroying 
an enemy unit. 
During sweep and assault operations, captured enemy soldiers gave 
information needed to track enemy locations and their modus operandi within the 
provinces. Amnesty programs targeting VC members aided the riverine force by 
providing local knowledge of enemy activities, routes of movement, and base areas. 
The U. S. employed sensors to detect enemy movement within 
sectors during the SEA LORDS barrier operations. Electronic sensors could determine 
movement during curfews in or around base areas or selected patrol sites. However, 
without visual confirmation it was impossible to determine if friend or foe was involved. 
Accordingly, the decision to engage could only be based on the assumption that all 
villagers were observing the curfew. 
(2) Clear and Hold. The main difference between search and 
destroy and clear and hold operations centered on the relative availability of intelligence. 
When the MRP maintained a permanent presence in Kien Hoa, it could establish an 
intelligence network with the local units and people. Since the threat to the MRF 
generally came from "hunter-killer" team ambushes and swimmer and sapper mining in 
the Kien Hoa area, local information was essential for locating enemy units or thwarting 
guerrilla harassing operations. By placing one battalion ashore, the MRF exploited the 
indigenous intelligence network for various operations. 
As the MRF shifted to small unit tactics, it began to frequently 
practice night operations and ambushes - tactics learned from the enemy. Enemy 
defectors and friendly villagers provided the best source of information on likely enemy 
activity and crossing points. Technology increased the MRF's capability to operate at 
night. Night vision devices improved the chance of detecting enemy movement along the 
waterways. Additionally, a shift in tactics led to small elements, such as sniper teams and 
small ambush/recon teams, to provide information on enemy activity in selected areas. 
The clear and hold scouting techniques heavily relied on human intelligence.   These 
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provided the MRF commander with information on enemy positions and thus he could 
bring his dispersed firepower together when the enemy could be located. 
d. Antiscouting 
(1) Search and Destroy Operations. Shifting of the MRB at night 
and over great distances allowed the MRF to keep the enemy off-balance. The MRF 
moved at night to objective areas so to limit the VC's ability to locate its destination. 
Additionally, false insertions kept the enemy guessing as to the exact location of real 
troop landing sites. However, the large size of strike operations obviated any effective 
means of foiling the enemy's scouting capability. Stealth was always foiled by the noise 
of approaching craft and the size of units engaged in operations. 
(2) Clear and Hold Operations. The MRF's "permanent" presence 
in the area allowed the enemy to study its operational pattern. This forced a repeated 
change in tactics to keep a measure of initiative. The MRF gradually shifted to stealth 
and copied the enemy's small unit tactics. However, the noisy engine powered craft 
always gave the enemy plenty of warning of approaching MRF elements. 
e. Screening 
(1) Search and Destroy Operations. Air cover was vital in 
screening the movement of riverine forces to the objective area. The MRF's ASPBs and 
Monitors provided close in screening for the formation. During landings, air, artillery and 
assault craft fire peppered likely ambush sites. 
(2) Clear and Hold Operations. Smaller units relied more on 
stealth than screening. When the helicopter assets were removed from supporting the 
MRF for a four month period, the riverine force had to rely solely on river craft for 
screening. However, the MRF recognized the importance of maintaining a frequent 
presence along the banks to screen waterway movement. Therefore, units frequently set 




(1) Search and Destroy Operations. The MRF relied on a column 
formation to control movement to the objective. Screening elements were placed fore and 
aft of the column. Command and control elements afloat positioned themselves in the 
center. The ground force commander usually remained airborne in a helicopter. At the 
objective area, the MRF relied on maneuver battalions to locate, fix, and destroy an 
enemy. Only by sealing off the enemy within an area, could the MRF call in supporting 
fire to destroy the VC units. Frequently, airmobile battalions worked with the MRF to 
envelop a suspected enemy position. Once contacted, the MRF maneuvered elements and 
craft to block likely avenues of escape. However, the enemy was often able to disperse 
by withdrawing along the numerous shallow canals which could not be blocked by the 
MRF craft. 
(2) Clear and Hold Operations. The MRF positioned forces within 
Kien Hoa to defend the provinces' villages and people. However, it still continued to 
conduct limited search and destroy missions when the enemy threat warranted such 
actions. The dispersed positioning of MRF elements kept the riverine force from 
immediately massing firepower against an enemy threat. 
C.  THE ENEMY'S CAMPAIGN 
1. Objective 
The objective of the VC was to harass and disrupt the efforts of the U.S. military 
to "pacify" the IV Corps area in order to continue control of the areas and its population. 
The Mekong Delta geography provided an "equalizing element" for the less numerous VC 
in their fight against the vast combat potential of the U.S. and ARVN forces. 
2. Means 
The VC used the riverine area of the Delta to sustain and expand its offensive 
insurgency. The region water routes were used to transport war supplies, and conduct 
raids and ambushes against specific U.S. and ARVN forces and their supporting supply 
bases. Operating from the periphery and within the Delta, the VC demonstrated a riverine 
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expertise for sustaining an insurgency in difficult terrain. Until the effective employment 
of U.S. riverine forces, the VC exploited the use of all waterways.98 
3. Forces 
The VC used units of various sizes to conduct their guerrilla campaign. Initially, 
battalion-size forces were employed to conduct harassment operations against U.S. and 
ARVN forces and supply bases. When U.S. forces embarked on search and destroy 
operations, the VC shifted toward small unit operations that used the tactics of terror, 
ambush, mining and the raid. However, as demonstrated during the Tet Offensive, the 
VC could still  launch major operations with battalion-size forces." 
4. Level of Control 
Permanent control of the riverine area was not necessary to sustain the insurgency. 
However, intermittent longitudinal waterway movement along specific waterways was 
essential to conduct offensive operations such as raids and ambushes. Similarly, 
intermittent cross-water movement within the interior was vital to transport war supplies. 
This mobility depended on a detailed knowledge of the Delta and an intimate relationship 
with the local people. Information gathered from the local people provided a better 
intelligence [scouting] capability than that of the U.S. and ARVN forces. These three 
necessary conditions depended on the VC control of the hamlets and villages. The people 
provided the essentials for the sustainment of the insurgency: supplies, recruits, and 
intelligence. Success depended on all factors working together in what was in effect an 
interlocking campaign plan. 
"Victory Daniels and Judith C. Erdheim, "Game Warden," Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, 
VA, January 1976, p. 50. 
"Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Loper, The Mobile Riverine Force or The Marriage of the Brown 
Water Navy and the Rice Paddy Army ( Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1970), p. 50. 
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D.  THE ENEMY'S ELEMENTS OF THE COMBAT PROCESS 
1.  Counterforce 
The capacity to reduce the effect of the U.S military's firepower. The VC created 
an effective counterforce by maximizing the use of difficult terrain, guerrilla tactics, and 
Soviet/Chinese-made weapons. The synergism of these elements provided the necessary 
firepower to disrupt and harass the attrition based tactics of the larger U.S. and ARVN 
forces. As an illustration, the VC/NVA inflicted the following combat losses to U.S. 
helicopters:100 









a. Defensive force 
The capacity to either destroy attacking weapons or defeat them by 
methods other than destruction. The VC used the Mekong Delta to limit the opponent's 
superior firepower and to sap its energy. The biggest threats to riverine forces were 
ambushes, mines, and raids by swimmers and sappers. Individual VC craft engaged River 
Patrol forces with small arms and automatic weapons.   Some units reported the use of 
°Clodfelter, 1290. 
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"suicide sampans" where craft would damage allied vessels with self-destruct charges. 
As with previous guerrilla wars in marginal terrain, the harsh environment of the Delta 
produced numerous non-battle casualties for the U.S. and ARVN forces. As Michael 
Clodfelter highlights: 
Casualties to the enemy bullets in the Delta were often eclipsed by 
casualties to immersion foot (similar to trench foot, caused by near 
constant immersion of the foot in muddy water). Later, among U.S. units 
operating in the Delta, the percentage of military personnel suffering from 
immersion foot in any given unit out on a combat or patrol mission rose 
from an average of 3 percent on the first day of the operation to 11 
percent on the second day, 15 percent on the third, 20 percent on the 
fourth, and to 35 percent after 5 days in the paddies, canals, and mangrove 
swamps of this wet region.101 
(1) Mining. Command detonated minings were usually attempted 
when the riverine force was departing to undergo a mission, to impede its assault 
capability. Mining operations were normally planned to support ambushes. The use of 
large command-detonated mines was coordinated with small arms, automatic weapons, 
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and recoilless rifle fire. During one seven-day 
operation, the riverine force was attacked eight times resulting in one ATC sunk by a 
waterborne mine on the Song Cai Tu River.102 
(2) Ambushes. These operations were usually conducted in 
daylight and at low tide. As with mining, ambushes were frequently made possible by 
the predictability of the MRF's route. Riverine forces were drawn into narrow channels 
where maneuverability was difficult. Harassing fire from one side of the river would 
draw the waterborne force to the opposite bank where the main enemy element would 
launch the ambush. 
(3) Raids. The VC raided isolated outposts inside the Delta to 
show the people the vulnerability and weakness of the U.S. and ARVN forces. 
,01Clodfelter, p. 1239. 
lc2Fulton, p. 175. 
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Additionally, the VC used swimmers and sappers to damage the mobile riverine base and 
associated vessels. In November 1969, the LST USS Westchester County was severely 
damaged while at anchor. Three assault craft and two helicopters were also damaged 
during this incident.103 
b. Staying Power 
The capacity to absorb damage and continue fighting with measurable 
effectiveness. In the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, General Giap cited the VC's 
willingness to accept huge sacrifices: 
. . . every minute, hundreds of thousands of people die all over the world. 
The life or death of a hundred, a thousand, or tens of thousands of human 
beings, even if they are our compatriots, represents really very little.104 
One year after the Tet Offensive, the VC maintained the capability to 
conduct river ambush tactics in the Delta. From February to September 1969, one 
"hunter-killer" team succeeded in ambushing and sinking 15 ATCs on the Vam Co Tay 
River, Binh Phuoc District, Long An Province.105 
c. Cover 
Secrecy, camouflage, or concealment to avoid attack. The VC were 
masters at the use of cover and concealment in military operations and in the covert 
storage of war supplies. One unique application was the use of tunnel warfare. The 
tunnels served as assembly areas, storage depots, and hospitals, and they supported 
military operations in the movement of forces in the otherwise open terrain. Tunnels 
along the Song Sai Gon River were used as base areas to launch attacks against the 
,03Ibid., p. 172. 
'""Anthony James Jones, Modern Guerrilla Insurgency (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), p. 145. 
105SP5 Charles T. Williams, "River Ambush Tactics," Department of Defense Intelligence 
Information Report, Report Number: 6 029 0812 70, dated 8 August 1970. 
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capital city of Saigon.106   The superb use in camouflage of personnel, weapons, and 
watercraft enhanced the mobility of the VC within the Delta region. 
d. Deception 
Deliberate misrepresentation of reality to gain an advantage. Deception 
was a major asset for the VC. The nature of the war allowed the VC to blend in with the 
people which enabled the overt and covert use of the waterways. When transporting 
goods in the river, the VC often disguised themselves as civilians, and carried stolen or 
forged identification papers. War supplies were hidden within difficult to move bulk 
items such as rice, sugar cane, and fish. False bottoms, bulkheads, and overheads of 
junks were common contraband areas. The VC often used the time during numerous 
ceasefires to rebuild and reconstitute its combat potential, including the acquisition of 
supplies, recruits, and intelligence. The U.S. and ARVN forces fell victim to this practice 
when unsuspecting units suffered huge losses from surprise attacks during the Tet 
Offensive. 
e. Dispersion 
The displacement of units that carry force. The VC dispersed units to form 
an infrastructure within the hamlets and villages of the Delta. Within the Delta region, 
small units restricted their operations to the local area for the transport of supplies. 
Seldom did one unit transport supplies from the original point of entry to its destination. 
The same principle was used for the conduct of raids and ambushes. This developed a 
capability to maintain a secure, fluid and flexible combat organizational structure. When 
required, large strike units were quickly assembled and/or promptly dispersed into small 
ambush elements. 
2.  Antiscouting 
Actions taken to destroy, diminish, or preclude U.S. scouting effectiveness. The 
VC minimized its predictability of cross-water traffic by not staging watercraft in vicinity 
of the specific site. Using the resources of nearby villages, the VC used sampans as the 
^Summers, pp. 344-45. 
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primary means of cross-water traffic. Small unit movement was restricted to 4 or 5 men 
per sampan travelling in pairs. An elaborate warning system was developed by using 
colored lights, gongs, bells, and gunshots. The use of "decoy gunfire" was used to 
distract the scouting efforts of the U.S. As was the practice, U.S. forces relied upon 
gunfire for the detection of enemy activity. Before making a crossing, VC snipers fired 
upstream or down stream to lead patrols away from the intended site.107 Another means 
of VC antiscouting was the removal of wounded or killed warriors during an engagement. 
This activity precluded a proper battle damage assessment by the U.S. forces for the 
notorious "body count." As noted by author Anthony James Joes, no one wants to 
remember Clausewitz': 
Casualty reports on either side are never accurate, seldom truthful, and in 
most cases deliberately falsified . . . that is why guns and prisoners have 
always counted as the real trophies of victory.108 
The most effective means of antiscouting was the specific targeting of U.S. 
CCBs. Thus, the VC practiced "riverine sniping." The VC recognized defectors and 
GVN sympathizers within the hamlets and villages as the primary intelligence [scouting] 
asset for the U.S. and ARVN forces. This prompted a terror campaign in an effort to 
deter collusion with U.S. and ARVN forces. Torture and death were the penalty for the 
individual who violated this "law." 
3.  Command and Control Countermeasures 
Actions taken to defeat or delay the effectiveness of the enemy's command and 
control. The VC ambushed personnel and supply transports to disrupt the lines of 
communications between U.S. and ARVN forces. These attacks also disrupted the 
primary means of communication with the local and popular forces of the hamlets and 
villages.  In battle, the VC employed sniper tactics to eliminate controlling elements of 
""Daniels and Erdheim, pp. 10-12. 
108Joes, p. 145. 
82 
combat units.    U.S. and ARVN officers were prone to this activity. Additionally, 
command and control elements of the riverine force were subject to attack. 
E.  TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS 
1. Command and Control 
The airmobile command post was the major innovation during riverine operations. 
It changed the speed of maneuver and control of separated elements. The radio provided 
the second innovation. Immediate communications with units increased the flow of 
information to the operational commander for the execution of operations. 
2. Firepower 
Again, helicopters played a vital role in concentrating effective fire against enemy 
units evading ground forces. Floating artillery barges added to the indirect fire capability 
of riverine forces. In swampy terrain, the Ammi pontoon and 105-mm Howitzer provided 
the bulk of artillery fire. The monitor and zippo added direct fire that could target enemy 
bunkers. The flame thrower concept was brought to new heights during the MRF's war. 
The Navy's 81-mm mortar was configured for direct fire, which added to the punch of the 
MRF's firepower capability. Night sights improved both river assault craft weapon and 
sniper capabilities. Survivability measures led to the addition of bar armor to riverine 
assault craft to pre-detonate armor piercing rounds. 
3. Scouting 
Employing the helicopter for scouting proved essential in terrain familiarization 
and in detecting exposed enemy movement in advance of a formation. Additionally, it 
could provide information on likely ambush sites, and during the battle it allowed the 
commander to sight enemy force movements. Night vision devices improved the scouting 
capability of reconnaissance teams, ambush operations, and small unit patrols. Use of 
electronic sensors and radar enhanced base security and barrier operations. Movement 
of a living creature could be detected without maintaining a permanent presence. 
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4. Antiscouting 
The MRF often used false insertions during airmobile and river assault craft 
landings to deceive the enemy as to the position of the assaulting force. Also, the MRF 
overflew areas and fired artillery into areas to deceive the enemy as to where an operation 
would take place. 
5. Screening 
The helicopter was the primary advance screening element used by the MRF. 
However, it could not detect well-concealed enemy ambush sites. The development of 
the Monitor and ASPB provided a means to screen the MRF from the constant threat of 
mines and close ambushes. The river assault craft would not operate in small canals 
without ground forces along the banks to screen their movement. 
6. Maneuver 
The MRF incorporated column movement of embarked troops to reach the area 
of operations. Once in the objective area, the MRF operated with other airmobile and 
ground units to envelop the enemy. The Army readily scrapped the second MRF when 
helicopters became available for the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. Jet propulsion 
allowed the PBRs to operate in shallower waters in support of MRF operations, but were 
prone to clogging from floating debris. Although, not used by the MRF, the Patrol Air 
Cushion Vehicle proved difficult to maintain in the swampy environment, but was useful 
in the Plain of Reeds where only shallow drafted sampans could ply the waters. 
F.  CONCLUSIONS 
When viewing Market Time, Game Warden, MRF, and SEA LORDS operations, 
an overall picture emerges of how the U.S. pursued operations in the Delta. It took over 
three years to integrate the Market Time, Game Warden, and MRF combat elements into 
a unified campaign to control the waterways. SEA LORDS was the culmination of 
previous attempts to deny the VC use of the waterways. Initiated after the Tet Offensive, 
it coordinated operations of these dissimilar craft and forces to pursue a goal of 
establishing a barrier along the Cambodian border. The force assembled under CTF 194 
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had the combat potential to erode the Viet Cong's physical, mental, and spiritual will to 
wage a protracted and ruthless war. The predominant objective of the land campaign - 
to seek out and destroy the enemy -- failed to fully exploit SEA LORDS potential. The 
ground force commanders would dedicate troops and aircraft to CTF 194 only when other 
search and destroy missions were not readily available. Such ad hoc support constrained 
CTF 194 from prosecuting a more aggressive campaign. Without dedicated air and 
ground forces, the barrier operations never became as effective as planned. Despite this, 
SEA LORDS greatly impeded the flow of supplies and harmed the enemy's morale. 
The riverine force gave the mobility to pursue the enemy into his sanctuary in the 
inundated Delta. Once in the Delta, the MRF located and delivered firepower against the 
VC units. The evolution of riverine warfare resulted in two distinct types of operations: 
the first, search and destroy, sought the destruction of the enemy as an intermediary step 
toward pacification; the second, clear and hold, pursued the pacification of specific areas 
within the Delta through the maintenance of a continuous waterborne presence. 
Destruction of the enemy was the MRP's primary stated mission. Control of the 
waterways was never sought as a primary objective. Even when the MRF supported the 
pacification of Kien Hoa, it focused on eliminating the enemy rather control of the 
waterways per se. 
The destruction of the enemy entailed locating the enemy and then delivering 
effective firepower to reduce his force. Technology increased the capacity to deliver 
firepower but only at an increased cost. The U.S. expended enough ammunition during 
the Vietnam conflict to "destroy all the soldiers in all the armies that ever existed in the 
history of the world."109 Some calculations show a cost $400,000 to kill a single Viet 
Cong guerrilla. The negative aspect of "liberation by firepower" came from the increased 
casualties of Vietnamese civilians, who after losing property and family to American 
firepower leaned towards supporting the enemy.110 
l09Joes, p. 146. 
"°Ibid., p. 146. 
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Only by locating the enemy (scouting) could the MRF deliver effective firepower. 
Often, suspected enemy sightings received extensive "recon by fire" to avert an ambush 
or harassing fire. In search and destroy assault landings, the MRF relied on air, artillery, 
and river assault craft fire support to soften the selected landing site. Once off -loaded, 
the ground force commander could often call in supporting fire, unless the enemy had 
positioned himself in built-up areas. VC ambushes reversed the sequence of fire support. 
Close engagements required the riverine force to fend off the attack while fire support 
could be directed onto the enemy. The closer the ambush occurred, the greater the 
probability that supporting fire would inflict casualties on friendly forces. Therefore, the 
VC tried to separate the MRP troops from its supporting fire. The MRF strove to 
improve its survivability through armor and increasing its organic firepower. The VC 
ambush became a primary guerrilla tactic and could inflict damage on the MRF's craft 
and troops. The enemy relied on Soviet and Chinese supplied weapons and a knowledge 
of the local Delta terrain to apply effective firepower against the MRF. Clearly, the VC 
had a much better scouting capability than the MRF as evidenced by the high incidence 
of enemy initiated fire fights. 
The MRF was employed for two characteristically different missions: strike or 
clear and hold. Strike operations were only effective when the enemy maintained large 
units and base areas. The strike operation never achieved any degree of control over the 
waterways. Additionally, the objective of eliminating large VC forces did not impede the 
enemy from launching the Tet Offensive, because the enemy could mass large forces from 
its dispersed units when needed. During the Tet Offensive, the MRF played a crucial role 
in rolling back a conventional VC campaign. After Tet, the Accelerated Pacification 
strategy required a different tactical employment of the MRF. 
Clear and hold operations came closer to achieving control of a riverine area. A 
waterborne presence prompted the VC to attack the MRF who had intruded into their 
sanctuary. Thus, the U.S. did not need to go in search of the enemy. The enemy was 
forced into battle if it was to continue operating in areas occupied by the MRF. Although 
engagements became more frequent, their size became smaller, and the casualty ratio 
86 
became more favorable. In search and destroy missions the MRF sustained a 2:6 friend 
to foe casualty ratio as compared to a 1:5 ratio for clear and hold missions.111 As the 
MRF search and destroy operations became less effective leading up to Tet, it is to the 
credit of the MRF commanders that they shifted to clear and hold operations. As Sir 
Robert Thompson noted: 
The mistake made in the MRF. . . , was to give them the mission of 
destroying Viet Cong main force units, this should have been to deny 
movement on and across the waterways to the Viet Cong.112 
The recognition that the waterways were vital to the enemy was not exploited by 
the MRF even when they pursued pacification of Kien Hoa. The patrol mission should 
have been carried out by both the river forces and riverine forces. A waterborne presence 
was required to deny the enemy use of the waterways, but instead, the MRF sought out 
the enemy and engaged him in battle - the perceived riverine force mission. In either 
type of operation a strong scouting capability that incorporates continuous indigenous 
information was needed to turn the tables on the enemy. The people provided the 
guerrilla with basic means for survival: recruits, supplies, and intelligence. The 
waterways provided the guerrilla the mobility to prosecute a long ruthless war. The MRF 
sought to defeat the guerrilla through attrition (search and destroy operations) rather 
than through control of the riverine area and by separating the guerrilla from the people 
through pacification (clear and hold operations). 
In light of the overall failure of the U.S. strategy in Vietnam, an indicator of the 
MRF's effectiveness within the Delta can be deduced from the 1972 and 1975 
Communists offensives. Extensive land reforms and heavy VC combat casualties are 
attributed to the stability of the Delta during the 72 Easter Offensive.   The people, 
'"Forbes, p. 104. 
"
2Sir Robert Thompson, Personal Letter, 11 February 1970 in LTCOL Thomas C. Loper, "The 
Mobile Riverine Force or the Marriage of the Brown Water Navy and the Rice Paddy Army," 
unpublished study (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 9 March 1970), p. 59. 
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perceiving legitimacy within the government of South Vietnam, were determined to resist 
conquest by the northern aggressors. The MRF helped the ARVN and Regional/Popular 
Forces establish a more credible capacity to coerce the VC within the Delta. Without the 
MRF, the VC would not have been challenged within their sanctuaries. Final testimony 
of this was evident in the final phases of the 1975 offensive. Throughout the time when 
other regions were collapsing towards Saigon, the government and military exercised firm 
control of the Mekong Delta's sixteen provincial capitals with associated districts until the 
final pullout.113 
Rear Admiral Salzer summed up riverine operations best with a reminiscence: 
As was proven time and time again in Brown Water Navy operations in 
Vietnam, cooperation with trained and aggressive ground forces was the 
real key to success. Without that cooperation a measure of initiative always 
remained with the enemy, who had the choice of when and where to 
dispute the control and ownership of a particular stretch of navigable 
water. In the absence of ground forces, the enemy could employ a further 
application of the strategy of sanctuary, for our boats could 'pursue' only 
to the maximum effective range of their installed weapons. Air power, to 
be sure, could further that pursuit and proved invaluable in support of our 
boats when they were caught up in a fire fight, but a lesson that was 
learned in the Indochina War, is that air power has only limited 
effectiveness in a counterinsurgency war and in the interdiction of enemy 
lines of communication through difficult and largely trackless terrain.114 
"
3Joes, p. 148-150. 
""Commander R. L. Schreadley, USN, "The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970," in Frank Uhlig, 
Jr., ed., Vietnam: The Naval Story (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp. 301-02. 
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IV.  RIVERINE  WARFARE IN COLOMBIA:   1989 - PRESENT 
A.  THE WAR 
1.  Nature of the Conflict 
The remote reaches of the Amazon Basin have become the setting for recent U.S. 
experience with riverine warfare against a different kind of unconventional opponent. The 
so-called "war on drugs" was declared in August 1989 when the United States embarked 
upon a more aggressive policy aimed at reducing the introduction of illegal narcotics into 
the United States by severing the connections between drug cartels, insurgents and 
transnational terrorists - the narco-guerrilla.115 As part of this effort, the United States 
assisted 70 Third World countries in planning and implementation of programs to disrupt 
the illegal processing, shipment, and sales by major drug trafficking organizations.116 
Fourteen of these countries are involved in programs aimed at the eradication of the "drug 
crop" at the source. For the United States, the primary focus became the north Andean 
Ridge of South America, which includes the countries of Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and 
Ecuador. The Ridge, with the adjacent Amazon Basin, provides an ideal sanctuary for 
the narco-guerrilla to cultivate, process, and traffic illicit drugs. This sanctuary also 
provides a staging area for unconventional warfare against each country's military forces 
and drug enforcement agencies.117 Lacking the capability to effectively engage this new 
type of guerrilla in his sanctuary, the Andean Ridge countries requested military and law 
enforcement assistance from the U.S. Then, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney 
articulated the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy: 
"
5Gary Williams, "The War on Cocaine: Strategy and Tactics," Center Paper, Center for the Study 
of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, February, 1991, p. 4, 17. 
"
6John M. Collins, America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future (New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1991), pp. 205-206. 
'"John M. Collins, America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future (New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1991), pp. 205-206. 
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... to increase the effectiveness of foreign forces efforts to destroy drug 
processing laboratories; disrupt drug-production enterprises; and control the 
land, river, and air routes.118 
2.  Evolution of Riverine Warfare 
After the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan on August 17, 
1989, the Colombian Government declared its own war against the coercion of the 
insurgents, specifically the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The 
FARC is a prime example of a private army, hired by major narcotics traffickers to 
provide security for processing laboratories, crop fields, air fields, and river routes. Prior 
to the assassination, the FARC and other insurgent forces had control of the countryside 
east of the cordillera.119 This area encompasses the Eastern Llanos and the Amazon 
Watershed regions, and comprises three-fifths of the country's total area, but only two 
percent of the total population. The area consists of numerous large rivers and jungle rain 
forests. Twenty-four rivers join to form four major systems within the region. These 
rivers provide over 20 separate points of entrance to the interior and delineate three of 
Colombia's borders. Over 6,000 miles of navigable rivers provide the primary means of 
transportation for both legitimate and illegitimate commercial purposes.120 
Prior 1989, the guerrillas controlled the river systems east of the cordillera. 
Financed by the Columbian drug cartel, the FARC waged a ruthless campaign, using 
terror, ambush, bombing, and assassination tactics to exert their authority and to maintain 
drug processing and trafficking operations. It took the innovations of two U.S. Marine 
Corps officers to bring the battle to the narco-guerrillas in the unconquered waterways of 
eastern Colombia.  (See Figure 5) 
"
8Richard B. Cheney, Secretary, Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of the 
President's National Drug Control Strategy, Washington, 18 September 1989.  Italics added by authors 
for emphasis. 
"'United States General Accounting Office, Drug War: Observations and Counter Narcotics Aid to 
Colombia, Washington, D.C., September 1991, p. 20. 
l20Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, Colombia: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 









AMA20N RtVE * 
Figure 5.  Rivers and Mountains of Colombia 119 
'Hanratty and Meditz, p. 68. 
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3.  Early Riverine Operations 
The Colombian Navy's Corps of Marine Infantry (COLMAR) stands at about 
5,000 marines. Organized into five battalions, the COLMAR is responsible for 
conducting riverine operations in the interior.122 In 1989, it was not trained, manned, or 
equipped to take on the guerrilla forces in the riverine areas. Its riverine capability was 
centered around a few 12 to 15 foot "John boats," powered by 25 hp engines, which could 
transport two to three lightly equipped marines each. When the Colombian government 
chose to launch its campaign against the guerrillas in the interior, 80% of the COLMAR 
boats were not operational due to a lack of maintenance and supply parts. The COLMAR 
could neither project, nor maintain a waterborne presence, and was restricted instead to 
conducting limited "check point" operations launched from distant bases in the Eastern 
Llanos and Amazon watershed regions.123 The COLMAR's poor state of readiness 
prompted one of the members of the Colombian U.S. Military Group (MILGRP) in 
Bogota to take action. 
U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel George Buldoc, the USMC representative 
at Colombian MILGRP, proposed a concept of operations to Rear Admiral Serrano, 
Commandant of the Colombian Marine Corps, in late 1989. The concept of operations 
was specifically designed to "increase the influence of the Colombian Marine Corps on 
the rivers of Colombia."124 It called for the creation of 15 riverine combat elements 
(RCEs), each consisting of: 
3 - 22ft Boston Whalers - Piranhas       1 M-2 .50cal MG/2 M60 7.62mm MGs 
1 - 35ft Riverine Assault Craft 1 M-2 .50cal MG/1 Mkl9 40mm MG/ 
2 M60 7.62mm MGs 
1 - Ground Assault Forces(GIL) 1 off/21 enlisted marines 
l22GAO/NSIAD - 91 - 296, Drug War, p. 15. 
123LTCOL H. Hernandez, USMC, Coalition and Special Warfare Division, MCCDC, Quantico, VA, 
phone interview by authors, 1 December 1994, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
l24Mobile Training Team Green After-Action Report, Quantico, Virginia, May -  December 1993. 
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The RCEs would be dispersed throughout Colombia at 15 locations along strategic river 
LOCs, whence, the COLMAR would maintain an advanced waterborne presence within 
the contested interior. The following sites were selected in the original plan (See Figure 
6): 
a-Barrancabermeja -2  RCEs g-Puerto Leguizamo - 2 RCEs 
b-La Tagua - 1 RCE h-San Jose del Guaviare - 2 RCEs 
c-Tumaco - 1 RCE i-Bahia de Malaga - 1 RCE 
d-Puerto Carreno - 1 RCE j-Magangue - 1 RCE 
e-Arauca - 1 RCE k-Turbo - 1 RCE 
f-Puerto Inirida - 1 RCE 1-Puerto Lopez - 1 RCE 
It took three years for the COLMAR riverine force to fully deploy and exploit this unique 
form of warfare against a guerilla opponent.125 
In November 1989, Admiral Serrano, Commandant of the Colombian Marines 
visited U.S. Marine Corps Commandant, General Alfred M. Gray, in Washington, D.C. 
During this visit, the Admiral asked General Gray if the latter could provide the necessary 
assistance to fulfill his riverine strategy. General Gray agreed, and quickly acquired 
approval, whereupon Lieutenant Colonel Hernandez, USMC, Coalition and Special 
Warfare Division, was tasked to develop and implement what is now referred to as The 
U.S. Marine Corps Counterdrug and Riverine Program}26 
'"Coalition and Special Warfare, MCCDC, USMC Colombian Riverine Program History, Quantico, 
VA. This 20 page unpublished document was provided to the authors.  It presents the only concise 
history of the U.S. Marine Corps involvement in training the Colombian Marine Corps for riverine 
operations against the narco-guerrillas. 
VA. 
6Coalition and Special Warfare Division, USMC Counterdrug and Riverine Program, Quantico, 
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Working closely with LTCOL Buldoc, Hernandez drew up a plan that led to the creation 
of a full scale mobile riverine force capable of conducting waterborne operations deep 
within the Colombian interior. He coordinated the organization and training of numerous 
joint/combined Mobile Training Teams(MTT) along with the planning and acquisition of 
assault craft and associated weapons, which would form the basis for assisting the 
development of RCEs. Hernandez and Buldoc were involved in each MTT operation and 
travelled extensively throughout Colombia to supervise the process. When the 22-foot 
Boston Whalers were procured, Hernandez organized four primary riverine MTTs: 
Riverine MTT "Red" March - June 1991 
Riverine MTT "Basco" September - December 1991 
Riverine MTT "Gold" August - December 1992 
Riverine MTT "Green" June - December 1993 
The MTTs gradually developed COLMAR's riverine capability. Each RCE became 
skilled in both ground and waterborne operations. Upon completion of its training, the 
graduating RCE (without USMC assistance) would conduct riverine assaults on known 
or suspected drug targets in the RCE's region of responsibility. In April 1991, the RCE 
trained by Team Red conducted the first riverine assault against a suspected site. This 
operation was the first offensive strike launched against a defended location in the history 
of the riverine program. The COLMAR captured large quantities of materials and 
narcotics and destroyed the site. 
However, this waterborne intrusion into the interior was soon contested by the 
guerrillas. During July of 1991, RCEs based at the central interior town of San Jose del 
Guaviare were ambushed and suffered substantial casualties and equipment losses. 
Colombian marines sustained 32 casualties, and 60 percent of the boats were destroyed, 
forcing the closing of the Rio Guaviare, a major east - west waterway, to all commercial 
traffic until the RCEs were replaced.  Recent published information is misleading in the 
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presentation of this particular engagement.128 Specifically, it should be noted, the 
ambushed RCEs were not trained by the USMC MTTs.129 Nevertheless, the COLMAR 
recovered from the setback and within a short period of time adjusted its tactics, and 
struck back at the cartels with another successful attack. This raid, benefitting from the 
training by MTT "Basco," resulted in the capture of large quantities of drugs, chemicals, 
and other processing materials. 
Similar results would transpire with the next RCE trained by MTT "Gold." The 
combat operations that followed this training involved the integration of adjacent ground 
forces into the scheme of maneuver. The success of the follow-on operation was duly 
noted by the supported battalion commander who insisted upon MTT support for his 
command. The progress in the integration of a riverine capability within Columbian 
counterdrug operations was finally realized through the efforts of the last MTT. 
MTT "Green" trained 300 Colombian marines based at Puerto Leguizamo, a river 
town on the Rio Putumayo which borders Peru. After five months of extensive training, 
the graduating RCEs spearheaded the largest counterdrug offensive against the guerrillas 
since the commencement of the "drug war." Combining forces with the Colombian 
National Police (DIRAN) and the Navy, the Colombian marines supported simultaneous 
ground, air, and riverine assaults against numerous objectives. From September 27 to 
October 3 1993 during Operation "Black Gold" this combined force concentrated its 
superior firepower potential directly against the guerrillas. 
4.  The Final Test 
Operation Black Gold was unique in the Colombian counterdrug strategy in a 
variety of ways. It was the first joint operation conducted by the COLMAR and DIRAN, 
in which riverine forces played a major role. Also, it was the first coordinated use of 
heliborne forces with the COLMAR riverine forces.   This combined force created a 
l28Captain Darren Pitts, USMCR, "Fighting Drugs at the Source", in U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, vol. 120/7 (July 1994), p. 54.  This article provides a general overview of USMC 
participation in the development of the Colombian Marine Corps riverine capability. 
129Hernandez, interview by authors. 
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stronger, more mobile and lethal force than previous strike operations. Before operation 
"Black Gold" the riverine force's mobility was limited to "foot movement" once the 
assault force had debarked from the boats. During Black Gold, the COLMAR used the 
helicopters to transport elements of the riverine ground force. DIRAN's helicopter combat 
power was limited by its vulnerability to ground fire, which reduced its ability to confront 
organized resistance in the objective area. Together, the helicopter assault force and 
riverine assault force formed a synthesis of combat potential that facilitated the delivery 
of firepower against the enemy. 
a.   The Plan 
The Colombian Navy, Marine, and DIRAN forces developed a joint plan 
to attack a large narcotics producing complex in vicinity of the port town of Pinuna 
Negro on the Rio Putumayo. Hernandez, Buldoc (recently retired and now senior advisor 
to the Columbian Anti-Narcotics Police ground forces) and LtCol William R. Kellner, 
USMC, officer-in-charge of MTT Green, were involved in the overall planning. DIRAN 
had previously attacked the targeted drug complex but was repulsed by overwhelming 
ground fire. The COLMAR had made a previous assault upon the town and captured 
many drug laden vessels; however, a lack of intelligence about the enemy disposition 
prevented further advance towards the airfield or lab complex. Intelligence indicated that 
a well armed force of 50 FARC guerrillas protected the laboratory complex and airfield. 
The following is an abbreviated version of the planned scheme of 
maneuver: Two days prior to the assault, two GILs use a commercial ferry to reach the 
town of Pifiafia Negro concealing the fact that troops are embarked. One day prior to the 
assault, three boat units with embarked GILs move up the Putumayo River to Puerto 
Ospina using the cover story that they are reinforcing the posts. Additionally, DIRAN 
concentrates their helicopter forces at Puerto Asis. On the day of the assault, the GILs 
embark on the commercial ferry, and seize control of the town of Pinafia Negro. Thirty 
minutes later, the three boat units move into position and block river traffic upriver and 
down river of the town. Upon notification that the town is secured, but no later than one 
hour, the riverine force proceeds up the Pinafia Negro River and within 30 minutes links 
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up with the heliborne force that has secured the airfield. Following the linkup with the 
DIRAN elements, the COLMAR units take over responsibility for the security of the 
airfield. Within one hour of the seizure of the town, two GILs transported by DIRAN's 
Twin Otter (a fixed-wing, propeller aircraft) land on the air strip. Thirty minutes later, 
COLMAR and DIRAN forces conduct simultaneous, mutually supporting attacks to seize 
the objectives within their assigned areas. Within three hours of the commencement of 
the operation, the ARC Riochaha (a small destroyer) takes position in the Putumayo River 
in front of the town of Pinana Negro and control all river traffic. Two GILs remain in 
position in the airfield, one of which is designated a reserve. The reserve must be 
prepared to be transported by helicopter or boat to support either the COLMAR or 
DIRAN forces.130 That was the plan.  (See Figure 7) 
b.   The Operation 
The operation itself did not deviate much from the plan. The assault forces 
debarked from the ferry and seized the town without any resistance. The riverine forces 
(in Piranhas) moved into blocking positions 30 minutes behind schedule because the river 
was shallower than expected, and several of the boats ran aground while searching for a 
channel. DIRAN helicopters with troops embarked departed behind schedule and arrived 
in vicinity of the airfield 30 minutes late. During this delay, a heavy cloud front blew 
in from the east and covered the airfield. The helicopters, using global positioning 
satellite navigation system (GPS), circled the intended landing zone at 1,000 feet and 
attempted to land. Unable to do so, and running low on fuel, the aircraft were diverted 
to an alternate landing site east of the town along the Putuyamo River. As the riverine 
force moved up the Pinana Negro River toward the airfield, the boats ran into manmade 
underwater obstacles,  which delayed their movement.    After the cloud cover 
'"Lieutenant Colonel William R. Kellner, USMC, MEMORANDUM: POST OPERATION 
SYNOPSIS OF THE COLOMBIAN COUNTERDRUG OPERATION "BLACK GOLD", to Director, 
Coalition and Special Warfare Division, MCCDC, Quantico, VA, dated 13 October 1993.  The context 
has been modified by the authors for clarity. 
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Figure 7.  Operation "Black Gold iil29 
129Kellner, map insert. 
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lifted, the second helibome assault force wave was inserted in a secondary landing zone 
near the airfield. Shortly thereafter, the first wave was airlifted to the primary landing 
zone. The heliborne forces linked up and seized the airfield without meeting any 
resistance. The COLMAR arrived and joined with the heliborne forces at the designated 
link up point without incident. Owing to radio communications problems, the forces 
aboard the Twin Otter arrived above the airfield three hours late. The night before rain 
had soaked the grass runway making it too slippery for a safe landing attempt. The plane, 
which was carrying the reserve force, was directed to land at Puerto Asis, where the GILs 
were transported to the airfield by awaiting helicopters. Meanwhile, with the reserve 
force rerouted to Puerto Asis, the ground force commander was unwilling to advance the 
attack. However, after reorganizing his command and designating a new reserve, he 
ordered the continuation of the attack. The DIRAN heliborne force continued the assault 
on to their next objectives. 
Only one half of the intended objectives was seized by night fall, with the 
remaining objectives and new targets of opportunity being captured during the next four 
days. The assault, on the first day, led to the capture of 11 laboratories, a large amount 
of gasoline and precursor chemicals, and seven prisoners (2 suspected FARC). The assault 
on the first day resulted in the capture of 85% of the entire cocaine base collected during 
the entire operation. Between 27 September to 3 October 1993, operation "Black Gold" 
resulted in the destruction of 26 more cocaine-base laboratories, a clandestine airstrip, and 
thousands of gallons of gasoline and precursor chemicals. Above all else, the operation 
demonstrated that by joining riverine assault forces with heliborne assault forces, the 
Colombians were more effective in achieving the intended objectives than if each unit had 
attempted to assault the same target independently. 
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B.  THE ANALYSIS 
1.  Hughes' Model 
a. Objective 
The COLMAR conduct riverine operations to deny the narco-guerrillas 
longitudinal use of specific waterways within the interior of Colombia. The goal is to 
achieve complete control of the waterways "at and inside Colombia's borders."132 
b. Means 
The COLMAR have established advanced riverine bases (enclaves) at 
strategic locations along specific waterways. Operating from these bases, the COLMAR 
conduct riverine patrols, raids, ambushes, sweeps, and blocking missions to control all 
vital points within proximity of the enclave. Riverine combat elements from one enclave 
support larger operations in the same or adjacent locations. 
c. Forces 
The initial strategy called for the establishment of 15 riverine combat 
elements. This requires a large commitment of forces from the COLMAR which numbers 
only 5,000 marines in total. Sustaining a land and waterborne presence on specific 
waterways in Colombia equates to over 15% of COLMAR personnel. Total funding for 
just the river assault craft from the start of the program (FY-90) to the end of Fiscal Year 
1993 was $64.46 million dollars.133 
d. Level of Control 
The RCEs are now able to deny longitudinal movement within close 
proximity of their enclaves. Large strike operations have raised the guerrilla's cost of 
maintaining operations, however, the limited duration of these operations means that only 
partial control of the riverine area can be claimed. 
I32CSW, USMC Colombian Riverine Program History, p. 1. 
'"Ibid., p. 8. 
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Compared to the previous case studies, this level of control is more feasible 
for the COLMAR to pursue. The cost/benefit ratio of partial area control is more 
economical than higher costs associated with complete area control. Although viewed as 
a small waterborne/land presence, the establishment of 15 strongpoints, within hostile 
territory, benefits the perception of legitimacy for the government of Colombia. This 
presence demonstrates the capacity to coerce the enemy who is compelled to either 
withdraw from the area or attack the intrusion. Lacking the expansive resources 
necessary to wage an extensive offensive riverine operation, which seeks control of the 
entire region, Colombia is relegated to devote available assets to establish partial area 
control, an economy of force measure. 
2.  The Elements of the Combat Process 
The following elements apply specifically to Operation "Black Gold." 
a. Command and Control 
Command and control of the riverine force is simplified when personnel 
and equipment belong to the same service. The COLMAR operates with other services 
and agencies when cooperation results in more favorable employment of the riverine 
force. The integration of the RCEs into the Colombian counterdrug strategy requires a 
strong radio connectivity between the various military and police units. Periodic lapses 
in radio communication between and among adjacent units proved detrimental to the 
overall operation. 
b. Firepower 
Since air support is not available, the COLMAR riverine force is totally 
dependent upon its own firepower. Until the arrival of a riverine assault craft with a 40- 
mm grenade launcher capability, this firepower is limited to the Piranha's .50 caliber and 
7.62-mm machine guns. Once the assault force is ashore, the primary firepower element 
is the individual marine armed with the U.S. M-14, 7.62mm rifle. Efforts are underway 
to obtain better individual and crew-served weapons. 
102 
c. Scouting 
Intelligence is the key to riverine counterdrug operations. The COLMAR 
has limited access to modern technological advancements and, therefore, human 
intelligence is still considered the most valuable asset at the tactical level. The unfamiliar 
and difficult terrain of the interior places a premium on the support of the local 
population. This became vital during the conduct of small unit operations. If the riverine 
forces did not have air cover, the potential for a guerrilla ambush or attack was great. 
To avoid a guerrilla attack the riverine force's intelligence gathering capability rests with 
the indigenous population. 
d. Antiscouting 
To ensure operational security during operation "Black Gold," a deception 
plan was devised to mislead the enemy and surrounding population. The increased 
training of the COLMAR was explained as a necessary precaution for the anticipated 
FARC "Black September Campaign," which called for the targeting of military posts. 
The marines attempted to deceive the enemy and convinced him that the riverine force 
was being deployed only to reinforce local military posts and not to stage any type of 
offensive operation. The use of commercial transport, such as the ferry, was an additional 
cover measure to achieve surprise. 
e. Screening 
Since air support is usually not available, the RCEs are dependent on 
organic assets for screening. The small size of the RCEs makes the requirement for 
stealth more critical in the absence of air cover and external fire support. The ambush 
of the RCEs at San Jose del Guaviare highlighted the importance of having a great 
volume of fire organically or immediately accessible. 
f. Maneuver 
The riverine force relies on the column formation when conducting assault 
operations. The river craft's shallow-draft and speed increased the areas a river force 
could penetrate. Although the RCEs are widely dispersed throughout the riverine area, 
the capability exists to quickly mass RCEs to conduct limited search and destroy 
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missions.   Operation "Black Gold" drew together several existing RCEs from different 
locations and trained several more to launch a strike operation. 
C.  THE ENEMY'S CAMPAIGN 
1. Objective 
The objective of the narco-guerrilla is to harass and disrupt the COLMAR's 
attempt to establish lateral control on selected waterways. Disrupting this control 
facilitates the trafficking of narcotics and the necessary precursor chemicals for drug 
production. 
2. Means 
The narco-guerrilla uses the riverine area of the Colombian interior to monatize 
its offensive insurgency. The interior is used to cultivate, process, and traffic narcotics 
which sustains the insurgency with financial support. The difficult terrain facilitates the 
conduct of ambushes and raids against the Colombian government attempts to gain 
control over the region. The FARC had demonstrated a riverine expertise for sustaining 
an insurgency and transporting narcotics and associated supplies along the network of 
waterways. Until the effective employment of the COLMAR riverine forces, the 
waterways in the interior were the FARC's roadways and lines of communications. 
3. Forces 
The FARC use units of various sizes to conduct their guerilla campaign and 
maintain drug production activities. The use of the ambush and raid prevail since the 
advent of the COLMAR riverine force within the interior. The local population is subject 
to terror to ensure loyalty to the guerrilla cause. The guerrillas have the capability to 
mount large scale operations against government forces. 
4. Level of Control 
Physical control of the entire riverine area is not necessary for the FARC to 
sustain both drug trafficking activities and the insurgency. However, intermittent 
longitudinal waterway movement along specific waterways is essential to conduct 
offensive operations, such as raids and ambushes.   Similarly, intermittent cross-water 
104 
movement is vital to transport war and drug processing supplies. This mobility depends 
on a detailed and intimate knowledge of the Colombian interior, which is resident in the 
indigenous population. The FARC's superior local knowledge has translated into a better 
intelligence (scouting) capability than that of the COLMAR. The people provide the 
essentials for sustainment of the insurgency: logistical support, recruits, and intelligence. 
These three necessary conditions depend on the FARC's ability to control the towns and 
villages. 
D.  THE ENEMY'S ELEMENTS OF THE COMBAT PROCESS 
1.  Counterforce 
The capacity to reduce the effect of the U.S military's firepower. The narco- 
guerrilla has created an effective counterforce by intelligent use of difficult terrain, 
guerrilla tactics, and Soviet/Cuban-made weapons. The synergism of these elements 
provide the necessary firepower to contest the assault tactics of the riverine forces in their 
efforts to establish a waterborne presence. 
a. Defensive Force 
The capacity to either destroy attacking weapons or defeat them by 
methods other than shooting them down. The narco-guerrilla has used the riverine terrain 
in the interior of Colombia for over forty years to avoid the superior firepower of 
government forces. The biggest threat to riverine forces are ambushes that are directed 
from the river banks. Rocket propelled grenades, mortars, automatic rifle, and machine 
gun fire are the predominant weapons encountered during an ambush. 
b. Staying Power 
The capacity to absorb damage and continue fighting with measurable 
effectiveness. After 40 years of guerrilla warfare, the FARC has enhanced its ability to 
wage a protracted insurgency by joining forces with the drug cartels. The so-called 
protection money has made it possible to procure quality war supplies. 
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c. Cover 
Secrecy, camouflage, or concealment to avoid attack. The narco-guerrillas 
are masters of the use of cover and concealment in military operations and in the covert 
cultivation and processing of the drug crop. Both drugs and weapons are covertly 
transported on the rivers with a wide variety of vessels. Use of clandestine airfields is 
a common practice of the narco-guerrillas. Air transport during the hours of darkness 
enhances the affect of this tactic. 
d. Deception 
Deliberate misrepresentation of reality to gain an advantage. The narco- 
guerrillas often used times of truce and negotiation to rebuild and reconstitute their 
combat potential and drug producing capability. 
e. Dispersion 
The displacement of units that carry force. The FARC uses the basic 
guerrilla tactics of operating in small units and massing only for limited strikes. Such 
tactics facilitate mounting large surprise attacks. If the attack fails, the FARC can quickly 
dismantle into small independent units and blend into the countryside. This fluid and 
flexible combat organizational structure has denied government forces to inflict large 
losses. 
2.  Antiscouting 
Actions taken to destroy, diminish, or preclude Colombian scouting effectiveness. 
The guerrillas make maximum use of the local population to provide early warning of an 
impending assault by government forces. The guerrillas have recognized that collaboration 
by the local population with government forces can jeopardize their operations. To guard 
against this, terror campaigns have been waged against whole towns and villages. 
Without a substantial presence of government forces, such campaigns have usually proven 
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effective. The access to electronic jamming, tapping, and interference equipment has 
brought an additional antiscouting advantage to the guerrilla.134 
3.  Command and Control Countermeasures 
Actions taken to defeat or delay the effectiveness of the enemy's command and 
control. An effective means of counter C2 is the specific targeting of command and 
control vessels. The FARC ambush personnel and supply transports to disrupt the 
command and control of the widely dispersed RCEs. These attacks also disrupt the lines 
of communication for commercial activities, which lessens the credibility of the 
government. As noted in connection with the guerrilla's antiscouting capability, access 
to electronic jamming equipment also facilitates a command and control countermeasure 
capability. 
E.  TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS 
Prior to the introduction of U.S. support, the narco-guerrilla had far better 
exploited the benefits of modern technology, including modern communications and 
commercial signal encryption. Due to budget constraints, the government forces were 
neither prepared, nor equipped to fight the high technology arms of the FARC.135 
Government weapons were no match to the guerrillas' AK-47 and M-16 assault rifles. 
The FARC's use of mortars and RPG-7s also indicates a well equipped enemy with 
money to buy the best. Additionally, the guerrillas use modem communication equipment 
to control widely dispersed units. Hijacked light aircraft provided the means to move 
personnel and supplies from one region to another. This capability gave the guerrillas a 
"flexible logistical apparatus."136 
'"Suzanne Bettina Danneskiold Lassen, "Drug Trafficking and Terrorism in Colombia," in Rubin, 
ed., The Politics of Counterterrorism: The Ordeal of Democratic States, p. 124. 
I35lbid., p. 124. 
'"Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narco Terrorism (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 83. 
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F.  CONCLUSIONS 
The threat posed to the United State's strategy by the narcotics trade led to U.S. 
Marine Corps involvement in Colombia. The Colombian Marine Corps had recognized 
the need to create a riverine force to gain and maintain control over its interior 
waterways, and requested the assistance of the U.S. Marines. The U.S. gave the 
Colombian Marine Corps the much needed resources and training to develop a capable 
riverine force to bring the war to the guerrilla in his riverine sanctuary. However, it took 
close to four years to create a combat force that had the potential to attack the narco- 
guerrilla's control of the inland waterways. Small unit riverine actions evolved into large 
scale operations that integrated river assault craft, helicopters, marines and the national 
police into a formidable counterdrug assault force. 
Unlike the previous two case studies, the U.S. and Colombian Marine Corps 
quickly moved beyond raids and into the more effective clear-and-hold strategy as its 
primary focus. This strategy rested on the combat potential of an effective riverine 
warfare capability both quantitatively and qualitatively. To support the strategy, the 
COLMAR now have 19 riverine combat elements on the strategic river lines of 
communications. Maintaining a credible waterborne presence, the COLMAR can conduct 
sustained riverine operations with the support of adjacent units. Until the procurement 
of a suitable assault craft with an enhanced firepower capability, the riverine force is 
restricted to limited search and destroy and patrolling operations. Control of the entire 
basin is far beyond the means employed, extensive though they are. These operations are 
harassing and disrupting the narco-guerrillas1 drug producing activities within selected 
regions of the interior with it is hoped, a demoralizing long term effect. The deployment 
of riverine combat elements to strongpoints (enclaves) in the interior has denied the 
enemy longitudinal use of the selected waterways. 
The guerrilla's firepower potential remains the biggest threat to the Colombian 
Marines' riverine operations in the interior. The narco-guerrilla in many instances 
possesses a far greater combat potential than that of the riverine force. Therefore, to 
pursue offensive operations beyond raids and the destruction of the guerrilla's resources, 
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the Colombian Marines must increase the firepower and survivability of the riverine force. 
Helicopter gunship support is the best means to support the lightly armed and protected 
riverine combat elements; however, such a capability is not readily available to the 
Colombian Marine Corps. Until the procurement of a suitable assault craft with 
enhanced firepower and survivability, the Colombian's clear and hold strategy remains 
contested. Instead, the riverine force is restricted to limited raids and patrolling operations 
in the vicinity of its strongpoints. This can only facilitate partial control of the riverine 
area along selected waterways. 
Following the establishment of these riverine enclaves, the COLMAR initiated 
limited search and destroy operations using combined air and waterborne assault forces 
to strike directly at the guerrillas ability to cultivate, produce, and transport cocaine. The 
primary objective was not the elimination of the guerrilla units, who provided the security 
for crop fields and processing plants. However, these operations do serve the purpose of 
harassing guerrilla activities in the area. Clear and hold operations and limited search and 
destroy missions have forced the FARC to contest the governments presence in the 
riverine area. Most likely, the FARC will be forced to increase its firepower potential 
and develop tactics such as mining, anti-air defense, and swimmers/sappers to inflict more 
casualties on the riverine force. The FARC has already demonstrated its capability to 
impose a heavy cost on the riverine forces. 
Success for either side in this ruthless "drug war" will be determined by the 
control of the key asset - the people. Control of the population will provide the recruits, 
supplies, and the intelligence to the side which can demonstrate the credible capacity to 
expand (or extend) control. The Colombian Marine riverine force is demonstrating that 
capacity.  In 1993, the RCEs conducted 137 major operations resulting in: 
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Labs destroyed 54 
HCL (processed cocaine) 1,371 kilos 
Base/Paste/Leaf captured 5,229 kilos 
Precursors (chemicals) 5,972 kilos 
Precursors (gasoline) 10,261 gals137 
This falls within the recent change in the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy. Shifting 
from drug interdiction missions, the U.S. is strongly encouraging the source nations to 
attack the drug problem by "destroying narco-trafficking organizations."138 Fortunately 
for Colombia, the efforts of the riverine force "demonstrates the strong political will" 
necessary for continuing U.S. assistance.139 
The recent activation of the Colombian Marine Corps Riverine School ensures the 
maintenance of the capability to effectively wage war on the inland waterways. Although 
there is no clear end in sight for the "drug war," combat operations against the guerrilla 
will continually test the COLMAR's ability to deliver its combat potential where needed 
in the riverine environment. The persistent delivery may ultimately demoralize the 
enemy, but as in operations at sea, the effects are less than obvious, slow, relentless, and 
cumulative. 
137CSW, USMC Columbian Riverine Program History, p. 14. 
l38The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, Washington, D.C., February 1994, p. 50. 
139 Ibid., p. 54. 
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V.  CONSTANTS AND TRENDS 
A.  OPPOSING STRATEGIES 
Riverine forces have been used to pursue two strategies in each case study. In the 
Seminole and Vietnam Wars, offensive strategies aimed at annihilation of the enemy 
through search and destroy operations were followed.140 It was envisioned that inflicting 
high enemy casualties would raise the costs of the war to the enemy to such a point that 
it would erode the morale and fighting spirit of the insurgent to maintain the fight. For 
their part, the guerrillas did not view the conflict in the same light. For the guerrilla, the 
war was not a zero sum game, but one of survival. Professor Larry E. Cable explains: 
. . . not correctly appreciated is the simple fact that once armed insurgency 
has commenced, it becomes the functional equivalent of a total war of 
national survival in which only one of the two contenders for power will 
be extant at war's end.141 
Either the guerrilla force would survive undominated by the riverine invader or it would 
die trying; a political compromise was not an option as long as a sanctuary existed for 
the guerrilla. Therefore, the United States could not impose a cost beyond the guerrilla's 
threshold of tolerance, since the guerrilla had more to lose than the major power. For the 
U.S., victory would only marginally add to its relative position in the world, whereas for 
the guerrilla victory was the only means to altering its position not only in the state, but 
in the world arena. Jacob Borresen makes a similar point in an albeit quite different 
contest, i.e. the struggle between a small and a large power: 
The small state may certainly win single battles, but cannot hope to win 
the war against a major power as long as the major power maintains his 
will to carry it on.   Instead, the aim of the small state is to bleed the 
l40Buker, p. 139-40. 
'■"Cable, "Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Peacekeeping Post 
Cold War," p. 32. 
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enemy's military and political resources, until he comes to the conclusion 
that the price of continuing the war exceeds any gain he might hope to 
reap from it. And in that context one or more tactical or operational 
victories may certainly come in handy for the small state. The point is, 
however, that it becomes more important to be able to maintain the 
pressure over time, than to be able to beat him in a spectacular 
confrontation head to head. As Clausewitz has taught us: War is primarily 
a struggle between wills.142 
The guerrilla views the war in the same context as a small state. Thus, its tactics will 
usually center on eroding the major power's desire by opposing its aim to gain political 
control. 
The second strategy used by U.S. riverine forces was to seize and hold vital 
positions. A "clear and hold" strategy centers on positioning a riverine force in a selected 
area to try and maintain a permanent presence in which to challenge the guerrilla's control 
of key territory. In Vietnam, riverine forces pursued such a strategy. The MRF was 
dedicated to the pacification of Kien Hoa Province for approximately one year. The 
guerrilla found such permanent presence of the MRF in key positions intolerable and was 
forced to attack them. Again, the guerrilla relied on the strategy of raising the cost to an 
unacceptable level for the riverine force. In Colombia, the USMC/USN trained 
COLMAR riverine force is pursuing a clear and hold strategy. Forces are divided into 19 
separate combat elements, which are deployed at specific sites along waterways that are 
considered strategic lines of communications. The goal is to control the waterways at and 
inside Colombia's borders.143 The ground force and national/local police are pursuing 
pacification operations in villages located next to the riverine force base areas. Such a 
strategy is challenging the guerrillas' traditional control over the population resources and 
communications.   It is forcing the FARC to attack the riverine force to maintain its 
M2Jacob Borresen, "Seapower: Theory and Practice," in The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 17 
(March 1994), p. 152. 
143CSW, USMC Colombian Riverine Program History, p. 1. 
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coercive credibility among the people.   The clear and hold strategy is recognized as a 
classic method for isolating guerrillas.144 
The execution of riverine warfare campaign strategies depended on the tactical 
skill of the commander, experience and training of the riverine force, and the available 
troops and equipment. The strategic aims of the riverine campaign were dependent upon 
the tactical proficiency of the riverine force. Each riverine strategy ultimately sought to 
gain and maintain control of the riverine area. Table 1 reviews the various levels of 
control, as prescribed in Hughes' Model, that a riverine force can attempt to achieve. 
Table 2 summarizes the level of control achieved by each riverine force in the three case 
studies by use of Hughes Model. Table 2 also shows that raiding (search and destroy) 
was ineffective in establishing control of the riverine area. Conversely, by establishing 
a sustained land and waterborne presence (clear and hold strategy) at selected, vital 
locations in the riverine area, the riverine force was effective in achieving partial control 
and imposing costly constraints on the enemy. The focus of this study, however, is the 
tactics used by the riverine force in achieving the objective of complete control of the 
riverine area. The following section presents the trends and constants of the riverine 
tactics developed against a guerrilla opponent. 
l44Joes, p.212.  Also, see Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of 
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Table 5.  Evaluation of Three Case Studies 
U.S. riverine warfare tactics have historically been tested in contests in which the 
United States faced "minor," guerrilla, powers. The following discussion focuses on the 
trends and constants of riverine tactics that have arisen from these conflicts. 
B.  THE TACTICAL TRENDS OF RIVERINE WARFARE 
1. Maneuver 
The trend has been the increasing speed of the riverine force's ability to maneuver. 
Faster craft, helicopter support, "real-time" encrypted communications, and improved 
navigation systems all contribute to a potential for quicker movement of combat elements. 
2. Firepower 
In general, firepower has increased in accuracy, range, and lethality. Trevor Dupuy 
in his study, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, traces the important trends of sea, 
air, and land warfare.   He attributes the apparent paradox between increased weapons 
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lethality and decreased casualty rates to the dispersion of forces in the face of more lethal 
firepower.145 How has this trend influenced riverine warfare? During the Seminole War, 
riverine forces relied on the infantryman to deliver firepower against the opponent. 
Attempts were made to place carronades on the barges, but the barge could not penetrate 
into the enemy's riverine sanctuary. Harney's decision to switch to the Colt rifle changed 
the advantage of firepower in favor of the U.S. riverine force. The Seminole warriors 
defended against the riverine force by fighting from defensive positions with smaller 
caliber rifled muskets. The defensive has been noted as the stronger of the two positions 
and the Indians mastered the art of fighting from defended positions in difficult terrain 
to limit the firepower advantage of the riverine force.146 
In the Mexican War and Civil War, riverine craft provided mobility to conduct 
operations against an enemy who relied on conventional tactics. The rivers were essential 
lines of communications. Such tactics led to engagements where the enemy directly 
contested the riverine force. During the Civil War, the Union Navy developed a wide 
array of weapons that were used by the riverine force. The monitor, ram, mortar barge, 
and gun boat all increased the firepower capacity that could be delivered against the 
opponent. The riverine force was able to support troops with firepower from the water, 
which proved effective not only against the opposing ground troops, but also against 
fortifications. But the deep draft of the larger boats still kept the riverine craft from 
plying the shallow waters, and thus the infantryman was still the primary means of 
bringing the battle to an opposing ground force in areas where the riverine craft could not 
penetrate. 
The Second Nicaraguan Intervention changed the means to deliver firepower against 
an opponent. The Marines used aircraft in support of riverine operations for the first time 
against Sandino's guerrilla force along the Coco River. Air delivered firepower became 
so important to USMC riverine operations that Captain Merrit A. ("Red Mike") Edson, 
,45Colonel Trevor Dupuy, U.S. Army, Ret., The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (New York: the 
Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc., 1980), pp. 309-310. 
M6Dupuy, p. 326. 
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USMC, declared that without air cover riverine operations should not be conducted. 
Although hindered by the mountainous topography, the slow flying biplanes were able to 
provide close air support with machine gun fire against the insurgents. The guerrillas 
responded to the new threat by developing tactics to shoot down the aircraft. Access to 
new technologies (i.e., modern machine guns) benefited Sandino's guerrilla force, and on 
several occasions the guerrillas were able to shoot down or severely damage aircraft by 
a concentration of machine gun fire. 
In Vietnam, firepower became all important for the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF). 
The terrain still constrained the riverine craft from penetrating into the shallower 
waterways, but the radio enabled a forward observer to direct the fire from aircraft, 
artillery, and riverine assault craft. The destructive power of the riverine force greatly 
increased with its ability to engage an enemy with indirect fire. The MRF became 
dependent on helicopter gunships to suppress enemy fire during offensive operations. 
In Colombia, the Marines learned the harsh lesson of operating in a riverine area 
without sufficient firepower to suppress enemy fire. A valuable lesson was relearned 
from the annihilation of two Colombian riverine combat elements. It was that a riverine 
force operating without air cover needs to increase its survivability by increasing both its 
suppressive fire capability and protection from enemy fire. 
The trend shows that riverine forces have increased the potential to deliver 
firepower against a guerrilla opponent even if the riverine craft cannot penetrate into the 
enemy's sanctuary. But effective firepower, especially for suppression of enemy fire and 
movement, is what counts in battle. The U.S. riverine warfare style focused on increasing 
its suppressive firepower capacity. Thus, the forward observer became the crucial link 
between the riverine force and its firepower. 
3.  Counterforce 
The capacity to reduce the effect of delivered firepower. The trend in counterforce 
is increased survivability of the riverine craft. Survivability was first achieved by way 
of stealth, cover and deception. In the Seminole War, the riverine force relied on cover 
and deception to avoid enemy detection while moving toward the objective; once engaged 
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in battle, it relied on firepower to defeat an opponent. Survivability shifted to armor and 
superior counterfire during the Civil War. The Union Navy's river fleet emphasized 
armor and increased mobile, afloat artillery to deliver firepower after being engaged by 
the enemy. This trend continued in the Vietnam War. The MRF traded deception, cover, 
and dispersion for survivability. The noise and distinct appearance of the riverine craft 
made it easy for the enemy to detect and avoid the MRF. The enemy relied on small 
arms, machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, recoilless rifles, and mines to assault the 
riverine force. In response, the MRF armored its craft. However, armor plating alone 
did not protect the riverine force against armor piercing ordnance. To fend off the new 
armor piercing ordnance, the riverine force used bar armor to pre-detonate the round 
before it struck the armor siding. This worked temporarily, but improved accuracy and 
lethality of shoulder-fired weapons still disabled river assault craft. Nevertheless, the 
MRF continued to rely on armor and counterforce over cover, deception, or dispersion. 
The Colombian riverine force relied on deception to achieve surprise, rather than speed 
of planning and movement. In addition, the Colombian rely on craft that are fast, 
shallow-drafted, and possess some firepower capability. If engaged, the riverine force 
returns fire to suppress the enemy's fire and then speedily exits the kill zone. However, 
the enemy has shown a tactical skill to select the most favorable opportunity to engage 
the riverine force. When the Colombians coordinated riverine operations with heliborne 
operations, the guerrillas were able to disperse. But when the riverine force operated 
without support, the FARC have been able to wreak havoc. 
Like the MRF after 1968, the Colombian riverine force dispersed its force in 19 
locations. Unlike in Vietnam, the Colombians do not have helicopters or supporting 
artillery to defend against an enemy attack. Once a guerrilla force engaged the MRF, air 
and artillery provided the supporting fire to increase its probability of surviving an enemy 
initiated fire fight, despite being dispersed. The Colombians do not have such a 
capability. 
The guerrilla goes to great lengths to avoid firepower. As demonstrated in the 
Seminole War, Vietnam, and Colombia, the enemy dispersed its force, relied on deception 
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by blending into physical and human terrain, and fought from fortified positions. These 
elements reduced the advantages of superior U.S. firepower. Such guerrilla tactics raised 
the cost of delivering effective firepower to kill the enemy. During the Vietnam War, 
estimates placed the cost of killing one VC guerrilla at $400,000 in expended ordnance. 
Since the enemy usually retained the element of surprise against riverine forces, it was 
necessary to increase firepower to overcome the disadvantage of enemy initiated fire 
fights. The increased firepower made it difficult for an enemy to sustain an attack against 
the riverine force. 
The guerrilla also sought to counter the system that was perceived to be its greatest 
threat, mainly the helicopter. The enemy considered the helicopter gunship to be the 
deadliest threat and its scouting and mobility to be a serious problem. Unconstrained by 
the geography of the riverine area, the helicopter could pursue the guerrilla into his 
sanctuaries. Helicopters were especially difficult to avoid once the guerrilla had been 
forced to vacate his concealed position. As a result, the VC trained to eliminate the low 
flying helicopter by concentrating automatic weapons fire in the flight path of the aircraft. 
The trend toward more lethal anti air weapons and their ready accessibility are 
aiding the guerrilla in defeating aircraft. The accuracy of shoulder fired surface-to-air 
munitions has increased the threat to aircraft operating in close support of all forces, 
including riverine forces, and even though helicopters have become more survivable to 
ground fire, they remain susceptible to shoulder-launched missile fire and concentrated 
heavy machine gun fire. 
4.   Scouting 
Scouting is the means to locate the enemy to deliver effective firepower. Scouting 
gathers information and reports it.14? Scouting is a process that consists of searching, 
detecting, and then targeting or avoiding the enemy. The trend in riverine operations has 
been an increased use of aircraft to locate enemy activity.    Although new sensor 
'Hughes, Fleet Tactics, p. 166. 
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technologies have drastically increased detection, search, and target capabilities since 
World War II, they have not been decisive in defeating the guerrilla. 
In the Seminole War, it was recognized that forays into the interior without a guide 
was useless for locating the enemy. The riverine force had to rely on information 
gathered from defectors and guides to locate the Indian camps. Another more subtle 
measure was to use friendly Creek Indians as spies to penetrate the Seminole camps to 
determine its strength and intentions. 
In the Vietnam War, the MRF gained most of its information from recently captured 
enemy troops, from VC who had rallied to the RVN side. When information was not 
available or if it was dated, the MRF still pursued operations into suspected enemy areas 
and relied on helicopter overflights to provide information so the riverine force would 
avoid enemy ambushes. Even so, the riverine force was often engaged by the enemy, 
who concealed their positions from the overflights. 
Scouting was also improved by the trend of decreased time to transmit information. 
The radio allowed for information to be relayed quickly to the riverine force commander, 
who could use it to reposition forces quickly and take advantage of a changed situation. 
The commander of the riverine force had to detect an enemy, then track his movement 
within an area before he could target him with available firepower. The radio increased 
the speed with which information flowed, and thus the speed at which information was 
relayed to maneuver elements involved in the operation. As experienced in Colombia, 
the guerrilla has enhanced his own command and control process through the access to 
the same communications technology as the COLMAR. 
The helicopter added a new dimension to riverine scouting. It allowed the riverine 
force to scout the countryside for enemy movement along the waterways, but was unable 
to detect the enemy in concealed positions or thick vegetation. Sensors were used to 
detect enemy movement in targeted areas, but it is difficult for sensors to determine friend 
from foe. The guerrilla recognized the threat and changed his tactics to operate in and 
around populated areas to avoid effective employment of sensors. Sensors did provide 
a means to alert the riverine force to movement in the areas they covered. 
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Today, the wide use of sensors (night vision devices, radar, motion detection 
devices, thermal imaging, etc.) has become common practice. Although they offer 
advantages, human intelligence still will be the predominate form of scouting to locate 
an enemy force. The introduction of aircraft to scout the riverine area provided 
information on the terrain and location of likely enemy areas, but do little in locating 
specific enemy positions or base areas. Thus, scouting against guerrilla opponents still 
requires the long-established practice of exploiting the local inhabitants, and ground 
reconnaissance. Without this information, the riverine force cannot deliver effective 
firepower. 
5.  Antiscouting 
Actions taken to destroy, diminish, or preclude U.S. scouting effectiveness. 
Measures to deny the guerrilla knowledge of riverine force dispositions is a continuing 
struggle in guerrilla wars. Since the guerrilla gains information through his local 
intelligence networks, he can use the network to track riverine force movement into his 
area and decide whether or not to engage the riverine force. The riverine force tried to 
overcome this problem by moving at night and relying on stealth and deception as 
practiced during the Seminole Indian War. In Vietnam, the noise of engine powered 
riverine assault craft easily gave away the position of the riverine force. Nevertheless, 
the MRF did not pursue cover, deception, or dispersion to foil the enemies scouting 
capabilities, but relied instead on speed of movement to limit the enemy's ability to 
exploit its information. 
The enemy relied on more subtle means to defeat the riverine forces' scouting 
capacity. During the day, he blended into the local village, and at night operated under 
the cover of darkness. He relied predominantly on stealth to avoid detection, and used 
cover and concealment to protect his positions and caches of supplies. Such measures 
prompted the riverine force to rely upon local intelligence to identify the enemy and 
locate his resources. Technology has yet to foil the guerrilla's tactic of blending into the 
population.   Only constabulary techniques can provide the information needed to target 
121 
the guerrillas in a village.   These techniques are dependent on the level of guerrilla 
control in a village.  As cited by Anthony Joes: 
In those districts officially declared under government control ("cleared"), 
the government may legitimately impose the severest penalties upon 
civilians who actively cooperate with the guerrillas. But in contested 
areas, where the government by definition is unable to guarantee the 
peasants physical security, civilian cooperation with the insurgents must be 
treated as a natural or at least pardonable phenomenon.148 
6.  Command and Control 
Command decides what is needed from forces. Control transforms the need into 
action.149 The major trend has been toward a unified operational command structure that 
exercises control over all elements assigned to a riverine operation. In the Seminole War, 
it took four years before LT McLaughlin established the Mosquito Fleet. The command 
structure evolved from coordinated operations between Army and Navy components to 
a unified command structure. Once LT McLaughlin had a functional command, he was 
able to direct the riverine force operations to support the land campaign plan without the 
need to request ad hoc support. Without the distraction of having to coordinate support, 
the Mosquito Fleet was able to launch more operations. 
During Vietnam, the MRF was not controlled by a unified command at the task 
force level. Instead, throughout its existence, the MRF had to coordinate each operation. 
Although the Navy established a close working relationship with the Army, the MRF still 
required seven to ten days to plan and implement an operation. More important, when 
the 9th Infantry Division gained the dedicated heliborne support of the 1st Air Cavalry, 
it decided to extract itself from riverine operations altogether. The Navy adjusted to the 
shift in Army support for riverine operations by establishing Task Force 194. Admiral 
Zumwalt and Captain Salzer recognized the importance of maintaining a riverine force, 
,48Joes, p. 213. 
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and incorporated the riverine assault craft into the SEA LORDS campaign. TF 194 turned 
out to be the closest thing to a unified task force that employed riverine force operations. 
Despite integration of the MRF into SEA LORDS, TF 194 was not able to secure 
dedicated ground and air elements. It still had to fight the battle of coordinating support 
for each operation. Nevertheless, TF 194 was able to integrate all naval elements from 
TF 115, 116, and 117 to create a more unified force for achieving its objectives. 
Strongly encouraged by the United States, the Colombians are moving toward a 
unified operational command structure for riverine operations. The Colombian Marine 
Corps has operational command of all riverine operations in the interior of the country, 
but lacks organic air support. They must therefore coordinate air support with the 
national police. 
Throughout, the time it has taken to establish a unified riverine task force command 
structure has remained the same: three years. Current U.S. riverine doctrine acknowledges 
that a unified command structure is more effective than coordinating operations in 
controlling riverine operations. Current doctrine calls for a single commander to be 
assigned operational control over sea, air and ground elements conducting riverine 
operations: 
The objective in organizing for riverine operations is the formation of a 
fully integrated combined arms force specifically tailored to provide the 
necessary mobility, unity of effort, and fire superiority to achieve the 
assigned task.150 
Another trend has been the increase in the span of tactical control that a commander 
can exercise over his riverine forces engaged in combat. In the Seminole War, the 
ground commander positioned himself well forward to direct the actions of the riverine 
force. Overall control was exercised through preplanned actions and verbal or written 
commands delivered by messengers, and, during the engagements, subordinates relied on 
the commander's intent as a guide to their actions.   Thus a great deal of control was 
^Proposed Joint PUB 3-06:  Doctrine for Joint Riverine Operations, May 1994, p. II-4. 
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delegated to subordinate officers when the force was divided or dispersed during an 
operation. 
In Vietnam, the wireless radio entered the scene, and the control function changed. 
A riverine force commander could relay commands to each subordinate element while 
remaining off the battle field. Additionally, the subordinates transmitted vital information 
to the commander enabling the latter to reposition forces rather than delegating such a 
decision. The MRF commander relied on radio nets to allow the to allocate supporting 
fire to the unit that needed it the most. The airborne command post played a crucial role 
in riverine force battles. It remained above the chaos and confusion of the engagement 
the better to locate the enemy and reposition forces. 
The enemy used various command and control countermeasures against the MRF. 
Captured documents showed that the VC had penetrated the radio net and could monitor 
message traffic. Espionage and penetration of allied forces proved troublesome to U.S. 
operational security. The guerrilla today has access to more sophisticated equipment and 
may rely on such measures to detect riverine force operational plans and tactics. The 
U.S. shifted to encrypted radio communications, but at a cost. The encryption reduced 
the range of radio transmissions and required all units to follow a communications plan 
to ensure that codes and call signs were changed at the same time to avoid loss of 
communications. The net effect is that the enemy has always developed measures to 
impede riverine force command and control functions. 
The trend toward encrypted communications has provided a more secure means of 
communications for U.S. riverine forces, but poses problems for combined operations. 
When working with foreign militaries, the compatibility of encrypted radios will prove 
to be a problem. 
Overall, control of the riverine force has become more complex as a commander 
tries to coordinate movement of ground, air, and waterborne elements and take advantage 
of potential for speedier communications and movements. The rate that information flows 
into a command post can overwhelm a commander who must orchestrate the battle. 
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C.  THE TACTICAL CONSTANTS OF RIVERINE WARFARE 
1.  Maneuver 
History has shown that the purpose of maneuver has been to establish a superior 
fighting position.151 The constant has been the riverine force's use of tactical maneuver 
to fix the enemy in a position so effective fire can be directed against him. In the initial 
stages of each riverine campaign, each time the United States first employed riverine 
forces in an offensive strategy to search out and destroy the enemy. Search and destroy 
operations centered on the tactic of maneuvering riverine forces into a position so that 
maxim firepower could be delivered against an enemy force. The primary goal of the 
riverine force was to immobilize the guerrilla whereupon firepower could be used to 
destroy him. Firepower was conceived to be the predominant means of defeating the 
enemy in battle. 
Only after search and destroy operations became ineffective in eliminating guerrilla 
units did the riverine forces shift to a strategy of sustained operations in areas deemed to 
be vital to the enemy, in other words, clear and hold operations. By holding vital areas 
in the riverine environment, the riverine force drew the enemy to attack him. When the 
guerrilla attempted to contest control, the riverine force had the advantage of fighting 
from a defensive posture in familiar terrain, and could direct its superior firepower 
potential against the exposed guerrilla unit. 
2.  Firepower 
Suppressive fire remains the one great constant that riverine forces have pursued 
since the Seminole War. Riverine forces that attempted to penetrate guerrilla sanctuaries 
usually came under enemy fire before the opponent could be detected the enemy. 
Therefore, riverine forces in the Seminole War, Vietnam War, and the current Colombian 
anti-drug campaign have striven to increase their suppressive fire potential relative to the 
guerrilla's. In the Seminole War, Lieutenants Powell and McLaughlin pushed for heavier 
weapons: carronades to be placed on board barges and schooners.  Attempts were made 
'Hughes, Fleet Tactics, p. 176. 
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to attach 4-pounders to the canoes. Suppressive fire capabilities reached their peak with 
the MRF. The organic firepower of the river assault craft exceeded anything previously 
used by a riverine force. In addition, the MRF added artillery and helicopter gunships. 
The COLMAR are currently in the process of deciding on how to increase their firepower 
capacity. The near annihilation of two riverine force elements spurred the Colombian 
Marines to conduct more large unit operations with added firepower to overcome the 
guerrillas' ability to deliver firepower first. Riverine forces without the capability to 
deliver suppressive firepower will be unable to operate in guerrilla controlled areas, unless 
they improve their scouting and stealth capabilities. 
In Vietnam, as in other more conventional wars, the tendency was to overestimate 
the effectiveness of riverine craft firepower against an enemy position ashore. The 
effectiveness of riverine weapons was brought into question after two friendly fire 
incidents on 4 December 1967 and 8 May 1968. In the first incident a company of U.S. 
infantry were along a river bank in a nipa and coconut grove. The vegetation was thick 
and provided concealment for unit. A Riverine Assault Division mistook the soldiers for 
the enemy and opened up with all weapons including a flamethrower from a zippo. 
Despite prolonged and intense fire, not a single soldier was scratched. In the second 
incident, the troops were in a tree line with no ground growth. The riverine craft fired 
from ideal conditions and at close range but did not inflict a single casualty upon the U.S. 
ground troops. Reports from VC defectors confirmed that few casualties were attributable 
to the fire of riverine craft.152 This suggests that the anticipated lethality of the firepower 
possessed by the riverine force will continue to fall short of its expected capability to 
produce enemy dead. 
3.  Counterforce 
Emphasis on means of survivability has been a major constant for the riverine force. 
This is because of a greater unwillingness to take casualties in the riverine force than in 
the guerrilla force. Survivability was pursued by increasing the river assault crafts' 
2Friedman, p. 340. 
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protection (armor), speed, or firepower potential. Defending against the aforementioned 
trend of increased enemy firepower was a serious problem in Vietnam and is a current 
one in Colombia. In Vietnam, the lethality of armor piecing rounds and mines threatened 
the MRF's ability to move along the waterways, and much effort was expended to 
improve the survivability of riverine assault craft that were often caught in ambushes at 
close range. Most enemy-initiated engagements occurred within 50 yards, demanding 
heavy reliance on armor plating and counterfire. Water mines led the MRF to attempt 
counter mine tactics, which never overcame the threat. 
The effort to protect riverine craft from such weapons continues unabated. The 
Colombian riverine force does not have the resources to develop a fleet of armored 
riverine craft. Used instead are high speed, shallow-draft, and low profile boats to evade 
enemy firepower. The Colombians recognize the operational limitations of the riverine 
combat elements in conducting offensive operations. To overcome this limitation the 
riverine force has increased its firepower potential by adding heliborne assault troops and 
more riverine combat elements to pursue large scale offensive operations. 
Guerrillas use the terrain to limit the effectiveness of superior firepower. They 
disperse their force, construct fortifications for protection, use concealment, and rely on 
stealthy movement to avoid detection. These actions have combined to reduce the 
riverine forces' firepower advantage. 
4.  Scouting 
Timely and accurate scouting remains the first step in an effective riverine warfare 
campaign. Human intelligence was and still is the primary means to gather information 
on guerrilla activities in the riverine area. Essential to fighting guerrillas has been the 
ability to exploit information from captured enemy, defectors, or the local people. 
Humint was highlighted in the riverine campaigns in the Seminole and Vietnam Wars, 
and it is equally important in Colombia. Each time an operation was launched without 
current information on the enemy's disposition, the riverine force encountered either an 
abandoned position or was caught in an ambush. 
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In Vietnam, helicopters became a new means of scouting in search and destroy 
missions. The helicopter has been useful in directing the ground force when it became 
engaged, but it has generally failed to detect well-concealed enemy positions or enemy 
movement under the cover of jungle canopy or forested areas as to prevent ambush.. 
In clear and hold operations scouting was directed to move safely to holding 
positions and then detect enemy activity against the dispersed riverine force elements. 
In every campaign, information from the people and indigenous military allowed the 
riverine force to develop the same warfare tactics used by the enemy. Technology has led 
to improved sensors, but has not eliminated the requirement for human intelligence. 
Information gained from the local people is still the most valuable means to gain 
knowledge on the enemy's situation and intentions. Without it, the riverine force has little 
chance of avoiding enemy ambushes, sabotage, evasion and harassing tactics. Scouting 
capacity will continue to be a factor in riverine warfare co-equal in importance with 
firepower. 
5.   Command and Control and C2 Countermeasures 
A constant in riverine warfare has been the lack of a unified task force commander 
at the outset of hostilities. In the Seminole War, initial operations began with the Army 
and Navy coordinating operations. It was not until the Mosquito Fleet was formed that 
a unified task force commander gained tactical control over all riverine force assets and 
personnel. In Vietnam, the MRF never developed a unified command that exercised 
tactical control over both the Army and Navy ground, air and water borne forces. 
Instead, the MRF relied on a cooperative relationship between its component 
commanders. SEALORDS prompted the Navy to create TF 194. The commander of TF 
194 was essentially the closest that the Navy came to a unified force under a single 
operational commander. CTF 194 controlled elements from three naval task forces and 
the riverine forces assigned to it, but still had to beg for air and ground support. In each 
instance, the lack of a unified command complicated and delayed operations by the 
riverine force.   Especially in the modern scenario of fighting jointly, a riverine force 
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commander will have no excuse for not gaining control over air, ground, and river forces 
to prosecute a campaign. 
An interesting constant of successful operations has been the proclivity to maintain 
control through column formations. The constrained waterways dictate that a column is 
the practicable way to progress up a river. The riverine force tries to maintain unit 
integrity during movement to the objective area through such measures. Nevertheless, as 
a result, a large riverine force formation loses tactical concentration. The column 
forewarns an enemy of a riverine force's movement. Because, a powered column 
formation of almost any size is easily heard. 
D.  SUMMARY OF TACTICAL TRENDS AND CONSTANTS 
1.  Summary of Trends in Riverine Warfare Against a Guerrilla Opponent 
*Riverine forces have increasingly pursued weapons that deliver a rapid rate of fire 
to suppress enemy fire. Volume of fire has steadily replaced weapons capable of accurate 
fire. 
The lethal potential of firepower in riverine warfare has substantially increased 
(shoulder-held guided SAMs rapid fire weapons, armor piercing ordnance, portable rocket 
propelled grenades, command detonated mines, etc.). 
The increased lethality of firepower has been to the advantage of the guerrilla. 
The consequences of an increase make it more hazardous to err in riverine warfare 
because the risk of destructive attack by a guerrilla force has increased. The advances 
in weapons lethality have outpaced the technological advancements in riverine craft 
survivability. 
*Due to the increasing combat potential of the guerrilla, resupply of strongpoints 
requires additional means of delivery besides the sole reliance on the waterways, but air 
resupply will also be made risky by guerrillas.. 
*Deception has become increasingly more important in offensive riverine operations. 
Technological innovations (internal combustion engines, communications, etc.) have made 
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riverine craft noisier, enabling the enemy to detect approaching forces from a greater 
distance. 
* Staying power was centered on survivability of riverine craft (armor plating, bar 
armor, increased organic firepower) up through the Vietnam War. Currently, speed and 
firepower have replaced the emphasis placed on armor as the means to survive enemy 
firepower and probably stealth (quiet engines) in the future.. 
* Supporting arms have increased the firepower capacity of riverine forces. Longer 
range of firepower potential (artillery and airpower) has allowed the riverine force to 
concentrate more suppressive firepower against an enemy force. 
* Sensor technology has increased the potential of riverine forces to operate at night 
and in poorly charted waters. Nevertheless, traditional scouting techniques that rely on 
human intelligence are essential for maintaining the initiative. 
The speed of electronic communications has increased the commanders' direct 
control over all units engaged in riverine operations. 
The speed of tactical maneuver has increased in riverine operations. In force on 
force engagements, riverine forces relied on canoes and foot movement to envelop an 
enemy as seen in the Everglades. By the time of the Vietnam War, riverine forces often 
used helicopters to vertically insert or reposition troops in battle to engage an enemy in 
place. In Colombia, shallow-draft craft and speed have increased the mobility of riverine 
elements to penetrate into the narrower and shallower waterways, increasing the ability 
to maneuver forces. Although not widely used helicopters still remain a means to 
maneuver forces. 
* Airpower (helicopters gunships) added a new dimension to riverine warfare. The 
riverine force was able to deploy smaller elements, since air delivered fire support 
increased its firepower potential. 
The duration of a riverine force operation has decreased. The trend has been an 
increase in the frequency of shorter duration operations. (In the Seminole War, riverine 
forces conducted a single waterborne operation for sixty days. In Vietnam, riverine force 
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operations did not exceed four days in the field, but more were conducted. In Colombia 
riverine operations have not extended over two days for a single mission). 
2.  Summary of Constants in Riverine Warfare Against a Guerrilla 
Opponent 
* Guerrillas attempt to separate the riverine force from its indirect fire support by 
engaging at close range. 
*By relying on deception and cover, the guerrilla seldom presents the riverine force 
an opportunity to maximize its firepower potential. 
The guerrilla has access to modern weapons. 
The guerrilla exploits the advantages of a riverine area to protract a conflict where 
water networks are accompanied by dense foliage. 
* Maneuver in riverine warfare has remained constrained by terrain. 
* Riverine warfare has regrettably been misapplied in the attempt at the outset to 
destroy an opponent rather than pursue control of the waterways and the riverine territory. 
* Complete control of a riverine area has not been achieved against a guerrilla 
opponent. The massive force required has made an objective of complete control too 
costly to pursue. 
The U.S. has tended to try to use riverine forces for the purpose of exploiting the 
waterways to deliver firepower against a guerrilla force and his base areas, generally with 
poor results. 
The enemy has consistently initiated nearly all of the majority of engagements. 
* Riverine forces rely on firepower over cover and deception to fight against a 
guerrilla force. 
* Search and destroy operations have never been effective in achieving control over 
a riverine area. 
*Despite the increased lethality of firepower, firepower remains less effective than 
expected in destroying the enemy. In Vietnam War the use of artillery, waterborne fire, 
grenades, and air delivered ordnance did not destroy the enemy as expected. The enemy 
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used the terrain and vegetation to protect itself from overwhelming firepower. It required 
the infantryman to apply close and direct fire onto an enemy position to destroy him. 
* Coordinated operations between the naval and military components of a riverine 
force require more time to develop a plan and conduct an operation than integrated 
riverine forces under one operational commander, yet the former command setup has been 
the initial structure. 
* Scouting has always relied on human intelligence when fighting a guerrilla force 
for the critical information. Technology has not changed this decisive factor. New means 
have only marginally increased the effectiveness of operations. 
* Deception remains a constant practice by guerrilla forces to hinder riverine force 
operations (blending into the population, using feints to distract riverine assaults, and 
providing false information through the local people). 
*To succeed, the guerrilla must achieve tactical surprise in offensive operations. 
E.  OPPOSING TACTICS:  RAIDING VERSUS STRONGPOINTS 
Two riverine strategies to achieve control over a riverine environment have been 
pursued by riverine forces. The first, search and destroy, is the employment of a riverine 
force to launch a campaign consisting of raids to eliminate the opposing force. Against 
a guerrilla, raiding tactics that support such a strategy require extensive intelligence 
gathering activities in order to be effective. Scouting is essential. In 1906 Colonel C. 
E. Callwell authored Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers based on his 
experience in guerrilla warfare.  Callwell noted: 
Guerrilla warfare means that the regular troops are spread about a hostile 
country where all their movements can be watched by the enemy and 
where their camps are full of spies. Experience proves that partisan 
leaders can seldom be trusted, and that in all dealings with them great 
circumspection is essential... Such conditions call for a very efficient and 
watchful secret service for a trustworthy corps of spies and for a wide 
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awake police, with a capable intelligence department controlling the 
whole.153 
Scouting remains the first essential element of guerrilla warfare. As seen in each case 
study, the guerrilla has retained the initiative when the riverine force did not have an 
effective scouting capability. 
Raiding tactics were also noted for their ineffectiveness to gain control. Attempting 
to eliminate the guerrilla by raids did little more than to harass their operations in the 
riverine area. Raiding, when successful, produces temporary demoralization of the enemy 
in a selected area of the riverine environment. Complete area control requires a 
demoralization of the enemy by way of a persistent waterborne presence, with the 
capability to sustain raiding operations throughout the riverine sanctuary. Partial control 
is an objective that reflects economy of force measures. Establishing strongpoints in the 
riverine area at selected sites is analogous to the "oil spot" theory of counterinsurgency. 
Strongpoints increase the people's perception of the government's legitimacy; it highlights 
the capability to contest the guerrilla's dominance within a selected region. Once it is 
recognized that the government can contest the guerrilla's control, an environment is 
established that will facilitate the defection of indigenous people from the guerrilla to the 
government. Defense of strongpoints and sustaining the ability to launch limited raids 
are essential to gaining limited control. The absence of a capability to repel an enemy's 
attacks against every stronghold will result in the failure of the overall campaign. This 
capability is dependent on an effective firepower potential and scouting that incorporates 
the indigenous population. In Colombia, the riverine force has established a network of 
strongpoints along the vital waterways in the country with the object of denying the 
enemy longitudinal movement. Although the strategy of denying enemy movement along 
the waterways is in its incipient phase, the riverine force has forced the FARC to contest 
COLMAR's use of the waterways. As a result, the riverine force has changed the nature 
'"Colonel C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: A Tactical textbook for Imperial Soldiers (Novato, CA: 
Presidio Press, 1990), p. 144.  Reprint of original 1906 edition. 
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of the conflict. With sufficient scouting and firepower capabilities, the riverine force can 
solidify its control of the strategic waterways and impede the activities of the guerrillas 
around its strongpoints. 
F.  CONCLUSION 
The mobile river force is an essential element to implant and sustain strongpoints 
in a riverine environment. Without a mobile force, the enemy will remain uncontested 
in his sanctuary. The riverine force, in combination with river forces, increases a 
country's capability to fight in a riverine area. Although complete control against a 
guerrilla opponent would be an almost unprecedented outcome of a riverine warfare 
campaign, partial control is achievable that imposes severe penalties on the enemy 
disproportionate to the riverine forces commitment.. Partial control of an area will 
establish a base from which a government can work on improving its legitimacy. 
However, without the coercive power to sustain a strongpoint a guerrilla force can contest 
the governments political and military control in the riverine area. Therefore, 
practitioners of riverine warfare must recognize that when fighting against a guerrilla 
opponent the preferred tactic of establishing strongpoints is the stronger of the two tactics. 
Once a strongpoint is sustained, the riverine force can maintain pressure in the vicinity 
of its influence through limited raids and patrols. 
134 
VI.  DISPELLING THE STYGIAN MYTH 
A.  PRESENT RIVERINE FORCE 
It has taken a wartime requirement to regenerate a riverine warfare capability in 
the U.S. military arsenal. As it prepared to train the Colombian Marine Corps to fight 
the drug war, the U.S. Marine Corps recognizes its own deficiency in the conduct of 
riverine warfare: 
The lack of a deployable, active duty brown water capability, however; 
means the U.S. lacks a capability to provide competent trainers, useful 
material, and tested, effective doctrine to assist our allies in brown water 
riverine environments.154 
All that remained of the large riverine force that was developed during the Vietnam War 
was relegated to the Naval Reserve, and was not sufficient to provide a "deployable 
capability, [and] a source of competent trainers, tested doctrine, and proven material 
assets."155 
Riverine operations are envisioned to impact more upon Third World countries 
exposed to "low intensity" hostilities. Within these conflicts, the "land-water interface" 
is the principle terrain feature. To seize this key terrain, a riverine force is required to 
conduct denial and river control operations. In 1990, the Navy and Marine Corps were 
capable of conducting small boat operations to surveil and interdict hostile forces. 
However, the Naval Services did not have a capacity to "completely control riverine lines 
of communications and contiguous terrain."156 
''"Headquarters, United States Marine Corps,  SO/LIC INFORMATION PAPER, SUBJECT: 
COMPARATIVE RIVERINE TASKINGS AND CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, 26 March 1990. 
'"Ibid., p. 2. 
,56Ibid., p. 3. 
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In 1987, the Commanding General of Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic, Alfred M. 
Gray, recognized the need to develop a riverine capability. He directed the procurement 
of Rigid Raiding Craft (RCA) to augment the Combat Rubber Raider Craft (CRRS) 
deployed with the Marine Amphibious Units. Recognizing the limitations of this riverine 
force, Gray, now the Corps' Commandant, directed the Service to achieve an enhanced 
riverine warfare capability. This was in response to the request by the Commander in 
Chief Southern Command (COMSOCOM) for the Marine Corps to take the lead in 
riverine operations in Colombia. The following chronology highlights the evolution of the 
Marine riverine force capability: 
1987-   LTGEN Gray orders procurement of Rigid Raiding Craft (REC) for Battalion 
Landing Teams deploying with Marine Amphibious Units (MAU) 
1987-   REC augments Combat Rubber Raider Craft deployed on MAU 
1989- Marine Corps purchases prototype Riverine Assault Craft (RAC) 
1990- RAC Platoon formed from elements of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 
Second Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 
1992-   RAC Platoon consolidated with Small Boat Platoon to form Small Craft Company 
1992-   RAC Platoon conducts training in Central America, South America, United States 
1994-    Small Craft Company supports 2d MARDIV during Exercise "Agile Provider-94" 
"Agile Provider-94" was the first large scale exercise in which a mobile riverine 
force supported a division's combat and security operations in a riverine environment. 
The 6th Marine Regiment, supported by the small craft unit, was designated the Mobile 
Riverine Force (MRF).  It demonstrated the following mission capabilities: 
-Troop Transport -Armed Escort 
-Reconnaissance -Direct Fire Support 








One such mission required the MRP to seize, occupy and defend an objective in order to 
establish a workable Forward Support Base (FSB). From this FSB, the MRF was to 
conduct subsequent operations up river.157 The FSB can be envisioned as a strongpoint 
for establishing a land/waterborne presence. This can facilitate the gaining of partial 
control of the riverine area. 
The current riverine force capability for the Marine Corps consists of one Small 
Craft Company, comprised of 67 18-foot Boston Whaler Rigid Raider Craft, 14 35-foot 
Riverine Assault Craft, and 90 15-foot Zodiac Combat Rubber Raid Craft.158 The 
company is organized into a headquarters platoon, maintenance platoon, two riverine 
assault platoons, and one raiding craft platoon. The unit is manned by seven officers and 
133 enlisted personnel, including four U.S. Navy corpsman. It is capable of providing 
a "single wave" lift capability for 380 marines. The primary weapon systems are the 
.50cal and Mk 19 40-mm machine guns, mounted aboard the riverine assault craft. 
In 1990, the required operational capability (ROC) for a riverine assault craft 
included the following requirement to support Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 
riverine operations in low intensity conflicts: 
. . .interdicting the flow of narcotics and precursor chemicals in 
conjunction with host nation forces; denying free use of river systems to 
hostile forces; protecting friendly lines of communication; establishing and 
maintaining complete control of a riverine area; evacuating noncombatants 
from a permissive or nonpermissive riverine area; conducting peacekeeping 
or stability operations in a riverine area; and/or conducting limited 
objective operations, such as raids or seizures. . . .159 
'"Frag Order 025-94 (AGILE PROVIDER - 94; FSB Establishment), Mission Statement. 
158CAPT Michael Walker, USMC, Small Craft Company, 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, NC, 
phone interview by authors, 1 December 1994, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
'"Commanding General, MCCDC, REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (ROC) FOR A 
RIVERINE ASSAULT CRAFT (RAC), 1 NOVEMBER 1990. 
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B.  WHAT IS THE STYGIAN MYTH? 
The belief that a riverine force, regardless of size, can achieve "complete control 
of the riverine area" against an unconventional opponent has prevailed up to the present 
day. The case studies reveal that absolute control has not been obtainable even at the cost 
of unleashing the black hell of total war. The sole exception of gaining complete control 
in the history of U.S. riverine operations took place during the American Civil War. The 
opportunity to use the full potential of riverine forces against defending Confederate 
positions provided the Union with area control, but at a grave cost in personnel and 
resources. The ruthlessness of waging riverine warfare against the guerrilla is just as 
destructive, if not more so, due to the propensity to involve innocent noncombatants. The 
U.S. military style of attritional warfare continues to favor a reliance on strategies of 
search and destroy. However, raiding strategies have not been effective in demoralizing 
the will of the enemy. The seizing and holding of strongpoints in the enemy's riverine 
sanctuary has prompted more favorable results. The clear and hold strategies take the 
initiative away from the guerrilla, and force either withdrawal or attack. The riverine 
force must have a fire power potential that can thwart the expected lethality of the enemy 
with a discriminative effect that reduces collateral damage to the contiguous population 
and natural resources. 
C.  WHAT CAN THE NAVAL SERVICES OFFER? 
No single service, except the nascent Navy and Marines Corps riverine team, 
possesses the requisite forces tasked and equipped to conduct area control operations at 
level four in the riverine environment.160 The naval services together can provide a means 
to pursue the integrated riverine tactics necessary to establish partial control.    The 
l60Hughes' Model defines level four as gaining temporary control of longitudinal and cross-waterway 
movement in the riverine environment. 
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contributions of each naval component are essential to impose a serious cost on the 
enemy that is large compared with the burden on our side. 
The Navy's contributions are threefold: the safe projection of the riverine forces 
into the area of operations; the denial of enemy movement on the waterways, and the 
sustainment of operations through "the delivery of goods and services." Specifically, the 
unconventional riverine capability is resident within the Naval Special Warfare 
community and fulfills the following roles: scouting, limited raids, and command and 
control countermeasures. These functions can provide the necessary advantages for 
establishing partial control. Partial control requires a commitment of riverine forces 
sufficient to implant and sustain a waterborne/land presence at strategically critical 
locations. 
The Marine Corps has a riverine capability that can conduct operations to achieve 
partial control of a riverine area. The capability to seize and hold vital strongpoints along 
strategic waterways is dependent upon the integration of the combat potential of both 
naval components. The Navy and Marine Corps forces, working as a team, are best 
suited to dominate an enemy who is capable of waging a ruthless and protracted guerrilla 
war, the most likely type of future conflict. 
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